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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Modern-day computers are the result of a fast-paced and sometimes unpredictable
evolution. The twentieth century saw the term applied to wildly different devices,
from massive number-crunchers like the ENIAC, which filled an entire room and
weighted thirty tons, to portable laptop computers that could fit in a backpack and
be lifted with one hand. The advances in technology that allowed for computers to
be shrunk in size also made them more affordable, making them a ubiquitous pres-
ence in the home and at the office. Furthermore, the continued miniaturization of
processing units has given rise to embedded systems, just as powerful as personal
computers of a few years ago. These special-purpose computer systems can be
found anywhere from mobile phones to kitchen appliances and it is not unreason-
able to think that their numbers will increase in coming years. In the same way as
the widespread use of personal computers prompted the development of computer
networks (such as the Internet), we can envision that the ubiquitous presence of
powerful embedded devices will lead to the desire to network them and harness
their collective power to create innovative applications.
Personal computers are often networked by means of a fixed infrastructure
of routers and switches. In the physical world, copper and fiber optic cables are
needed to connect all these devices together. With the advent of portable, mobile
devices, this type of connectivity becomes a limitation, leading to the use of the
wireless spectrum to connect to the infrastructure. We can view this as a wire-
less extension to the wired network rather than an autonomous wireless network.
Purely wireless networks, unable to rely on the services provided by the infras-
tructure, face their own particular challenges. Chiefly among them is the need to
self-organize in order to carry out a task. In this dissertation, we focus on purely
wireless networks and, specifically, on how to disseminate information effectively
and efficiently in these types of networks.
Devices capable of wireless communication run the gamut from powerful lap-
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tops to simple wireless sensor nodes. As can be expected, different types of de-
vices are used with different objectives in mind. Nevertheless, in order to form
self-reliant autonomous networks, these devices need to communicate using ro-
bust distributed algorithms. The characteristics of the wireless medium (limited
range of the radios, unreliable communication, dynamic topologies) complicate
the use of centralized solutions for anything other than small deployments. While
centralized solutions might work well in a small setting (such as a group of users
with laptops in a coffeeshop), we envision that the ubiquity of wireless embedded
systems will lead to the possibility of having large-scale wireless networks in the
order of thousands of nodes. For these networks, centralized administration would
be anything but trivial.
The choice of a communication model for large-scale wireless environments is
largely influenced by the characteristics of the medium itself, namely the limited
range of the radios, unreliable communication and dynamic topologies. These
three aspects suggest that the chosen communication model should have certain
characteristics:
• Robustness Given the unreliable nature of the communication channel and
the nodes themselves, the network should not depend on the presence of any
one node to carry out a desired task. It is a desirable property that the net-
work can continue to operate effectively under adverse conditions such as
sudden decreases in membership (which could be caused by nodes moving
out of range or nodes running out of power) or degradation of the communi-
cation channel (due to congestion or interference). Graceful degradation of
the network operation under unexpected network changes should be a goal
and intrinsic to the chosen communication model.
• Scalability Unless the network is deployed in a controlled environment, it
is not easy to predict the form that it will take. The number of participants
may vary over time and, with potentially thousands of participants, it is
desirable for the network to be able to handle large numbers of participants
regardless of the way they are arranged (very sparsely or physically close).
This suggests the need for algorithms that impose a fixed load on each node
which should remain unaffected with regard to the size of the network.1
• Locality Key to achieving a scalable network is the ability of nodes to carry
out their tasks using only locally available information. As neighborhoods
are defined by physical proximity, communication within a neighborhood is
1In this dissertation, we assume that the nodes in our networks are similar in terms of compu-
tational power, storage space and energy consumption. For heterogeneous networks, where some
nodes may be considerably more powerful than others, having a load distribution proportional to
the nodes’ capabilities may be more appropriate.
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bound to be more reliable and immediate than communication with distant
nodes. Given that we envision the creation of very large networks, it is cru-
cial that a node does not rely on feedback from nodes outside its immediate
neighborhood.
1.1. DRAWING INSPIRATION FROM NATURE
A fundamental problem in wireless environments is efficient information dis-
semination. Although this might seem trivial in a small network, complications
arise when dealing with very large deployments. As pointed out in [Ni et al.
1999], plain flooding is guaranteed to cause congestion in the medium leading to
poor communication. While structured approaches, like building multicast trees
and overlays, have been proposed to alleviate the problem, we argue that these
approaches are too fragile, especially for large systems. In a wireless setting, a
single node failure could invalidate several paths. A route repair algorithm would
then be triggered. This approach is acceptable in a wired setting, where the topol-
ogy of the network is fairly stable and the communication overhead for repairing
the structure is low. On the other hand, wireless environments are prone to expe-
riencing failures and disconnections which could turn into a continuous cycle of
build/break/repair steps. Additionally, the cost per node for maintaining a struc-
ture can increase with the size of the network, for example, when optimal struc-
tures, such as a shortest-path tree, are desired. In cases like these, a link failure
may have far-reaching implications, as a large number of nodes may have to be
updated in order to repair the structure. While a structured approach could be suit-
able for a small deployment (tens of nodes), large wireless networks require more
robust solutions.
The challenges presented by wireless environments can be tackled by drawing
inspiration from nature. Biological systems composed of large numbers of ele-
ments regularly organize themselves to achieve a task without a central authority.
These systems (e.g., a collection of cells or a population of organisms) are fully
distributed, adaptive to changing conditions, resilient to failures of individual ele-
ments, and based on local interactions. By devising algorithms inspired by nature,
we can obtain these useful properties for free and, at the same time, be assured that
our solution has been tested and proven to be successful over generations. In this
work, we take a cue from epidemic theory to tackle the information dissemination
problem in wireless environments.
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1.2. GOSSIPING IN WIRED NETWORKS
Epidemic techniques were first introduced into the realm of distributed sys-
tems in the pioneering work of [Demers et al. 1987] in the late 80’s. As part of the
Clearing House project, an epidemic protocol was used to remove inconsistencies
in tables in wide-area database systems. Since then, popularity of epidemic proto-
cols in the distributed systems domain has flourished. In addition to their elegant
simplicity, the appeal of epidemic protocols lies in the fact that they can be easily
implemented in a fully decentralized way and exhibit desirable properties, namely
reliability, robustness and scalability.
In most of the current literature, the terms gossip and epidemics are generally
used interchangeably. Formally, gossiping is a subgroup of epidemic protocols.
Analogous to rumor spreading in real life, gossiping means that a rumor is spread
when entities interact. This interaction occurs at random and each time the rumor
is communicated, the receiving entity will spread it further with a certain probabil-
ity. This results in the rumor being spread rapidly, but without any hard guarantees
that it will reach all entities. In computer systems, the definition of gossip is not
as clear [Costa et al. 2007]. Prototypical characteristics of a gossip protocol in-
clude: random peer selection, periodic execution and symmetry (meaning that the
same algorithm is executed by all nodes). However, variations based on these
characteristics have been developed according to the specific goal of the protocol.
Since their introduction into the domain of distributed systems, a wealth of
work in epidemic protocols has been produced. The majority of this work has
been designed with traditional wired networks in mind, in part fueled by the rise
in popularity of peer-to-peer applications. Like wireless networks, peer-to-peer
networks can be highly dynamic. Due to their unpredictable nature, an unstruc-
tured communication model like gossip is an appealing solution and has been
successfully applied to problems ranging from overlay construction and mainte-
nance [Jelasity et al. 2003; Voulgaris et al. 2005] to membership management
[Jelasity et al. 2004] and aggregation [Jelasity and Montresor 2004; Montresor
et al. 2004].
1.3. GOSSIPING IN WIRELESS ENVIRONMENTS
Given the successful experiences in applying epidemic techniques to tackle
a variety of problems in wired networks, it is not surprising that these principles
were soon applied to the wireless domain. It can be argued that epidemic commu-
nication is a natural fit for wireless networks, where information can be exchanged
only between nodes within physical proximity, resembling the way information is
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disseminated through social interactions. Like in social networks, nodes in a wire-
less network may join and leave frequently, and often unpredictably, resulting in
dynamic network topologies. As a consequence, the delivery of a message to a
particular destination might only be possible with the intervention of other nodes
as intermediaries. While there might be several paths to the destination, the most
optimal path might not always be evident without up-to-date knowledge of the
topology and network conditions. The complications of obtaining this informa-
tion, especially as the network grows, makes an epidemic approach appealing, in
that nodes proactively spread the message through several paths leading to a high
probability of it reaching the destination.
Early work on applying epidemics in wireless environments concentrated on
broadcasting. Delivering a message to all nodes in the network can be achieved
easily through flooding, where each node that receives the message for the first
time rebroadcasts it to its neighbors. As demonstrated in [Ni et al. 1999], plain
flooding can be specially troublesome in wireless environments, bringing upon
problems with redundant broadcasts, contention and collisions. The authors cat-
egorize the possible solutions to these problems as probabilistic, counter-based,
distance-based, location-based and cluster-based schemes. Probabilistic flood-
ing schemes, where nodes rebroadcast a message after receiving it for the first
time with a certain retransmission probability, result in an epidemic spread of the
message. In their landmark paper [Haas et al. 2002], Haas and colleagues used
an epidemic (or gossip-based) approach for the dissemination of routing mes-
sages, showing that gossiping can use up to 35% fewer messages than flooding.
They also demonstrated that there is a value for the retransmission probability
that roughly determines whether a message is delivered to almost all the nodes or
dies out. This bimodal behavior when using epidemics for broadcasting was also
studied in [Sasson et al. 2003] and has been exploited to achieve reliable broad-
cast in wireless networks [Wang et al. 2005]. More recent work [Drabkin et al.
2007] shows that, by adding deterministic correction actions to the probabilistic
dissemination and using node density to adjust the retransmission probability, high
delivery rates can be achieved and selfish and malicious behavior can be handled
as well.
Besides broadcast flooding, gossiping has been applied to a variety of other
areas, such as reliable multicast [Luo et al. 2003] and information dissemina-
tion [Khelil et al. 2002; Datta et al. 2004]. Anonymous Gossip, one of the earliest
works on gossip-based multicast for ad hoc networks, improves the reliability of
the underlying best-effort multicast protocol (MAODV [Royer and Perkins 1999])
by using gossip to recover missing messages. By contrast, Route Driven Gos-
sip [Luo et al. 2003] uses a purely gossip-based approach to multicasting, relying
solely on a basic unicast routing protocol, e.g., Dynamic Source Routing (DSR),
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being available. Autonomous Gossiping [Datta et al. 2004] uses gossip to update
node profiles. These profiles are used to decide whether data items should be kept,
replicated or migrated to another node with a more suitable profile. In the area of
wireless sensor networks, Heinzelman and colleagues [Heinzelman et al. 1999]
studied gossiping and flooding for information dissemination and compared them
against their own dissemination protocol, which relies upon meta-data negotia-
tions to reduce redundant data transmissions.
A concrete application area where gossiping shows promising results is code
propagation. Updating software code in resource-constraint wireless sensor net-
works is a specially daunting challenge. Given that a deployed sensor network is
expected to operate for long periods of time, updating the code that nodes run may
be required. While this might be easily achieved in a small network, with increas-
ing network size and the inclusion of mobile nodes the problem becomes more
complex. Recognizing the need for fully decentralized and robust algorithms for
code propagation, Trickle [Levis et al. 2004] and, more recently, GCP [Busnel
et al. 2007] use gossip-based dissemination to deliver software updates.
1.4. RESEARCH GOALS
In this dissertation, we explore themes related to the use of epidemic tech-
niques in wireless networks. Despite the similarities between peer-to-peer net-
works and wireless networks, wireless networks display peculiar characteristics
stemming from the communication medium and the limitations of most mobile,
portable or embedded devices. Because of this, the analysis of epidemic algo-
rithms in wired networks does not necessarily hold for wireless environments.
Wired networks offer a variety of services that are taken for granted by system
designers, for instance naming and routing. A variety of projects to bring basic
services to wireless networks have been undertaken over the years, but standard
methods are still not widely agreed on. The wide variety of wireless platforms,
with their varying capabilities and limitations, suggests that a one-size-fits-all so-
lution is unlikely. With this in mind, the work presented in this dissertation focuses
on minimalistic epidemic protocols that rely solely on local interactions.
In particular, we focus on the problem of information dissemination, as it is
a basic service that serves as a building block for other services (e.g., code prop-
agation or building routing tables). The wireless medium introduces a variety of
obstacles that complicate the dissemination of data. As mentioned earlier, unpre-
dictable topology changes make structures hard to maintain. Mobility and node
failures may even cause temporary partitioning of the network. Links between
nodes are not always reliable. For these reasons, the dissemination of informa-
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tion is not just a matter of getting the information from a central repository or
even flooding the network. This becomes more apparent as we consider increas-
ingly larger networks. Successful dissemination of information in a wireless en-
vironment calls for the collaboration of the nodes in the network in a distributed
manner. We believe that gossip protocols are a natural fit for disseminating data
over large-scale wireless networks and can overcome the problems posed by their
unpredictable behavior.
The particular research questions we address are the following:
How would a gossip protocol inspired by peer-to-peer behave in a
wireless environment and to what extent would the switch from a
wired to a wireless environment affect the desired properties of the
protocol?
When it comes to wireless environments, the limited communication range of
radios restricts the randomness of the peer with which a node can gossip. Intu-
itively, we can infer that this alone will cause an epidemic algorithm to perform
differently in wireless environments compared to wired ones. However, the effect
that restricted connectivity (dictated by geographical proximity) will have on the
emergent properties of the protocol cannot be easily predicted.
As a first step in our study of epidemic protocols, we propose a gossip protocol
inspired by Cyclon [Voulgaris et al. 2005], a gossip protocol used for membership
management in wired networks. While Cyclon gossips the addresses of nodes
to maintain an overlay with the properties of a random graph, we use a similar
mechanism to disseminate data items (instead of node addresses) through the net-
work. We analyze the characteristics of the dissemination, scalability with respect
to data items in the network, and resilience to failures.
Can the emergent behavior of the protocol be explained through
formal analysis?
In order to observe a protocol’s particular characteristics, two paths can be fol-
lowed: a testbed deployment or a simulation study. The testbed approach has
the benefit of providing a realistic experience, using the real wireless medium in-
stead of a model and requiring the protocol to be tailored for use in actual nodes
with specific resource constraints. On the downside, building a testbed can be
expensive and, for this reason, testbeds are often small (tens of nodes). In ad-
dition, once the testbed is deployed, making changes may be cumbersome and
time-consuming. Using simulations, the protocol can be tested in very large net-
works and making topology changes becomes trivial.
Due to their probabilistic nature, the characteristic behavior of an epidemic
protocol cannot be easily predicted during the design phase. In order to discover
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the trademark properties of an epidemic protocol, large networks (where trends
can be observed) are needed. Simulations allow us to execute our epidemic proto-
cols in large networks and easily change parameters and settings. However, even
though simulations allow us to discover emergent behavior, we cannot be sure that
the protocol will continue to exhibit the observed characteristics under a different
set of parameters and settings. Moreover, the relationship between the parameters
can only be inferred, but not proven.
We believe that formal analysis of the interactions between two gossiping
nodes can provide insight into the mechanics behind the emerging behavior of
epidemic protocols, shedding some light into the relationship between system pa-
rameters and ultimately enabling us to predict behavior and (hopefully) even shape
it to obtain the desired results.
What are appropriate counter measures against misbehaving or
faulty nodes when gossiping in wireless networks?
A fundamental property of gossip protocols is symmetry, which suggests that all
nodes in the network are acting in good faith by executing the exact same protocol.
In other words, there is implicit trust in the interaction between a node and its
neighbor. This raises questions such as what would happen if this trust is broken
and can a gossiping network remain in operation in the presence of malicious
nodes?
The problem of malicious peers in a gossiping peer-to-peer network has proven
to be complex and seriously damaging. In a wired network, nodes can resort to
contacting a trusted party if they suspect that a neighbor is not conforming to
the specified protocol [Jesi et al. 2006]. However, nodes in a wireless network,
restricted to communicate only with their nearby neighbors, do not have this ad-
vantage. The wireless environment calls for local decision-making when tackling
such a problem. We test the severity of an attack by malicious nodes compromis-
ing the integrity of the data items being disseminated and, in light of the devas-
tating results, we propose the use of probabilistic verification of messages. Addi-
tionally, we propose measures for detecting and, ultimately, isolating nodes that
deviate from the expected behavior.
To what extent can we obtain the same emergent behavior of a gos-
sip protocol with a broadcast-based probabilistic communication
model?
Random peer selection is a defining characteristic of gossip protocols, as imple-
mented in wired networks. While it is possible to randomly select a neighbor to
gossip with in a wireless environment, the wireless medium is naturally suited for
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broadcast communication. Broadcasting, as opposed to point-to-point communi-
cation, does not require continuous neighbor discovery or for nodes to have unique
ids. Once a message is sent, the recipients are determined by the link quality to
the source at the moment of transmission. The simplicity of a broadcast-based
protocol is appealing as it lowers the requirements on the wireless platform. A
broadcast-based protocol can therefore be easily implemented for use in the most
simple resource-constrained nodes.
The move from a push/pull gossip protocol to a broadcast-based protocol that
retains the same emergent properties requires that the probabilistic behavior be
shifted from the peer selection to the data management at the receiving node. The
challenge of data management at reception lies in the fact that the incoming traffic
that a node will receive is proportional to the number of neighbors it has, while
the outgoing data that the node can send stays the same. This imbalance between
the amount of incoming and outgoing traffic opens the door for experimentation
in data management strategies.
1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
At first instance, the ideas put forward in this dissertation are evaluated using
an experimental approach. Given that we are interested in the emergent proper-
ties of gossip protocols in large wireless networks, we test and validate our ideas
through large-scale simulations. After gaining a thorough understanding of the
observed behavior through experimentation, we attempt to describe the behavior
of the protocols through theoretical analysis.
For the experimental part of our work, two simulation environments were
used: Peersim [PeerSim 2008] and TOSSIM [Levis et al. 2003]. Peersim is
an event-based simulator developed for the testing of peer-to-peer protocols in
large-scale settings. In order to simulate wireless communication, we tailored our
Peersim environment to create neighborhoods according to radio range. In other
words, nodes are able to communicate only with nodes within a specified radio
range (modeled as a disk). Peersim allowed us to explore multi-hop communi-
cation and its effect on the speed of data dissemination. Later on, the need to
explore the effect of a more realistic radio model led us to use TOSSIM (short for
TinyOS SIMulator). Using TOSSIM, a theoretical propagation model is applied
to a physical layout of nodes providing a more realistic model of radio commu-
nication. As a consequence, the experimental results obtained using TOSSIM are
closer to what we would expect from a large-scale deployment in real life.
The theoretical part of our work consists of modeling gossip protocols using
Markov chains. The model is validated by comparing the results with a battery
10 INTRODUCTION CHAP. 1
of simulation experiments showing that, statistically, the model reproduces the
behavior of the protocol. In addition, specific properties observed in large-scale
data dissemination experiments are modeled and contrasted against simulations.
1.6. OUTLINE AND CONTRIBUTION
The following list presents the forthcoming chapters of this dissertation and
summarizes their contribution.
Chapter 2 — The Shuffle Protocol Chapter 2 introduces the shuffle protocol, a
gossip protocol for information dissemination in wireless mesh networks.
In the spirit of peer-to-peer, the shuffle protocol follows a push/pull model
in the same vein as Cyclon [Voulgaris et al. 2005]. We propose the use
of the shuffle protocol to build a fully decentralized news service which is
shown to be scalable and resilient to failures.
Chapter 3 — Modeling of the Shuffle Protocol - This chapter delves into a prob-
abilistic analysis of the interactions between gossiping nodes executing the
shuffle protocol. We develop a model of the interactions and show, through
an extensive simulation study, that the model can faithfully reproduce the
characteristic behavior of the dissemination of a data item. A closer look
at the model reveals the precise relationships between system parameters,
which we use to find optimal values for the parameters of the protocol.
Chapter 4 — Canning Spam - Building on the gossip-based shuffle protocol,
Chapter 4 explores the implications of trusting neighboring peers blindly.
After observing the damage that can be done by just a few malicious nodes
in the network, we implement probabilistic security measures to curtail the
negative effects of malicious behavior and provide a basic level of data in-
tegrity.
Chapter 5 — Enforcing Data Integrity - This chapter follows along the path set
by Chapter 4 and presents an adaptive method for applying integrity checks
with the goal of having stronger security measures when exchanging data
with a suspicious node. After successfully proving that security measures
can be adjusted according to the threat posed by a neighbor, we introduce a
method for identifying and isolating misbehaving nodes.
Chapter 6 — Broadcast-based Epidemics - Radio communication is inherently
broadcast-based. With this in mind, we move away from point-to-point
communication in favor of a broadcast-based model while attempting to re-
tain the useful properties of the shuffle protocol. In this chapter, we present
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SharedState, a protocol for probabilistic replication of data items. In addi-
tion, we propose a technique for reducing unnecessary communication in
order to optimize the conservation of resources.
To conclude, Chapter 7 presents a discussion about the challenges encountered
during the development of the epidemic protocols introduced in this dissertation.
From this discussion, we draw out the lessons we have learned regarding the na-
ture of gossiping in wireless networks and delineate possible directions of future
research.
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CHAPTER 2
The Shuffle Protocol
The widespread acceptance of Internet technology has made it easier than ever
to interconnect computers from all over the world, opening the doors to the cre-
ation of large ad hoc networks. The appearance of the first peer-to-peer applica-
tions proved that large numbers of computers could indeed create a network of
collaborating peers. Those first successes sparked great interest in the deploy-
ment of truly large-scale distributed systems and also brought to light a major
challenge: finding robust and scalable decentralized algorithms. Algorithms with
those characteristics are needed to ensure that the network can add and lose nodes
organically without much impact to its performance and that its operation is not
compromised by the failure of any single node. Epidemic protocols are inherently
distributed, scalable and have proven to be robust enough to handle the constant
coming-and-going of nodes. As an added benefit, they are very simple and easy
to implement. For these reasons, they have been used in recent years to tackle a
variety of problems, such as membership management [Jelasity et al. 2004] and
aggregation [Jelasity and Montresor 2004; Montresor et al. 2004].
Wireless ad hoc networks share many characteristics with these internet-based
peer-to-peer networks. Unexpected failures, constant or sudden changes in mem-
bership and unreliable links, all contribute to creating dynamic, unpredictable
topologies. Like peer-to-peer networks, wireless ad hoc networks require robust,
scalable algorithms that can tolerate these problems. Given that epidemic pro-
tocols have been successfully used to build services in large-scale peer-to-peer
networks, in this first chapter we explore using the same principles in a wireless
environment.
We gather inspiration from Cyclon [Jelasity et al. 2004], a membership man-
agement protocol based on random gossiping. In Cyclon, each node keeps a small
list of node addresses. By periodically exchanging a subset of its node addresses
with a node from the list, each node is able to update its list, such that the over-
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lay graph created by the links between each node and the addresses in its list has
the characteristics of a random graph. As a result, by taking part in the Cyclon
gossiping any node can easily join and become part of the peer-to-peer overlay.
In this work, we address the fundamental problem of information dissemina-
tion. Cyclon, like many gossip protocols, is essentially used for data dissemina-
tion. In particular, it takes care of disseminating node addresses to keep the over-
lay connected. In a wireless environment, connectivity is dictated by the physical
proximity between nodes. Communicating with a node that is outside of radio
range is therefore more expensive, as it requires multiple hops. Without cheap
routing, maintaining a Cyclon overlay in a wireless environment would be pro-
hibitively expensive. Instead, we use the principles of the Cyclon data exchange
to disseminate data items through the wireless network. The choice of nodes to
gossip with in a wireless network is restricted to a node’s nearby neighbors, but as
long as the physical network is not partitioned, random gossip with nearby neigh-
bors should result in epidemic dissemination of items through the network. This
chapter studies the characteristics of this dissemination under the assumption of a
stable wireless mesh network.
2.1. INTRODUCTION
As advances in wireless networking continue, we are gradually seeing a shift
in which distributed (middleware) systems are moving from wired networks to
heterogeneous or completely wireless systems. Notably, wireless mesh networks
[Akyildiz et al. 2005] offer the facilities to quickly and cheaply set up a networking
infrastructure that can easily span the size of a city. From a distributed systems
perspective, the challenge lies in providing services that can hide the inherent
unreliable nature of the underlying infrastructure. This unreliability is caused by
failing links and a relatively high rate of joining and leaving nodes (purposefully
or unintentionally), which continuously affect the topology of the network.
This instability requires that we seek new solutions to well-known problems.
As a step in that direction, we are exploring how gossiping protocols can help in
the construction of highly robust services. In this chapter, we consider the problem
of providing a news service that runs entirely on a wireless mesh network. This
service provides mobile users news items that are of interest to them. In our
approach, we assume that a user, by means of a PDA or a similar small device,
can connect to an access point (i.e., a router) of a wireless mesh network. When
connected, the user can read news items as if accessing a central database where
all items are stored. Using content-based filtering, for example by means of SQL-
like queries, only the items of interest will be delivered.
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The problem we address can best be described as setting up a simple, self-
configuring news service in a mesh network, under the condition that it be fully
decentralized. The reasons for avoiding a centralized implementation are, in a
way, related to the nature of mesh networks. Wireless mesh networks are based on
the principle of cooperation between routers, most notably exemplified by routers
forwarding packets on behalf of other nodes. With that in mind, we want to steer
away from a centralized solution where one node is solely responsible for the
availability of the service. A decentralized solution effectively divides the work-
load (and responsibility) among the collection of nodes providing the service, al-
lowing us to sidestep issues that may arise from having a single point of failure
and single ownership of the service. We outline the requirements for a successful
implementation of our distributed news service as follows:
• Ease of deployment A collection of nodes should be able to start providing
the service with minimal configuration. Nodes should be able to join the
system without going through complicated bootstrapping mechanisms. In
essence, we desire to have a decentralized system where nodes can start
making a contribution to the service as soon as they are operational.
• Minimal requirements Contributing to the service should not be a burden
to the nodes in the mesh network. Memory and computational requirements
should be small enough to allow any router to be part of the service. No
powerful nodes are expected to be in place for high-performance tasks.
• Robustness The system should be minimally affected by nodes joining and
leaving the network. Moreover, recovery from significant changes in mem-
bership should be prompt.
• Scalability The service should be able to perform adequately in the face of
increasing number of nodes and news items being published.
• Effectiveness When an item is published, it should be made available to the
interested users in a timely manner.
We expect to meet these requirements by having the routers in the mesh back-
bone exchange news items using the epidemic protocol we introduce in Sec-
tion 2.3. Epidemic (or gossip-based) techniques have proved to be a robust, ef-
ficient, and scalable solution for disseminating information in peer-to-peer net-
works [Demers et al. 1987; Birman 2003; Jelasity et al. 2004]. Aside from the
robustness and scalability inherent to gossiping, the protocol we present is char-
acterized by simple, independent one-to-one interactions. The simplicity of this
approach allows any router willing to participate in the service to start contributing
as soon as they come in contact with a router that is already providing the service.
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By basing our solution on gossiping, we expect to be less vulnerable to topology
changes.
Our main contribution is that we embrace the unpredictable nature of wireless
networks and attempt to use this to our advantage by implementing a gossip-based
solution. Our approach skews deterministic routing in favor of probabilistic de-
livery of news. As a result, we can deliver a scalable and robust service with
predictable behavior for large-scale deployments.
2.2. SYSTEM MODEL
The service we propose is provided by a mesh backbone composed of a large
number of wireless routers. Users running the news service are able to publish
events, which we call news items, of interest to other users. These users carry
around clients, which are portable devices capable of connecting to the mesh back-
bone to retrieve news items. Essentially, the clients poll the routers for news items
matching the interests of users. By specifying their preferences in advance and
using them for filtering, users are able to receive in their portable devices only
relevant news items.
When initially contacting a mesh router, clients are expected to send a filter to
be used to identify the items of interest to the user. As long as the client maintains
a connection to the router, it will receive updates whenever new items that match
the users interests are received. Filtering is done at the router to avoid excessive
communication with the client devices, which may have limited power supplies.
Filters are not propagated through the network.
2.2.1. Assumptions
We assume the presence of a large collection of mesh routers forming a mesh
backbone. These mesh routers are not mobile and, as a whole, provide coverage
for an extensive geographical area. As part of the fixed infrastructure, they do
not have strict constraints on power consumption. We expect these routers to
have a dedicated amount of memory space to be used for storing news items.
These caches will be updated periodically using the gossip protocol described in
Section 2.3.
News items are propagated through the network in the form of news entries.
While a news item is a piece of information, a news entry is the representation
of the news item in the network and for each news item several news entries may
exist. The dissemination of news entries is done primarily within the mesh back-
bone. Each router can communicate wirelessly with the routers within its range.
These routers are called its neighbors. A unique id is associated with each router.
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The entries that a router inserts into the network can be uniquely identified by a
combination of the router id and a sequence number. In its most basic form, a
news entry contains a unique id, a timestamp and a time-to-live. There may be
other fields of information depending on the application. A limited number of
these entries can be stored by each router in its local cache. In our experiments,
the size of the cache is defined by the parameter c, which is the same for all
routers. The storage capacity of the network as a whole is then N× c, where N is
the number of routers in the network. Routers in the network gossip periodically,
exchanging the entries in their caches. We define a round as a gossiping interval
in which each router initiates an exchange once.
The clients in our system are, for the most part, portable devices, such as
phones, laptops or PDAs. These devices have limited power supplies and, for that
reason, do not participate actively in the dissemination of news items. They do,
however, engage in communication with the routers to be updated on news events.
2.2.2. Application Description
To illustrate the usefulness of the service, we propose a possible application sce-
nario: advertising in a shopping center where products on sale need to be pro-
moted. In this scenario, routers could be located at any other shop. Some routers
may already be in place for use as hotspots or as part of a store’s accounting sys-
tem. As computers have become prevalent in business environments, we do not
expect lack of infrastructure to be a major obstacle for the deployment of the mesh
network. With the mesh network in place, news items advertising products would
be disseminated through the mesh network and be picked up by the mobile devices
that customers carry.
News entries have a limited lifetime. After this time period expires, the in-
formation they carry is no longer valuable to clients and should be flushed from
the network. Going back to our example, the lifetime of entries could relate to the
time period when a sale is effective (for example, drink at a discount price during
lunch time).
At any point in time, a router will have a partial view of the complete set
of news items in its cache. We do not expect each router to store all items. In-
stead, each router will devote a fixed amount of memory to store entries it dis-
covers through communication with other routers. Periodically, this view will be
refreshed with different news entries. According to the interests that customers
have expressed when contacting a router, their mobile clients will be updated with
relevant advertisements.
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/*** Active thread ***/ /*** Passive thread ***/
// Runs every T time units // Runs when contacted
Q = selectPeer() receive buff recv from any P
buff send = selectItemsToSend() buff send = selectItemsToSend()
send buff send to Q send buff send to P
receive buff recv from Q cache = selectItemsToKeep()
cache = selectItemsToKeep()
(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: Skeleton of an epidemic protocol.
2.3. SHUFFLE PROTOCOL
When a router participates in a gossip exchange, it assumes either an active or
a passive role. Each router initiates an exchange once per round. We refer to the
router that initiates the exchange as the active one, while the one that is contacted
assumes the passive role.
The data exchange between routers follows a predefined structure. Figure 2.1
shows the skeleton of the push-pull epidemic protocol we use for communication
within the mesh backbone. Three methods represent the core of the protocol:
selectPeer(),selectItemsToSend()and selectItemsToKeep().
By implementing different policies in these methods, various epidemic protocols,
each with its own distinctive characteristics, can be instantiated.
Based on the structure shown in Figure 2.1, we introduce an epidemic protocol
we call shuffle. The shuffle protocol is characterized by avoiding the loss of data
during an exchange. It achieves this by establishing an agreement between peers
that each peer will keep the entries received from the other after the exchange
takes place. We will elaborate on the details of the exchange later on.
The shuffle protocol is partly based on a peer-to-peer protocol used for han-
dling flash crowds [Stavrou et al. 2004], which we recently enhanced in order
to maintain unstructured overlays that share important properties with random
graphs [Voulgaris et al. 2005]. The most important observation to make is that
any two nodes that engage in a shuffle essentially swap a number of entries. In
doing so, they not only preserve the data that are collectively stored in the network,
but also “move” these data around in a seemingly random fashion. The underly-
ing idea is that by randomly shuffling data entries between nodes, all nodes will
be able to see all news items eventually.
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2.3.1. Protocol Policies
In the shuffle protocol, each node agrees to keep the entries received from a neigh-
bor for the next round. This might seem trivial, but given the limited storage space
available in each node, keeping the entries received during an exchange implies
discarding some entries that the node has in its cache. By picking the entries to
be discarded from the ones that have been sent to the neighbor, we ensure the
conservation of data in the network. The policies are summarized as follows:
Method Description
selectPeer() Select a neighbor randomly
selectItemsToSend() Randomly select s entries from the local
cache.
Send a copy of those entries to the selected
peer.
selectItemsToKeep() Add received entries to the local cache.
Remove repeated items.
If the number of entries exceeds c, remove
entries among the ones that were previously
sent until the cache contains c entries.
2.3.2. Simulation Setup
In order to observe the behavior of the protocol in large-scale settings, a series
of simulations was conducted. We have learned from earlier studies of other epi-
demic protocols [Voulgaris and van Steen 2003] that the results from emulations
running in a cluster of hundreds of nodes yield strikingly similar results to simu-
lation results when observing large-scale behavior. While these results were ob-
tained for a wired environment, we have also conducted practical experiments with
deployments of up to 100 gossiping nodes [Mandemaker 2008]. We observed that
the dissemination of a data item through the network shows similar characteristics
to the dissemination observed in simulations, which we view as an encouraging
sign that simulation is a useful tool to capture the major properties of a gossip
protocol.
The simulations in this chapter use the unit disc graph model, where nodes
can only communicate with their neighbors located within a fixed communication
range. Even though our simulations use this simple model (and unrealistic) model
of the physical layer, they allow us to gain some insight into the behavior of the
protocol by exploring a variety of scenarios with a large number of nodes. More
realistic simulations1 would restrict our ability to explore the design space with
1TOSSIM (the TinyOS simulator) is an example of a simulator that provides a more realistic
MAC layer and radio model. We use TOSSIM in Chapter 6 for networks of up to 900 nodes.
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very large networks. For this reasons, we decided to study the behavior of the
protocol presented in this chapter through extensive high-level simulations of very
large networks.
The results presented in this section correspond to a network of 10000 nodes
with a cache size of c, which may vary in different experiments. Two types of
topologies were used in the experiments:
• Grid topology The nodes were set up in a square grid topology, with 100
nodes on each side over an area of 100 × 100 units. Two cases were ex-
plored: (a) the range of each node was set to 1 unit, making communication
possible with the node’s immediate neighbors to the North, South, East and
West. On average, each node had 3.96 neighbors (due to the effect of bound-
ary nodes with less than 4 neighbors); (b) the range of each node was set to
2 units, making communication with 12 immediate neighbors.
• Random topology The nodes were placed randomly in a square area of 100
× 100 units. Nodes were allowed to reach neighbors within a range of 2
units, which was enough to guarantee that each node had at least one neigh-
bor and that a path between any two nodes existed. The average number of
neighbors for each node was 12.19.
Both topologies were used to study the behavior of the protocols. The ex-
periments that we conducted focused on two characteristics observed during the
execution of each epidemic protocol (a) the replication of items in the network
and (b) the time required to reach all the nodes in the network.
2.3.3. Properties
To understand the behavior of the protocol, we focus on the way a single news
entry traverses the network. At first instance, a news entry is inserted into the
network by a router. Subsequently, the entry takes a step (moves to the cache of
another router) whenever the router that currently holds the entry participates in an
exchange. For every execution of the protocol, the next step of the entry is chosen
randomly. As a consequence, the path followed by an individual entry consists
of a series of random steps. This behavior is analogous to a random walk in the
space defined by the mesh network.
Additionally, as an entry moves from router to router, there is a chance that it
will be replicated in the caches of the routers it has passed through, given that there
was space available. It follows that a news item may have several news entries in
the network at the same time. For that reason, when referring to an item in the
network we are actually referring to all news entries that represent that news item.
These entries have the same id. In the next sections we study the way these entries
are replicated through the network.
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Distribution of Storage Capacity
Let us first consider how different news items are distributed through the network.
After running the protocol for several rounds, we observe that the storage capacity
of the network is evenly divided between the different items. By this, we mean that
the slots available to store news entries are used in a balanced way, with each news
item being able to place approximately the same number of entries in the network.
This behavior is not programmed into the algorithm, but it is an emerging property
resulting from its repeated execution.
The value to which the number of entries of an item converges is dictated by
the number of different news items in the network. Given a network of size N
where all nodes have a cache size of c, the network has a total capacity of N× c.
These N× c available slots have to be filled with d different news items. Because
of the randomness introduced when choosing which entries to exchange, the total
capacity should eventually be evenly divided between the different items resulting
in an average of N×cd entries for each of the d news items. Considering that the
protocol does not allow more than one news entry representing the same news
item in the same cache, this means that c/d of the nodes should have an item of
each of the d different ids:
# entries per item = capacity of the network
number of news items =
N× c
d
Figure 2.2 shows the convergent behavior of the protocol. For the experiment,
a collection of 10000 nodes were placed in a grid topology with 4 neighbors per
node and 10 nodes were randomly selected to generate different news items. Time
is measured in rounds, where a round is a gossiping interval in which each node
executes the exchange protocol once. After an initial stabilization period, the
number of entries in the system for each of the 10 items converges to the same
value. According to our previous reasoning, this value should be 10000×5/10 =
5000, meaning that 50% of the nodes in the network have an entry from one of the
10 different news items available, which is confirmed by our experiments. Similar
convergent behavior was observed when experimenting with other topologies.
Dissemination Speed as a Function of the Diversity of News Items
To demonstrate the effectiveness of shuffling for disseminating information, we
have conducted experiments that show the effect of the number of different items
on the dissemination speed of the items through the network. In this section,
we look at the time needed for the news items to have reached all routers in the
network. The results presented here correspond to a mesh backbone of 10000
routers. Unless explicitly stated, the routers were set up in a rectangular grid
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Figure 2.2: Convergent behavior illustrated by having 10 nodes that generate news
items in a network of 10000 nodes (arranged as a 100×100 grid).
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Figure 2.3: Number of rounds required for all the routers in the backbone to have
seen an item using shuffling on a grid topology.
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Figure 2.4: Number of rounds required for all the routers in the backbone to have
seen an item using shuffling on three different topologies.
topology, with 100 routers on each side. For the experiments, we measure the
time it takes for the items to reach all the routers in the network.
Figure 2.3 shows the time, measured in rounds, required for various different
items to have passed through the caches of all the routers in the backbone. The
cache size for all routers was set to 50 and all items in the cache were shuffled in
each round. In each experiment, a different number of distinct items (starting at 50
and up to 600, with increments of 50) were inserted into the backbone by routers
located in random locations. For each news item, the time required to traverse the
backbone was measured. Due to randomness in the exchanges and the location
of the routers inserting the news items, the time measured for an individual news
item may vary significantly compared to the measurements for other items. By
calculating the average time for a news item to go through the mesh backbone,
we can observe that as the diversity of news items in the network increases the
average time for a specific news item to reach all routers increases linearly. We
observe that this linear behavior is maintained when conducting the experiments
with different topologies, as shown in Figure 2.4.
In our third set of experiments, we focus on the effect of the cache size on
the dissemination speed. As before, we look at the average time required for an
item to have reached all routers in relation to the number of different items being
gossiped. The results, shown in Figure 2.5, reveal that the slope of the curve of av-
erage values is directly related to the number of items being shuffled. There is an
inversely proportional relationship between the number of items being exchanged
and the slope of the curve. The four curves shown correspond to experiments with
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Figure 2.5: Number of rounds required for all the nodes in the network to have
seen an item for different cache sizes with (a) grid topology (range 1), (b) grid
topology (range 2) and (c) random topology (range 2). All entries in the cache are
exchanged.
a cache size of 30, 40, 50 and 60 items. In all cases, all entries in the cache were
exchanged. By doubling the number of entries shuffled from 30 to 60, the aver-
age time for news items to pass through every router in the backbone is virtually
divided in half. Such a characteristic, as well as the predictable behavior with
an increasing number of different items, are important factors to consider when
choosing an appropriate value for the cache size c and the number of entries to
shuffle.
Robustness
In order to test the robustness of our system in the case of node failures, we look at
a scenario where the nodes within a limited area go down, not unlike what would
happen in case of a power outage. The experiment, performed with 10000 routers
arranged in a grid with range 1, consists of observing the number of entries per
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200 and recover at round 300.
 0
 1000
 2000
 3000
 4000
 5000
 6000
 7000
 0  50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400  450  500
n
u
m
be
r o
f e
nt
rie
s
rounds
25% nodes go down
49% nodes go down
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item in the mesh backbone before, during and after the failure of all routers within
a square area. We assume that when a router fails, all the entries in its cache are
lost. When the router goes up again, its cache is empty and has to be populated
again.
Figure 2.6 shows the results of the experiment when 49% of the routers expe-
rience a failure at the same time and recover 100 rounds later. The routers chosen
for failure were arranged in a 70× 70 square inside the 100× 100 grid. Like the
experiment in Figure 2.2, 10 items are being shuffled in the network and all routers
have a cache size of 5. Once the numbers of entries per news item have converged
to the same value, the routers chosen for failure go down. As could be expected,
given that the entries were randomly located throughout the network, the number
of entries per item is virtually cut by half once the failures occur. When the routers
that failed rejoin the network, we observe a smooth transition to the previous state,
with entries quickly populating their caches. Unlike the first rounds, the entries
per item are replicated at roughly the same rate. This is due to the fact that the
routers surrounding the area of failure already have their caches full of entries and
can update the routers that failed as soon as they become operational again.
For a clear view of the recovery time, Figure 2.7 shows the average number
of entries per item. In addition to the experiment presented earlier, we include the
case where 25% of the routers fail. These routers are arranged in a 50×50 square.
Comparing both curves, we observe the same behavior up to the moment of node
failures. At that point, the average number of entries per items falls according to
the loss of storage space. The recovery in both cases is quick despite the difference
in the number of routers that failed.
The speedy recovery of the affected area can be attributed to information flow-
ing in from multiple sides. For an affected square area, we would expect the re-
covery time to be proportional to the square root of n, where n is the number of
routers that experience a failure. As can be seen in Figure 2.8, this seems to be the
case. The results shown in the figure were obtained using the random topology
with range 2. Several experiments where routers within a square area failed were
conducted. For each experiment, a square area of a different size was used, rang-
ing from 20× 20 up to 80× 80 with increments of 5 distance units on each side.
Figure 2.8 shows that, indeed, the recovery times obtained from the simulations
tend to be proportional to the square root of the number of routers affected. To
verify this, we also plot the curve a*sqrt(n)+b which was obtained through linear
regression. The constants have values 0.504244, and 5.18383, respectively.
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Figure 2.8: Recovery times when an increasing number of routers fail.
2.4. PERFORMANCE ON THE CLIENT SIDE
In this section, we take a look at the performance of the news service from
the user’s perspective. Users of the service have access to news items through
clients in the mesh network. These include portable devices such as laptops, PDAs
or other hand-held devices. Due to the variety of news items available in the
network, users need to configure their clients to retrieve items matching the users’
interests. Item retrieval is based on content filtering. Once a connection to a router
is established, clients must submit filtering criteria for the router to identify which
news items to forward to the client.
2.4.1. Discovery Rate
To evaluate the effectiveness of the news service from the user’s perspective, we
observe the discovery rate of items over time. The discovery rate is defined as the
number of items of interest to a user that a router delivers to the client device over
a period of time versus the total number of relevant items. We test the discovery
rate through the following experiment:
• A network of 2500 routers is arranged in a 50× 50 grid. Each router can
communicate with its neighbors to the North, South, East and West.
• 50 users are positioned at random locations.
• 500 news items are being shuffled in the network.
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• The interests of the users match 100 news items.
The news items are published at random locations in the network and shuffled until
the number of entries for each item converges to roughly the same value (as seen
in Section 2.3.3). At that point, the clients connect to the nearest router expressing
interest in certain kinds of items. A router responds by forwarding the matching
news items seen in its cache to the client. Caches are updated with every gossip
round prompting the delivery of previously undiscovered items to the client. As
a result, we expect the discovery rate to increase as the client spends more time
connected to a router.
The results of repeating the experiment with different cache sizes can be seen
in Figure 2.9. The figure shows the average discovery rates for the 50 users. In all
cases, the discovery rates increase rapidly during the initial rounds and slow down
when most items have already been discovered. As could be expected, larger
caches lead to higher discovery rates of items. This is due to a higher storage
capacity in the network that allows for more entries to be placed for each news
item. Therefore, the probability of finding a particular item in the cache of a
router increases.
It should be noted that an increase in the total number of news items would
slow down the discovery rate, as dissemination speed decreases with the number
of news items in the network. This effect can be countered by an increase in cache
size. In the remainder of this section, we take a fixed number (500) of news items
and explore the effect of modifying other parameters, such as the cache size, the
number of items shuffled and the topology of the network, on the discovery rate.
2.4.2. Probability of seeing an item
Executing the shuffle protocol until the storage capacity of the network is full
yields a probability of c/d of finding a particular item when examining the cache
of a router picked at random, for c≤ d. If we define the success of our experiment
as finding a particular item in a random cache and knowing that the probability
of success remains constant, the probability of succeeding after performing the
experiment k ≥ 1 times is:
p(k,c,d) = 1−
k
∏
i=1
(1− prob success(i)) = 1−
(
1− cd
)k
Figure 2.10 shows the probability of finding an item in a cache selected at random
after k attempts for different cache sizes. We observe a similar, although not
identical, behavior to the discovery rate results presented in the previous section.
This is not surprising, as the shuffle protocol ensures that after each round a router
refills its cache with entries received from a neighbor chosen at random. However,
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Figure 2.9: Discovery rate of news items. All entries in the cache are exchanged.
due to the locality of the gossip exchanges, when looking at the cache of the same
router for several rounds, we are bound to discover the items held by our neighbors
first. This limits the variety of items we might see as our neighbors are more likely
to hold many of the same items as we do in comparison to a randomly chosen
router in the network. This accounts for the slightly lower discovery rate in the
experimental results compared to the probability of seeing an item when selecting
a random cache every time.
2.4.3. Improving Discovery Rate
Shuffling provides a random sample of the collection of items in the network at
every round for each router. However, as can be inferred from Figure 2.9 and 2.10,
there is a correlation in the items seen from one round to the next, which accounts
for less than optimal discovery rates. In other words, the reason for the discovery
rate results not being identical to the probability in Figure 2.10 is due to the results
from each round not being independent. This can be attributed to the lack of
variety of items in the neighborhood of a router.
Figure 2.11 shows the effect of the neighborhood in the discovery rate. We
confirm that the discovery rate was being hampered by each router having a lim-
ited neighborhood by showing that the probability of seeing an item when a cache
is picked randomly is the same as the discovery rate when the range of a router
is such that it can reach any other router in the network. In the graph, the results
for a network of routers with range 100 and p(k,50,500) overlap. We also show
the impact in performance of doubling the range from 1 to 2 units, effectively in-
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Figure 2.10: Probability of finding an item in a randomly filled cache.
creasing the number of neighbors from 4 to 12. This experiment shows that it is
not necessary to be able to reach every node in the network to achieve a close-to-
optimal discovery rate. Finally, as a worse case scenario, we show what happens
if the routers are arranged in a single line, where each router can only reach its
neighbors to the left and right. In this case, the discovery of items after the first
few rounds becomes increasingly slow. We attribute this to new items being hard
to come by after the items of interest in the immediate neighborhood have been
discovered. Having only two neighbors, the likelihood of new items reaching the
neighborhood is reduced, requiring more iterations of the protocol to update a
cache with different items. Obviously, this topology is not realistic and should be
avoided.
Another option for improving the discovery rate without increasing the num-
ber of entries exchanged per round is to increase the cache size. The results pre-
sented previously assumed that all entries in the cache were exchanged in each
round. Figure 2.12 shows how increasing the cache size while exchanging the
same number of entries provides an initial boost in the discovery rate. However,
since the speed at which news items move through the network depends on the
number of entries exchanged per round, having a bigger cache does not provide
any benefits for finding the last few items that were not originally in the vicinity
of the router.
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2.5. RELATED WORK
From a functional point of view, the news service we propose has some sim-
ilarity with content-based distributed publish/subscribe systems [Carzaniga et al.
2001; Cugola et al. 2001; Pietzuch and Bacon 2002; Segall and Arnold 1997].
With the increase in popularity of wireless technology, some publish/subscribe
systems have been extended to support mobile, wireless clients [Caporuscio et al.
2003]. For the most part, the systems proposed use a single tree-shaped overlay
to interconnect a set of brokers which cooperate to deliver the events published to
the appropriate subscribers. This approach, while efficient under static conditions,
might face robustness and scalability issues in highly dynamic environments, such
as wireless networks with mobile users. Efforts in maintaining a tree overlay un-
der frequent topology changes aim at dealing with these issues [Picco et al. 2003].
However, depending on how frequently the changes occur, maintaining a tree may
introduce additional overhead and complexity. Our approach offers robustness
and scalability at the cost of periodic communication for gossiping.
Content-based publish/subscribe projects aimed explicitly at wireless, mobile
environments [Cugola et al. 2005; Huang and Garcia-Molina 2003; Meier and
Cahill 2002], especially systems that rely on probabilistic techniques for the de-
livery of events [Costa and Picco 2005], are more closely related to our work. Like
our news service, these publish/subscribe systems rely on distributed algorithms
to build their trees and deliver messages to subscribers. When designing a pub-
lish/subscribe system for wireless environments, unlike the wired case, the cost
of communication between brokers varies depending on the wireless connectivity.
Consequently, the creation of publish/subscribe trees is largely influenced by the
wireless connectivity, driving an interest in building trees that can deliver the mes-
sages to subscribers at a lower cost [Huang and Garcia-Molina 2003]. [Costa and
Picco 2005] recognizes the fragility of a using a tree in a wireless environment and
proposes a combination of deterministic routing with probabilistic techniques to
increase resilience when faced with topology changes. In our work, while similar
in spirit to publish/subscribe systems, we deal with dynamicity (due to mobility
and node/link failures) introduced by the wireless environment through a purely
probabilistic approach. As a result, our news service provides robustness and re-
silience to failures without increasing complexity.
Our work also relates, in a way, to efforts in distributed storage [Haeberlen
et al. 2005; Adya et al. 2002]. Like our news service, these systems rely on data
redundancy to ensure robustness when node failures occur. However, while most
of these systems carefully place replicas based on the reliability of nodes, we repli-
cate items and relocate them in a random fashion. We do, nevertheless, manage
to use the storage capacity in a fair manner, dynamically adjusting the number of
SEC. 2.6 DISCUSSION 33
replicas of an item according to the number of items in the network.
2.6. DISCUSSION
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the main advantages of having a de-
centralized system like the one we propose is avoiding single ownership of the
service. Single ownership implies that one entity is fully responsible for the avail-
ability and quality of the service. This may not be a bad thing from the point
of view of managing the system, however it restricts others from contributing to
the service even when resources are available. One of the strengths of our news
service is the flexibility it allows for routers to have some control over the quality
of service they offer. As explained in Section 2.4, the quality of the service as
perceived by the users can be improved by increasing the wireless range or the
amount of memory allocated for storing entries. Decisions to do so can then be
taken on an individual basis by the administrators of each router.
Taking a more active approach for the discovery of items is also a possible
way of improving the perceived performance from the users point of view. As
explained, clients connect to a nearby router and retrieve news items matching
the user’s interests. While the matching news items from the router’s cache will
be made available to the client immediately, discovering the totality of relevant
news items may take several rounds and, depending on the time period between
rounds, this delay might inconvenience some users. Instead of passively waiting
for the news items to arrive, a router may decide to forward the user’s filter to
other routers, thus increasing the chances of discovering relevant news items. For
example, we can calculate that for c/d = 0.2 it would take at least 10 rounds to
retrieve approximately 90% of all items. In this case, by forwarding the filter to 4
other routers, the client could receive almost all news items in 2 rounds.
The flexibility of being able to independently decide on the amount of re-
sources to invest in the news service coupled with the minimal requirements to
participate opens up the possibility of deploying the service on a large scale using
heterogeneous nodes. Deploying the service over large geographical areas, such
as a campus or a city, may require some considerations in the dissemination of
news items. As mentioned before, we impose a time limit for the validity of the
entries in the network. However, when disseminating the entries over a large area,
it may also be necessary to establish geographic constraints. By adding location-
awareness to the shuffling of entries, news items could be dispersed over limited
areas. For example, an entry may be forwarded only within a radius from the loca-
tion where it originated. As a result of restricting the area over which an entry can
travel, space which would otherwise be taken by these entries is freed, increasing
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the number of different items that the network can hold.
Another consideration to keep in mind is security. A gossip-based system like
the one we propose is specially susceptible to denial-of-service attacks. We can
imagine a scenario where a malicious node generates bogus news items and in-
serts them into the network at a high rate. Having large numbers of items at the
same time slows down the dissemination speed, as there are less entries per item
in the network. Without any security mechanisms in place, a single node could
virtually bring the service to a halt. It is clear that some kind of regulation regard-
ing who can publish news items is necessary. We return to this issue extensively
in subsequent chapters.
2.7. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we presented a highly robust distributed news service suitable
for wireless mesh networks. We have shown that by using an epidemic protocol
at the core of our service, we can provide an efficient and scalable solution for
delivering news items while, at the same time, offering the participating routers
the flexibility of managing their own resources to better suit their clients needs.
Through the use of simulations, we analyzed the effectiveness and robustness of
the dissemination of items through the mesh backbone. We corroborated the effec-
tiveness of the service by taking the user’s perspective and providing an analysis
of the quality of the service in terms of the delivery of relevant news items to the
client devices.
In the three next chapters, we take the shuffle protocol as a test case to ex-
plore two subjects related to gossip protocols: a) the study and modelling of local
interactions as a way to understand large-scale behavior (Chapter 3) and b) the
impact of malicious behavior in the properties of dissemination in a network of
gossiping nodes (Chapters 4 and 5). Afterwards, in Chapter 6 we move away
from the point-to-point model of communication used by the shuffle protocol and
focus on recreating similar characteristics of dissemination with a broadcast-based
protocol.
CHAPTER 3
Modelling the Shuffle Protocol
Through an extensive simulation study, we have gained some insight into the ba-
sic properties of the shuffle protocol. While executing large-scale simulations has
shed some light into the emergent behavior of the protocol, the relationships be-
tween the performance of the protocol and the settings of the parameters are only
understood at a high level. The mechanics of the gossip exchanges have yet to be
fully analyzed and understood.
In this chapter, we develop an analytical model of information dissemination
for the shuffle protocol. With this model we analyse how fast an item is replicated
through a network, and how fast the item covers the network. We also determine
the optimal size of the exchange buffer, to obtain fast replication. Our results are
confirmed by large-scale simulation experiments.
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Today, large-scale distributed systems consisting of thousands of nodes are
commonplace, due to the wide availability of high-performance and low-cost de-
vices. In practice, these systems are often diagnosed through performing simula-
tions to discover correlations between design parameters and observed behavior.
Such experimental results provide essential data on system behavior, and can aid
in understanding the emergent behavior of the system. However, experiments can
be time consuming and the infinite space of the parameter settings for probabilistic
systems is often too large to be explored experimentally. Consequently, the exper-
iments do not always clarify how parameter settings influence the extra-functional
properties of the system. As a result, it is very difficult to predict what the effects
of certain design decisions are, as it is practically infeasible to explore the full
range of input data. A challenge is to develop analytical models that capture (part
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of) the behavior of a system, and then subsequently optimise design parameters
following an analytical rather than an experimental approach.
We are interested in developing and validating analytical models for gossip-
based systems (cf. [Bakhshi et al. 2007]). These systems rely on epidemic tech-
niques for the communication and exchange of information. These communica-
tion protocols, while having simple specifications, show complex and often unex-
pected behavior when executed on a large scale (e.g., [Jelasity et al. 2007; Drost
et al. 2007]). Our analytical models of gossip protocols need to be realistic, yet,
sufficiently abstract to allow for easy prediction of systems behavior. By ‘real-
istic’ we mean that they can be applied to large-scale systems and can capture
functional and extra-functional behavior such as replication, coverage, conver-
gence, and other system dynamics (see [Eugster et al. 2004]). Such models are
amenable for mathematical analysis, to make precise predictions. Furthermore,
we will exploit the fact that because an analytical model presents an abstraction
of the original protocol, a simulation of the model tends to be much more efficient
(in computation time and memory consumption) than a simulation of an imple-
mentation of this protocol.
In this chapter, we develop an analytical model the epidemic protocol from the
previous chapter. To summarize briefly, nodes executing the protocol periodically
contact each other and exchange data items. Concisely, a node initiates a contact
with a random neighbor, pulls a random subset of items from the contacted node,
simultaneously pushing its own random subset of items. This push/pull approach
has a better performance than a pure push or pull approach [Jelasity et al. 2007;
Karp et al. 2000]. The amount of information exchanged during each contact be-
tween two communicating nodes is limited. Replication ensures the availability
of the data items even in the face of dynamic behavior. Thus, nodes not only con-
serve the data collectively stored in the network, but also relocate it in a random
fashion; hence, nodes will eventually see all data items.
The central point of our study is a thorough probabilistic analysis of infor-
mation dissemination in a large-scale network using the aforementioned protocol.
Our modelling framework for a gossip protocol differs from others in that we do
not follow the traditional modelling using the mathematical theory of epidemics
[Eugster et al. 2004]. Instead, the behavior of the protocol is modelled at an ab-
stract level as pairwise node interactions. When two neighboring nodes interact
with each other (gossip), they may undergo a state transition (exchange items)
with a certain probability. The transition probabilities depend on the probability
that a given item in a node’s local storage has been replaced by another item after
the exchange. We calculated accurate values for these probabilities, yielding a
rather complicated expression. This expression depends not only on the amount
of items, message size and local storage size, but also on the amount of items
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both gossiping nodes have in common, in particular, how many of such items the
contacted node receives during the exchange. The expression is complex because
it incorporates the expected value of the amount of such items, and a connection
between the parameters is not obvious. We also determined a close approximation
that is expressed by a much simpler formula, as well as a correction factor for this
approximation allowing for precise error estimations. Thus we obtain a better un-
derstanding of the emergent behavior of the protocol and how parameter settings
influence its extra-functional behavior.
We investigated two properties characterizing the protocol, namely, the num-
ber of nodes that have ‘seen’ a given item over time (coverage), and the number of
replicas of this item in the network at a certain moment in time (replication). Us-
ing the values of the transition probabilities, we determined the optimal number of
items to exchange per gossip, for a fast convergence of coverage and replication.
Moreover, we determined formulas that capture the dissemination of an item in
a fully connected network. All our modelling and analysis results are confirmed
by large-scale simulations, in which simulations based on our analytical models
are compared with running the actual protocol. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to develop an accurate, realistic formal model that can be used to
optimally design and fine-tune a given gossip protocol. In this sense, our main
contribution is demonstrating the feasibility of a model-driven approach to devel-
oping real-world gossip protocols.
Related work
Two areas of research are most relevant to the work described in this chapter:
rigorous analysis of gossip (and related) protocols, and results from mathemati-
cal theory of epidemics [Bailey 1975; Daley and Gani 1999]. The results from
epidemics are often used in the analysis of gossip protocols [Eugster et al. 2004]
(e.g., the traditional gossiping paper by Demers and colleagues [Demers et al.
1987]). We restrict our overview to the most relevant publications from the area
of (analysis of) gossip protocols.
Several works have focused on gossip-based membership management pro-
tocols. Allavena and colleagues [Allavena et al. 2005] proposed a gossip-based
membership management protocol and analysed the evolution of the number of
links between two nodes executing the protocol. The states of the associated
Markov chain are the number of links between pairs of nodes. From the designed
Markov chain they calculated the expected time until a network partition occurs.
This case study also includes a model of the system under churn. A goal of that
paper is to show the effect of mixing both pull and push approaches.
Eugster and colleagues [Eugster et al. 2003] presented a lightweight prob-
abilistic broadcast algorithm, and analysed the evolution of processes that gos-
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sip one message. The states of the associated Markov chain are the number of
processes that propagate one gossip message. From the designed Markov chain,
the authors computed the distribution of the gossiping nodes. Their analysis has
shown that the expected number of rounds to propagate the message to the en-
tire system does not depend on the out-degree of nodes. These results are based
on the analysis assumption that the individual out-degrees are uniform. However,
this simplification has shown to be valid only for small systems (cf. [Jelasity et al.
2007]).
Bonnet [Bonnet 2006] studied the evolution of the in-degree distribution of
nodes executing the Cyclon protocol [Voulgaris et al. 2005]. The states of the
associated Markov chain are the fraction of nodes with a specific in-degree distri-
bution. From the designed Markov chain the author determined the distribution to
which the protocol converges.
There are a number of theoretical results on gossip protocols, targeted to a dis-
tributed aggregation. In these protocols, a set of data is distributed over the nodes
of a network and the nodes compute an aggregate of the data set. Kempe and
colleagues [Kempe et al. 2003] proposed a push-only gossip-based aggregation
protocol for the fully connected network. In this paper, the authors used Gaus-
sian mixture modelling [Dempster et al. 1977; McLachlan and Peel 2000]. A
performance of the protocol has been measured by how quickly a data originating
with a node diffuses through a network (for uniform gossip). Each node locally
maintains an aggregation vector vt,i. A state of the associated Markov chain is the
fraction of the vector node i sends to other node. From the designed Markov chain,
the authors studied the convergence rate. In addition, the authors showed that the
diffusion speed for flooding corresponds to the mixing time of a random walk on
the network. Validation of the theoretical results with practical experiments is left
as a future work.
The protocol [Kempe et al. 2003] has been further tailored by Boyd and col-
leagues [Boyd et al. 2005] to work on an arbitrarily connected network. In their
analysis, the Markov chain is defined by a weighted random walk on the graph.
Every time step, a pair of nodes (connected by an edge) communicates with a tran-
sition probability, and sets their values equal to the average of their current values.
A state of the associated Markov chain is a vector of values at the end of the time
step. The authors considered the optimisation of the neighbor selection probabil-
ities for each node, to find the fastest-mixing Markov chain (for fast convergence
of the algorithm) on the graph.
Jelasity and colleagues [Jelasity et al. 2005] proposed a push-pull solution
for aggregation in large dynamic networks, supported by a performance analysis
of the protocol. A state of the system is represented by a vector, the elements
of which correspond to the values at the nodes, a target value of the protocol
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calculated from the vector elements, and a measure of homogeneity characterising
the quality of local approximations. The vector evolves at every step of the system
according to some distribution. In the analysis, the authors considered different
strategies (e.g., neighbor selection) to optimise the protocol implementation, and
calculated the expected values for the above mentioned protocol parameters.
Deb and colleagues [Deb et al. 2006] studied the adaptation of random net-
work coding to gossip protocols. The authors analysed the expected time and
message complexity of two gossip protocols for message transmission with pure
push and pure pull communication models.
3.2. A GOSSIP-BASED PROTOCOL FOR DATA DISSEMINATION
This section summarizes the main aspects of the shuffle protocol (introduced
in the previous chapter), which we aim to model. The protocol itself is, at heart, a
simple push-pull gossip protocol which can be used in wired or wireless networks.
Its purpose is to disseminates data items of general interest to a collection of nodes.
The protocol relies on replication to ensure the availability of data items in the face
of dynamic behavior. We briefly summarize the protocol and explain the system
model.
The system consists of a collection of nodes, each of which contributes a lim-
ited amount of storage space (which we will refer to as the node’s cache) to store
data items. The nodes periodically swap (shuffle) data items from their cache with
a randomly chosen neighbor. In this way, nodes update their caches on a regular
basis, allowing nodes to gradually discover new items as they are disseminated
through the network.
Items can be published by any user of the system, and are propagated through
the network. An item is a piece of information, and for each item several copies
may exist in the network. As items are gossiped between neighboring nodes,
replication may occur when a node has available storage space to keep a copy of
an item it just gossiped to a neighbor.
3.2.1. Protocol assumptions
All nodes have a common agreement on the frequency of gossiping. However,
there is no agreement on when to gossip.
In terms of storage space, we assume that all nodes dedicate the same amount
of storage space to keep items locally, and that all items are of the same size.
Therefore, we say that each node has a cache size of c. When shuffling, each node
sends a fixed number s of the c items in the cache.
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The gossip exchange is performed as an atomic procedure, meaning that once
a node initiates an exchange with another node, this pair of nodes cannot become
involved in another exchange until the current exchange is finished.
3.2.2. Description
Nodes executing the shuffle protocol initiate a shuffle periodically. In order to ex-
ecute the protocol, the initiating node needs to contact a gossiping partner. Such a
random peer is delivered by an underlying layer that keeps track of the neighbor-
hood membership. In a wired environment, this service could be provided by, for
instance, a peer sampling service [Jelasity et al. 2007] running at each node. For
wireless environments, the neighborhood is determined by the radio connectivity
between nodes.
We describe the protocol from the point of view of each participating node.
Node A initiates the shuffle by executing the following steps:
1. picks a neighboring node B uniformly at random;
2. selects randomly s items from the local cache, and sends a copy of these
items to B;
3. receives s items from the local cache of B;
4. checks whether any of the received items are already in its cache; if so, these
received items are eliminated;
5. adds the rest of the received items to the local cache; if the total number of
items exceeds cache size c, removes items at random among the ones that
were sent by A to B, but not those that were also received by A from B, until
the cache contains c items.
In response to being contacted by A, node B executes the following steps:
1. receives s items from the local cache of A;
2. selects randomly s items from its local cache, and sends a copy of these
items to A;
3. checks whether any of the received items are already in its cache; if so, these
received items are eliminated;
4. adds the rest of the received items to the local cache; if the total number of
items exceeds cache size c, removes items at random among the ones that
were sent by B to A, but not those that were also received by B from A, until
the cache contains c items.
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According to the protocol, each node agrees to keep the items received from
a neighbor. Given the limited storage space available in each node, keeping the
items received during an exchange implies discarding some items that the node
has in its cache. By picking the items to be discarded from the ones that have been
sent to the neighbor, the conservation of data in the network is ensured.
3.2.3. Properties
We are interested in the characteristics of the dissemination of data items when
the protocol is executed at a large scale, i.e., with a large set of nodes. For this
reason, we focus on two properties that can be observed in large deployments: i)
the number of replicas of an item in the network, and ii) the coverage achieved by
an item over time.
Replication
This property is defined as the fraction of nodes that hold a copy of a generic item
d in their cache, at a given moment. After an item is introduced into the network,
with every shuffle involving a node that has the item in its cache, there is a chance
that a new copy of the item will be created, or that the item will be discarded. As a
result, with every passing round the number of copies in the network for a partic-
ular item fluctuates. Given that the storage space at the nodes is limited, items are
in constant competition to place copies in the network. Since competition is fair
(all items have the same chance of being replicated or discarded), eventually the
storage capacity is evenly divided between the existing items. To be more precise,
consider a network of N nodes, in which n different items have been published in
total. Since there are N ·c cache entries in the network in total, the average number
of copies that an individual item has in the network will converge to N·c
n
. So the
fraction of nodes that have a replica of an item in their cache will converge to c
n
on average.
Coverage
This property is defined as the fraction of nodes in the network that have seen
a generic item d since it was introduced into the network. As explained earlier,
several copies of an item are generated after the item is first published. Due to
the periodic nature of the protocol, these copies continually move through the
network. This results in nodes discovering item d over several rounds. With each
passing round, more nodes will have seen d. Eventually, d will have been seen
by all nodes (i.e., the coverage is equal to 1). The speed at which the coverage
grows is influenced by several factors (as will be explained later on) including the
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number of different items in the network (i.e., competition), cache size, and the
size of the exchange buffer.
3.2.4. Experimental observations
Before moving on to the analysis of the protocol, we would like to focus on an
important aspect that we have observed during our extensive simulation study of
the shuffle protocol: the tendency of items to replicate to even levels. In other
words, a newly published item generates replicas in the network over time until its
number of replicas reaches a level comparable to the number of replicas of other
items. This comes as a consequence of the random selection of items to gossip
and to keep in local storage. By applying random selection, no item is favored
over the others resulting in a fair division of the storage space. That is, once the
system has reached equilibrium, each item in the network will have, on average,
the same number of replicas (N·c
n
).
Figure 3.1 shows a set of experiments where the distribution of replicas for
all the items in the system is tracked over several gossip rounds. In all cases, the
network consists of N = 2500 nodes with a cache size of c = 100 and each node
sends s = 50 items when it gossips. The number of different items that are inserted
in the network is n = 500. Each graph shows three curves corresponding to the
following initial scenarios:
1. Nodes are arranged in a 50×50 grid. The insertion of items to be gossiped
occurs simultaneously at round 0. All nodes start with an empty cache,
except for 500 nodes randomly chosen nodes. A unique item is placed in
the cache of each of these 500 nodes. As a result, at round 0 our network
contains 500 different items and each of these items has a single replica.
2. Nodes are arranged in a 50×50 grid. The insertion of items to be gossiped
occurs at randomly chosen times before round 100. At round 100, all 500
items will be present in the network. However, items that were inserted
earlier will have more replicas due to having been shuffled for a longer
time.
3. Topology with higher density at the center. The insertion of items to be gos-
siped occurs at randomly chosen times before round 100. In this topology,
nodes near the center have more neighbors to gossip with.
As can be seen from the graphs, the different initial conditions result in dif-
ferent replication patterns early on. However, note how as time progresses the
replication patterns become more and more similar. By round 350, it is clear that
items have on average N·c
n
= 500 replicas, regardless of the initial conditions of the
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of replicas over time.
44 MODELLING THE SHUFFLE PROTOCOL CHAP. 3
experiment. This convergence to an equilibrium where the storage space (N · c) is
evenly divided between the number of items present (n) is a result of the repeated
execution of the protocol.
In the shuffle protocol, there is no loss of information during the gossip ex-
change. We assume that the shuffle operation between two nodes is atomic and
since nodes swap items, no item can possibly disappear once inserted into the
network. For this reason, once the system has reached equilibrium in terms of
replication of items and assuming that there is a path between any two nodes in
the network, the replicas will continue to be shuffled, moving from one node to
another in a random fashion. Under these conditions, it is reasonable to assume
that the probability of finding any given item in a node’s cache is the same for all
items in the networks. To be more specific, based on our observations we make
the assumption that items are uniformly distributed throughout the network and
that any item can be found in a node’s cache with probability c
n
. This is the start-
ing point for our probabilistic analysis. The observation of uniform distribution
is not entirely unexpected. Similar observations about uniform distribution after
repeated shuffling have been made regarding the shuffling of decks of cards in
[Bayer and Diaconis 1992; Assaf et al. 2008].
3.3. ANALYTICAL MODEL OF INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
In this section, we analyse the dissemination of a generic item d in a network
in which the nodes execute the shuffling protocol.
3.3.1. Probabilities of state transitions
We present a model of the shuffle protocol that captures the presence or absence
of a generic item d after shuffling of two nodes A and B. There are four possible
states of the caches of A and B before the shuffle: both hold d, either A’s or B’s
cache holds d, or neither of the caches holds d.
We use the notation P(a2b2|a1b1) for the probability that from state a1b1 after
a shuffle we get to state a2b2, with ai,bi ∈ {0,1}. The indices a1, a2 and b1, b2
indicate the presence (if equal to 1) or the absence (if equal to 0) of a generic item d
in the cache of an initiator A and the contacted node B, respectively. For example,
P(01|10) means that node A had d before the shuffle, which then moved to the
cache of B, afterwards. Due to the symmetry of information exchange between
nodes A and B in the shuffle protocol, P(a2b2|a1b1) = P(b2a2|b1a1).
Fig. 3.2 depicts all possible outcomes for the caches of gossiping nodes as a
state transition diagram. If before the exchange A and B do not have d (a1b1 = 00),
then clearly after the exchange A and B will not have d (a2b2 = 00). Otherwise,
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Figure 3.2: Symbolic representation for caches of gossiping nodes.
if A or B has d (a1 = 1∨ b1 = 1), the shuffle protocol guarantees that after the
exchange A or B or both will have d (a2 = 1∨b2 = 1). Therefore, the state 00 has
a self-transition, and no other outgoing or incoming transitions.
We now determine values for all probabilities P(a2b2|a1b1). They are ex-
pressed in terms of probabilities Pselect and Pdrop. The probability Pselect expresses
the chance of an item to be selected by a node from its local cache when engaged
in an exchange. The probability Pdrop represents a probability that an item which
can be overwritten (meaning it is in the exchange buffer of its node, but not of the
other node in the shuffle) is indeed overwritten by an item received by its node in
the shuffle. Due to the symmetry of the protocol, these probabilities are the same
for both initiating and contacted nodes. In Sec. 3.3.2, we will calculate Pselect and
Pdrop. We write P¬select for 1−Pselect and P¬drop for 1−Pdrop.
Scenario 1: a1b1 = 00
Before shuffling, neither node A nor node B have d in their cache.
a2b2 = 00: neither node A nor node B have item d after a shuffle because neither
of them had it in the caches before the shuffle: P(00|00) = 1
a2b2 ∈ {01,10,11}: cannot occur, because none of the nodes have item d.
Scenario 2: a1b1 = 01
Before shuffling, a copy of d is only in the cache of node B.
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a2b2 = 01: node A does not have d because node B had d but did not select it (to
send) and, thus, B did not overwrite d, i.e., the probability is P(01|01) =
P¬select
a2b2 = 10: only node A has d because node B selected d and dropped it; that is,
the probability is P(10|01) = Pselect ·Pdrop
a2b2 = 11: both nodes A and B have a copy of d because node B selected d and
kept it; that is, P(11|01) = Pselect ·P¬drop
a2b2 = 00: cannot occur as completely discarding d is not possible in the proto-
col; that is, if either node sends an item, its partner keeps this copy, and if
an item is not among the selected for a shuffle, the item is not replaced by
another one (see Sec. 3.2.2).
Scenario 3: a1b1 = 10
Before shuffling, d is only in the cache of node A. Due to the symmetry of
nodes A and B, this scenario is symmetric to the previous one with P(a2b2|10) =
P(b2a2|01).
Scenario 4: a1b1 = 11
Before shuffling, d is in the cache of node A as well as in the cache of node B.
a2b2 = 01: only node B has d because node A selected d and dropped it and node
B did not select d; that is, P(01|11) = Pselect ·Pdrop ·P¬select
a2b2 = 10: this outcome is symmetric to the previous one: P(10|11) = P¬select ·
Pselect ·Pdrop
a2b2 = 11: after the shuffle both nodes A and B have d, because:
◦ nodes A and B had d but both did not select it, i.e., P¬select ·P¬select
◦ both nodes A and B selected d (thus, both kept it), i.e., Pselect ·Pselect
◦ node A selected d and kept it and node B did not select d: Pselect ·P¬drop ·
P¬select
◦ symmetric case with the previous one: P¬select ·Pselect ·P¬drop
Thus, P(11|11) = P¬select ·P¬select + Pselect ·Pselect + 2 ·Pselect ·P¬select ·P¬drop
a2b2 = 00: cannot occur, discarding of an item is not permitted by the protocol
(see Sec. 3.2.2).
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3.3.2. Probabilities of selecting and dropping an item
The following analysis assumes that all node caches are full (that is, the network is
already running for a while). Moreover, we assume a uniform distribution of items
over the network. This assumption is supported by experiments in subsection 3.2.4
and [Jelasity et al. 2007].
Consider nodes A and B engaged in a shuffle, and let B receive the exchange
buffer SA from A. Let k be the number of duplicates (see Fig. 3.3), i.e., the items
of an intersection of the node cache CB and the exchange buffer of its gossiping
partner SA (i.e., SA∩CB). Recall from Sec. 3.2.1 that CA and CB contain the same
number of items for all A and B, and likewise for SA and SB; we use c and s for
these values. The total number of different items in the network is denoted as n.
n
SA k CB
Figure 3.3: k items in SA∩CB
SA
SBbs
CB
Figure 3.4: ŝ items in SA∩SB
The probability of selecting an item d in the cache is the number of selected
items (i.e., s) divided by the total number of items in the cache (i.e., c): Pselect = sc .
Thus, the probability that an item d in the cache is not selected is: P¬select =
1−Pselect = c−sc .
Consider Figs. 3.3 and 3.4. The shuffle protocol demands that all items in
SA are kept in CB after the shuffle. This implies that: a) all items in SA\CB will
overwrite items in SB ⊆CB, and b) all items in SA ∩CB are kept in CB. Thus, the
probability that an item from SB will be overwritten is determined by the proba-
bility that an item from SA is in CB, but not in SB. Namely, the items in SB\SA
provide a space in the cache for items from SA\CB. We would like to express the
probability Pdrop of a selected item d in SB\SA (or SA\SB) to be overwritten by an-
other item in CB (or CA). Due to symmetry, this probability is the same for A and
B; therefore, we calculate only the probability that an item in SB\SA is dropped
from CB. The expected value of this probability depends on how many duplicates
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a node receives from its gossiping partner1:
E[Pdrop] =

s
∑
k=0
(P|SA∩CB|=kdrop ·P|SA∩CB|=k) if s+ c 6 n
s
∑
k=(s+c)−n
(P|SA∩CB|=kdrop ·P|SA∩CB|=k) otherwise
where P|SA∩CB|=k is the probability of having exactly k items in SA ∩CB, and
P|SA∩CB|=kdrop is the probability that an item in SB\SA is dropped from CB given k
duplicates in SA ∩CB. The case distinction is because if s + c > n, then clearly
there are at least (s+ c)−n items in SA∩CB.
From the
(
n
s
)
possible sets SA, we compute how many have k items in com-
mon with CB. Firstly, there are
(
c
k
)
ways to choose k such items in CB. Secondly,
there are
(
n−c
s−k
)
ways to choose the remaining s− k items outside CB. So in total,(
c
k
) ·(n−c
s−k
)
possible sets SA have k items in common with CB. Hence, under the as-
sumption of a uniform distribution of the data items over the caches of the nodes,2
P|SA∩CB|=k =
(
c
k
)(n−cs−k)
(ns)
. The expected value of P|SA∩CB|=kdrop is3:
E[P|SA∩CB|=kdrop ] =

k
∑̂
s=0
P|SA∩SB|=ŝdrop ·P|SA∩SB|=ŝ if s+ k 6 c
k
∑
ŝ=(s+k)−c
P|SA∩SB|=ŝdrop ·P|SA∩SB|=ŝ otherwise
where ŝ is the number of items in SA ∩ SB (see Fig. 3.4). The case distinction is
because if s+ k > c (with k the number of items in SA∩CB), then clearly there are
at least (s+ k)− c items in SA∩SB.
Among the s items in SB, there are ŝ items also in SA, and thus only the s− ŝ
items in SB\SA can be dropped from CB. P|SA∩SB|=ŝdrop is the probability that an item
in SB\SA is dropped from CB, given ŝ items in SA∩SB:
P|SA∩SB|=ŝdrop =
{
0 if s = ŝ
s−k
s−ŝ otherwise
P|SA∩SB|=ŝ is the probability of having exactly ŝ items in SA ∩ SB: P|SA∩SB|=ŝ =(
s
ŝ
)(c−sk−ŝ)
(ck)
. The intuition behind this expected value of P|SA∩SB|=ŝ is similar to the
1The other case is presented for the sake of completeness.
2Here we use a generalisation of the usual definition of binomial coefficients to negative integers.
That is, for all m and l ≥ 0, (ml )= (−1)l(−m+l−1l ) (cf. [Hilton et al. 1997])
3The other case is presented for the sake of completeness.
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one of P|SA∩CB|=k. From the
(
c
k
)
possible sets SA, we compute how many have ŝ
items in common with SB. That is, there are
(
s
ŝ
)
ways to choose ŝ items in SB, and(
c−s
k−ŝ
)
ways to choose the remaining k− ŝ items outside SB.
Let us assume s + c ≤ n and s + k ≤ c. Then, substituting in the expression
for E[Pdrop] in case s + c ≤ n, and noting that in the summand k = s the factor
P|SA∩SB|=sdrop is equal to zero, we get:
E[Pdrop] =
s−1
∑
k=0
(
c
k
)(n−c
s−k
)(
n
s
) k∑̂
s=0
s− k
s− ŝ
(
s
ŝ
)(c−s
k−ŝ
)(
c
k
)
=
n− c(
n
s
) s−1∑
k=0
(
(n− c)−1
(s− k)−1
) k
∑̂
s=0
(
c−s
k−ŝ
)(
s
ŝ
)
s− ŝ (3.1)
The probability of keeping an item d in SB\SA⊆CB can be expressed as P¬drop =
1−Pdrop.
3.3.3. Simplification of Pdrop
In order to gain a clearer insight into the emergent behavior of the gossiping pro-
tocol we make an effort to simplify the formula for the probability Pdrop of an
item in SB\SA to be dropped from CB after a shuffle. Therefore, we re-examine
the relationships between the k duplicates received from a neighbor, the ŝ items of
the overlap SA∩SB, and Pdrop. Let’s estimate P|SA∩CB|=kdrop by considering each item
from SA separately, and calculating the probability that the item is a duplicate (i.e.,
is also in CB). The probability of an item from SA to be a duplicate (also present in
CB) is cn . In view of the uniform distribution of items over the network, the items
in a node’s cache are a random sample from the universe of n data items; so all
items in SA have the same chance to be a duplicate. Thus, the expected number k
of items in SA ∩CB can be estimated by s · cn . The expected number ŝ of items in
SA∩SB can be estimated by k · sc , because only the k items in SA∩CB may end up
in SA ∩CB; sc captures the probability that an item from CB is also selected to be
in SB. It follows that the probability of an item in SB\SA to be dropped from CB
after the shuffle is Pdrop = s−ks−ŝ =
s−s· c
n
s−s· c
n
· s
c
= n−c
n−s . The complementary probability of
keeping an item is P¬drop = 1− n−cn−s = c−sn−s . These estimates are valid for general
s ≤ c ≤ n.
Substituting the expressions for Pselect and the simplified Pdrop into the formu-
las for the transition probabilities in Fig. 3.2, we obtain:
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P(01|01) = P(10|10) = c−s
c
P(01|11) = P(10|11) = s
c
c−s
c
n−c
n−s
P(10|01) = P(01|10) = s
c
n−c
n−s P(11|11) = 1−2 sc c−sc n−cn−s
P(11|01) = P(11|10) = s
c
c−s
n−s
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Figure 3.5: The relative error of the difference of the accurate Pdrop and its ap-
proximation, for c = 250 (left) and c = 500 (right) and different values of n.
In order to verify the accuracy of the proposed simplification for E[Pdrop], we
compare the simplification and the accurate formula (3.1) for different values of n.
We plot the difference of the accurate Pdrop and the simplification, for cache sizes
c = 250 and c = 500 (Fig. 3.5). These figures show that the simplification gives a
close approximation of the accurate formula for Pdrop (note the log y-scale).
3.3.4. Correction factor
We now investigate how closely the simplified formula of Pdrop, that is n−cn−s (here
referred to as S(n,c,s)) approximates formula (3.1) (here referred to as E(n,c,s)).
We compared the difference between these two formulas using a Java package
based on common fractions, which provides loss-less calculation [Gilleland 2002].
We observe that the inverse of the difference of the inverse values of both formulas,
i.e., ec,s(n) =
(
E(n,c,s)−1 −S(n,c,s)−1)−1, exhibits a certain pattern for different
values of n, c and s.
For s = 1 and arbitrary values of n and c, E(n,c,1) = n−c
n
, whereas S(n,c,1) =
n−c
n−1 . This leads us to investigate the correction factor θ as in E(n,c,s) =
n−c
(n−s)+θ .
For s = 1, clearly the factor θ = 1. Yet, for s > 1 the situation is more complicated.
We therefore calculate the first, the second and other (forward) differences4 over
4A forward difference of discrete function f : Z → Z is a function ∆ f : Z → Z with ∆ f (n) =
f (n+1)− f (n) (cf. [Abramowitz and Stegun 1972]).
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n.
For s = 1, the result of the first difference of the function ec,1(n) is 1. However,
for s = 2 the first difference is, e.g., if c = 4: e4,2(7)− e4,2(6) = 3.5, e4,2(8)−
e4,2(7) = 4, e4,2(9)− e4,2(8) = 4.5 and so on. Thus, we observe that the second
difference of ec,2(n) is 12 . By calculating higher differences for s > 2, we conclude
that the s-th difference of the function ec,s(n) is always 1s .
Moreover, at the point n = 0 the first, . . . , s-th differences of the function ec,s
exhibit a pattern similar to the Pascal triangle [Graham et al. 1994]. That is, for
d ≥ 1 the d-th difference is (∆d ec,s)(0) = 1
s·(s−1d )
(assuming (ab) = 0, whenever
b > a). Knowing the initial difference at point n = 0, we were able to use the
Newton forward difference equation [Abramowitz and Stegun 1972] to derive the
following formula for n > 0: E[Pdrop] = n−c(n−s)+ 1γ
, where
γ =
s−1
∑
d=0
(
n
d
)
s · (s−1d ) =
(
n
s
)
(n− s)+ 1 ·
s−1
∑
d=0
1(
n−d
(s−1)−d
) (3.2)
In this equation the sum is finite because due to the observation that the s-th dif-
ference is constant 1
s
, all higher differences are 0.
Thus, the correction factor is θ = 1γ . Extensive experiments with Mathematica
and Matlab indicate that n−c
(n−s)+ 1γ
and formula (3.1) indeed coincide. We can also
see from Fig. 3.5 that the correction factor is small.
3.3.5. Optimal size for the exchange buffer
We study the optimal value of the exchange buffer s for fast convergence of repli-
cation and coverage with respect to an item d. Since d is introduced at only
one node in the network, one needs to maximize the chance that an item is du-
plicated. That is, the probabilities P(11|01) and P(11|10) should be maximized
(then P(01|11) and P(10|11) are maximized as well, intuitively because for each
duplicated item in a shuffle, another item must be dropped).
We give a rigorous argument for this claim in the case of a fully connected
network. Let α be a replication of item d at a given moment, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In
the long run, α converges to c
n
. Suppose that a shuffle takes place. The chance that
after the shuffle there is one more copy of item d in the system is
(P(11|01)+ P(11|10)) ·α · (1−α) = 2 ·P(11|01) ·α · (1−α)
Here α · (1−α) expresses the chance that exactly one of the nodes in the shuffle
contains a copy of the item. Likewise, the chance that after the shuffle a copy of
the item has been removed from the system is
(P(01|11)+ P(10|11)) ·α2 = 2 ·P(01|11) ·α2 = 2 · n− c
c
·P(11|01) ·α2
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Figure 3.6: Optimal value of exchange buffer size for c = 100, depending on n.
So, after a shuffle, the change in the number of copies of the item in the system is
on average
2 ·P(11|01) ·α · (1−α)−2 · n− c
c
·P(11|01) ·α2 = 2 ·P(11|01) ·α · (1− n
c
·α)
It follows that as long as α < c
n
, maximizing P(11|01) maximizes replication of
the item.
The probability of replication P(11|01), and its symmetric case P(11|10), are
both equal to s
c
c−s
n−s . In order to find the value of s that maximizes them, we com-
pute the s-derivative of this expression and equal to zero. This yields the equation
s2 − 2ns + nc = 0. Taking into the account that s ≤ n, the only solution of this
equation is s = n−√n(n− c). We conclude that this is the optimal value for s to
obtain fast convergence of replication (see Fig. 3.6). This will also be confirmed
by the experiments and analyses in the following sections.
3.4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In order to test the validity of the analytical model of information spread based
on the shuffle protocol presented in the previous section, we follow an experimen-
tal approach. We compare properties observed while running the shuffle protocol
in a large-scale deployment with simulations of the model under the same con-
ditions. These experiments show that the analytical model indeed captures the
characteristics of the information spread due to the shuffle protocol. We note that
a simulation of the analytical model is much more efficient (in computation time
and memory consumption) than a simulation of the implementation of the shuffle
protocol. We discuss this further in Sec. 3.7.
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The experiments simulate the case where a new item d is introduced at one
node in a network, in which all caches are full and uniformly populated by n = 500
items. We use an event-based simulator that takes as input the topology of the net-
work to determine which pairs of nodes can gossip. The experiments are per-
formed on a network of N = 2500 nodes, arranged in a square grid topology
(50×50), where each node can communicate only with its four immediate neigh-
bors (to the North, South, East and West). This configuration of nodes is arbitrary,
except for the fact that we require a large number of nodes for the observation
of emergent behavior. Our aim is to validate the correctness of our analytical
model, not to test the endless possibilities of network configurations. The model
and the shuffle protocol do not make any assumptions about the network. The net-
work configuration is provided by the simulation environment and can easily be
changed into something different, e.g., another network topology. For this reason,
we have chosen this large grid for testing, although other configurations could
have been possible. In the experiments that follow, after each gossiping round,
we measure the total number of occurrences of d in the network (replication), and
how many nodes in total have seen d (coverage).
Simulations with the shuffle protocol Each node in the network has a cache
size of c = 100, and sends s items when gossiping. In each round, every node
randomly selects one of its neighbors and shuffles. In order to make a fair com-
parison with the simulations with the model, we let the nodes gossip for 1000
rounds before initiating the measurements of the properties. After this start-up
period of 1000 rounds, items are replicated and the replicas fill the caches of all
nodes fulfilling the uniform distribution requirement of the model. At round 1000,
item d is inserted into the network at a random location. From that moment on we
track its replication and coverage.
Simulations with the model For the simulations with the model, n,c and s are
only system parameters. Instead of maintaining a cache, each node in the network
only maintains a variable that represents whether it holds item d or not (state 1 or
0, respectively). Nodes update their state in pairs according to the transition prob-
abilities introduced before (Fig. 3.2). This mimics an actual exchange of items
between a pair of nodes according to the shuffle protocol. While in the protocol
this results in both nodes updating the contents of their caches, in a simulation
using the analytical model updating the state of a node refers to updating only one
variable: whether the node is in possession of the item d or not. To sum up, we
use transition probabilities to update the state of one variable. Since we do not
need a start-up time for the simulations with the model, at round 0 we set the state
of a random node to 1 (while all the other have state 0) and track the state of the
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Figure 3.7: The shuffle protocol (left) and the model (right), for N = 2500, n =
500, c = 100 and different values of s.
nodes for the remainder of the simulation.
Fig. 3.7 shows the behavior of both the shuffle protocol and the analytical
model in terms of replication (upper row of Fig. 3.7) and coverage (lower row of
Fig. 3.7) of d, for various values of s. Each curve in the graphs represents the
average and standard deviation calculated over 100 runs. The experiments with
the model calculate Pdrop using the simplified formula n−cn−s described in Sec. 3.3.3.
It can be observed very clearly that the results obtained from the model (right)
resemble closely the ones from executing the protocol (left).
We note that in all cases, the network converges to a situation in which there
are 500 copies of d, meaning that replication is 5002500 = 0.2; this agrees with the
fact that c
n
= 100500 = 0.2. Moreover, our experiments show that replication and
coverage display the fastest convergence when s = 50; this agrees with the fact
that n−
√
n(n− c) = 500−√500 ·400 ≈ 50 (cf. Sec. 3.3.5).
3.5. MODELLING WITH DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS
In this section, we exploit the analytical model of information dissemination
to perform a mathematical analysis of replication and coverage with regard to the
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shuffle protocol. For the particular case of a network with full connectivity, we
can find explicit expressions for the dissemination of a generic item d in terms
of the probabilities presented in Sec. 3.3. We construct two differential equations
that capture replication and coverage of item d from a round-based perspective.
The advantage of this approach is that we can determine the long-term behavior
of the system as a function of the parameters. Differential equations have been
previously used, for example, in [Mitzenmacher 2001; Gupta et al. 2007; Ko et al.
2008] to model probabilistic protocols for large-scale distributed systems.
The characteristics of the replication and coverage are influenced by the topol-
ogy of the network. It is the topology of the network that will dictate the likelihood
of any two nodes to gossip. In order to model the properties of the protocol, it is
crucial that we know the probabilities of a node in a given state (0 or 1) to inter-
act with another node in a given state. For this reason, we choose to model the
properties for a fully-connected network, where a node can gossip with any other
node in the network. This topology allows us to easily calculate the probability of
a node in state 1 to interact with a node in state 0 or to interact with another node
in state 1. Knowing this, we concentrate on applying the state transition proba-
bilities that we calculated in Section 3.3. The aim of this section is to provide an
example of how the transition probabilities can be used to model the properties of
dissemination for a specific topology.
3.5.1. Replication
One node introduces a new item d into the network at time t = 0, by placing d
into its cache. From that moment on, d is replicated as a consequence of gossiping
among nodes.
Let x(t) represent the percentage of nodes in the network that have d in their
cache at time t, where each gossip round takes one time unit. The variation in x per
time unit dxdt can be derived based on the probability that an item d will replicate
or disappear after an exchange between two nodes, where at least one of the nodes
has d in its cache:
dx
dt = [P(11|10)+ P(11|01)] · (1− x) · x− [P(10|11)+ P(01|11)] · x · x
The first term, P(11|10) · x · (1− x), represents duplication of d when a node that
has d in its cache initiates the shuffle, and contacts a node that does not have the
item. The second term, P(11|01) · (1− x) · x, represents the opposite situation,
when a node that does not have the item d initiates a shuffle with a node that has
d and item d is replicated as a result. The third and fourth terms in the equation
(which decrease the replication) represent the cases where both gossiping nodes
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Figure 3.8: Percentage of nodes in the network with a replica of item d in their
cache, for N = 2500, c = 100, s = 50, and n = 500, n = 1000 or n = 2000.
have d in their cache, and after the exchange only one copy of d remains. Sub-
stituting P(11|10) = P(11|01) = s
c
c−s
n−s and P(10|11) = P(01|11) = sc n−cn−s c−sc , we
obtain
dx
dt = 2 ·
s
c
· c− s
n− s · x · (1−
n
c
· x)
The solution of this equation, taking into account that x(0) = 1N with N the number
of nodes in the network, is
x(t) =
eαt
(N− n
c
)+ n
c
eαt
(3.3)
where α denotes 2 s
c
c−s
n−s . By imposing stationarity, i.e.,
dx
dt = 0, we find the station-
ary solution c
n
. Hence, this calculation confirms the observation in Sec. 3.2.3 that
the network converges to a situation in which replication of d is c
n
.
We evaluate the accuracy of x(t) as a representation of the fraction of nodes
carrying a replica of d, by running a series of experiments where N = 2500 nodes
execute the shuffle protocol, and their caches are monitored for the presence of
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d. Unlike the experiments in Sec. 3.4, we assume full connectivity; that is, for
each node, all other nodes are within reach. After 1000 rounds, where items
are disseminated and replicated, a new item d is inserted at a random node, at
time t = 0. We track the number of replicas of d for the next 1000 rounds. The
experiment is repeated 100 times and the results are averaged. These simulation
results (average and standard deviation) for the protocol, together with x(t), are
presented in Fig. 3.8. This figure shows the same initial increase in replicas after
d has been inserted, and in all cases the steady state reaches precisely the expected
value c
n
predicted from the stationary solution.
We repeat the calculation from Sec. 3.3.5, but now against x(t), to determine
which size of the exchange buffer yields the fastest convergence to the steady-state
for both replication and coverage. That is, we search for the s that maximizes the
value of x(t). We first compute the derivative of x(t) with respect to s (z(t,s)),
and then derive the value of s that maximizes x(t), by taking z(·,m) = ∂x∂s |m = 0:
z(t,s) = ∂x∂s =
2ekt(cN−n)(cn+s(−2n+s))t
(cN+(−1+ekt)n)2(n−s)2
, where k = 2 s
c
c−s
n−s . Let z(t,s) = 0. For t > 0,
cn = s(2n− s). Solving this equation we get s = n±√n(n− c). Taking into the
account that s ≤ n, the only solution is s = n−
√
n(n− c). This also coincides
with the optimal exchange buffer size found in Sec. 3.3.5.
3.5.2. Coverage
We use the term coverage to denote the percentage of nodes in the network that
have seen item d from the moment it was introduced into the network. Let y(t)
represent the coverage of d at time t. The variation in coverage per time unit, dydt ,
is determined by the fraction of nodes that have not seen d, 1− y, that interacts
with nodes that have d in their cache, x. Let∗∈ {0,1}, then:
dy
dt =
1
2
· (P(1∗|01) ·P(∗1|∗1) · (1−y) ·x+P(∗1|10) ·P(1∗|1∗) ·x · (1−y)) (3.4)
The expression above is divided in two parts. The first part represents the
nodes that discover item d by initiating a shuffle with nodes that have d in their
cache (P(1∗|01)) and the second represents the nodes that discover d after being
contacted by nodes that have d (P(∗1|10)). Each of these scenarios has a 50%
chance of occurring, hence the 12 . In both cases, to increase the coverage it is
necessary that the node that discovers d does not give away its copy of d within
the same round to another node, as indicated by the probabilities P(∗1|∗1) and
P(1∗|1∗), respectively. This is because coverage is measured only at the end of
a gossiping round, meaning that a node that sees item d for the first time, and
drops it in the same round, is considered not to have seen item d yet.5 Since nodes
5The reason for this is that the application has an opportunity to read from the lower-level cache
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shuffle, on average, twice per round (once when they initiate the shuffle and again
if they are contacted by a neighbor), giving away a copy of d that a node has just
discovered can occur under two scenarios: i) the node acquired d by initiating
an exchange with a node that had d (P(1∗|01)) and next lost its copy of d when
shuffling with a node that contacted it, or ii) the node was first contacted by a node
that sent a copy of d (P(∗1|10)) and afterwards initiated a shuffle and gave away
its copy of d.
The value of the probability P(∗1|∗1) can be calculated from the following
cases: a) the gossip partner of the node does not have d, and: i) the state of two
nodes does not change after the gossip (P(01|01) · (1−x)), and ii) the gossip part-
ner obtains a copy of d after the gossip (P(11|01) · (1− x)); and b) the gossip
partner of the node has d, and: i) two nodes have the same state after the ex-
change (P(11|11) ·x), and ii) the gossip partner loses its copy of d after the gossip
(P(01|11) · x). Hence,
P(∗1|∗1) = (P(01|01)+ P(11|01))·(1− x)+ (P(11|11)+ P(01|11))·x
= P¬select + Pselect ·(P¬drop·(1− x)+ Pselect·x+ P¬drop·P¬select)
Due to the symmetry of both gossiping nodes, P(∗1|∗1) = P(1∗|1∗).
Substituting these probabilities into (3.4), we obtain
dy
dt =
s
c
·
(
1− s
c
+
s
c
· c− s
n− s
(
2− s
c
)
+
(
s
c
− c− s
n− s
)
· x
)
· (1− y) · x
The solution of this equation, taking into account that y(0) = 1N , is
y(t) = 1− (N−1) ·Nβ−1
((
N− n
c
)
+
n
c
· eαt
)−β
· e−λ
where λ denotes
s
c
·( sc− c−sn−s)
α· n
c
(
1
N − e
αt
(N− nc )+ nc eαt
)
, and β denotes nc ·κ+ sc ·( sc− c−sn−s)
α·( n
c
)2
, wherein
κ is s
c
· (1− s
c
+ s
c
· c−s
n−s
(
2− s
c
))
. By imposing stationarity dydt = 0, we find the sta-
tionary solution 1, meaning that eventually all nodes will see d.
In order to evaluate how closely y(t) models coverage, we use the traces from
the simulations executed for Sec. 3.5.1. At every round, the nodes that carry a
replica of d are identified, and a record of the nodes that have seen d since it was
published is kept.
Fig. 3.9 presents the coverage measured for three sets of experiments, each
set with a different value for n. As n increases, a newly inserted item requires
more time to cover the whole network. This is due to having more competition
only once every round.
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Figure 3.9: Percentage of nodes in the network that have already seen a replica of
item d, for N = 2500, c = 100, s = 50, and n = 500, n = 1000 or n = 2000.
from other items to create replicas in the limited space available, as was previously
shown in Fig. 3.8. However, as predicted by the stationary solution, in all cases
the coverage eventually reaches 1.
As shown in Fig. 3.9, the solution y(t) models the behavior observed in simu-
lations in case of n = 2000 and n = 1000, falling nicely within the standard devi-
ation of the simulation results. However, for smaller n (i.e., n = 500), the solution
y(t) becomes less accurate, converging slower than the simulation results.
Next, we describe a more accurate version of the coverage model, which con-
siders that nodes may be contacted an arbitrary number of times with a certain
probability defined by the network topology.
3.6. COVERAGE MODEL (REVISITED)
The coverage model in Sec. 3.5.2 has an implicit assumption that a node shuf-
fles two times per round (once when it initiates the gossip and once when it is
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of nodes according to the number of shuffles they exe-
cute per round, for a fully connected network of N = 2500 nodes.
contacted by another node). Although this is true on average, what actually hap-
pens is that a node initiates a shuffle once per round (with some random neighbor),
but can be contacted an arbitrary number of times (≤ N − 1). In Fig. 3.10), it is
depicted for k ≥ 1 which percentage of nodes, on average, shuffle k times in a
given round. The number of times a node shuffles in a round has an impact on
coverage. In this subsection, we revisit our coverage model to take into account
that there is a probability distribution for the number of times a node is contacted.
We compute the probability that a node is contacted i times by other nodes in
the network:
C(i) =
(
N−1
i
)(
1
N−1
)i(N−2
N−1
)(N−1)−i
, i ≤ N−1
Namely, there are
(N−1
i
)
ways to choose i nodes in a network of N−1 nodes
that contact the given node. Those i nodes contact the given node with probability
1
N−1 each, and the remaining (N−1)− i nodes do not contact the given node with
probability N−2N−1 .
A node may discover d during any of its shuffles. However, coverage is only
measured at the end of a gossip round, meaning that a node that sees item d for
the first time and drops it in the same round is considered not to have seen item d
at all.6 Consequently, coverage increases only under the following conditions: i) a
6The reason for this is that in general the application has an opportunity to read from the lower-
level cache only once every round.
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node that has not seen item d obtains a copy of item d during one of the contacts,
and ii) by the end of the round (after i exchanges), it still holds on to a copy of d.
In order to model coverage, we need to express the probabilities Pget that a
node that does not have a copy of d gets this copy in a shuffle, and Plose that a
node that has a copy of d loses this copy in a shuffle.
Pget = P(1∗|0∗) = x·P(1∗|01) = x·(P(10|01)+ P(11|01))
P¬get = 1−Pget
P¬lose = P(1∗|1∗) = x·P(1∗|11)+ (1− x)·P(1∗|10)
= x·(P(10|11)+ P(11|11))+ (1− x)·(P(10|10)+ P(11|10))
Plose = 1−P¬lose
The increase in coverage from one round to the next can be modelled by iden-
tifying all the possible cases where a node that has previously not seen item d
discovers it by the end of the round. Let Φi express the probability that a node that
does not hold d, does hold d after performing i shuffles. We have
Φi =
i−1
∑
m=0
(1−Φm) ·Pget · (P¬lose)(i−m)−1, i ≥ 0
where Φ0 = 0. Namely, the expression (1−Φm) ·Pget · (P¬lose)(i−m)−1 captures
the case where a node does not have the item at the end of m < i shuffles (with
probability 1−Φm), then discovers it in the mth shuffle (with probability Pget),
and does not lose it in the remaining shuffles (with probability (P¬lose)(i−m)−1).
In a given round, only the fraction 1− y of nodes in the network that did not
yet see item d can contribute to an increase in coverage. Such a node is contacted
i ≥ 0 times in the round with probability C(i), and then performs i + 1 shuffles
in total. With probability Φi+1 the node will hold item d at the end of the round.
Thus, coverage can be modelled by the equation
dy
dt = (1− y) ·
k
∑
i=0
C(i) ·Φi+1
where k is the maximum number of times that a node is contacted in a round, i.e.,
k = N−1.
As before, y(0) = 1N , as initially only one of the N nodes holds d.
For a network of 2500 nodes with full connectivity, the probability of a node
being contacted more than four times in one round is negligible (less than 1%). We
therefore use the aforementioned coverage model with a limit of k = 4 to estimate
the coverage and compare with our simulation traces. The results can be seen in
Fig. 3.11.
Unlike the results from Fig. 3.9, the current model not only falls into the stan-
dard deviation of the shuffle simulation results, but also closely reproduces the
curve of average values in all three cases (n = 500, n = 1000 and n = 2000).
62 MODELLING THE SHUFFLE PROTOCOL CHAP. 3
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
co
ve
ra
ge
 (%
 of
 no
de
s)
rounds
simulation (average)
model
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
co
ve
ra
ge
 (%
 of
 no
de
s)
rounds
simulation (average)
model
500 items 1000 items
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
co
ve
ra
ge
 (%
 of
 no
de
s)
rounds
simulation (average)
model
2000 items
Figure 3.11: Percentage of nodes in the network that have already seen a replica
of item d, for N = 2500, c = 100, s = 50, and n = 500, n = 1000 or n = 2000.
3.7. TIME COMPLEXITY OF EXPERIMENTS
In this section we discuss some topics/issues that arose during the develop-
ment and testing of the model for the shuffle protocol.
During the experimental phase of this work, we observed a remarkable dis-
parity between the time required to run an experiment with the shuffle protocol or
with the model. In both cases, the experiment was the same in terms of properties
being measured and parameters used (cache size c, exchange buffer size s, number
of different items n and network size N).
The difference in execution times can be traced back to the two different algo-
rithms executed at each simulated node. From a node’s point of view, the shuffle
protocol requires the selection of items to send to the gossiping partner and the
selection of items to keep for the next round. The first operation can be done in
linear time, O(c). The second operation requires checking if the incoming items
are already in the cache and removing entries from the cache if space is needed.
These steps can be done in O(c · log c) time. With the second operation dominat-
SEC. 3.8 CONCLUSIONS 63
ing the execution time, we can estimate the time complexity for one round of the
shuffle to be O(c · logc).
Now, let us look at the time complexity of the model. Unlike the protocol
implementation, the model requires very little state, namely the value of the pa-
rameters and a variable to indicate the presence or absence of item d. At each
round, each simulated node and its gossiping partner only have to determine their
current state (a1,b1) and transition to a new state (a2,b2) according to the ap-
propriate transition probabilities. The transition probabilities themselves do not
change during the simulation (since they depend solely on the parameters c, s and
n), so they are precomputed at the initialisation phase. As a result, the execution
of the model for each node has a constant time complexity, O(1).
The defining factor in the execution time of the simulations with the shuffle
protocol is the size of the cache. With a cache size of 100 for all of our experi-
ments, the execution times for our simulations with the shuffle protocol and the
model differed by approximately two orders of magnitude. Considering that large
networks are needed to clearly observe emergent behavior and that this behavior
evolves over many rounds, the value of having a model becomes evident. Be-
ing simply parameters in the model, the cache size and exchange buffer size have
no effect on the memory requirements and execution time of the simulation, thus
freeing computational resources to experiment with larger networks and different
topologies.
3.8. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have demonstrated that it is possible to model a gossip
protocol through a rigorous probabilistic analysis of the state transitions of a pair
of nodes engaged in the gossip. We have shown, through an extensive simulation
study, that the dissemination of a data item can be faithfully reproduced by the
model. Having an accurate model of node interactions, we have been able to carry
out the following:
• After finding precise expressions for the probabilities involved in the model,
we provide a simplified version of the transition probabilities. These sim-
plified, yet accurate, expressions can be easily computed, allowing us to
simulate the dissemination of an item without the complexity of execut-
ing the actual shuffle protocol. These simulations use very little state (only
some parameters and variables, as opposed to maintaining a cache) and can
be executed in a fraction of the time required to run the protocol.
• The model reveals the relationships between the parameters of the system.
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Armed with this knowledge, we successfully optimized one of the param-
eters (the size of the exchange buffer) to obtain the fastest convergence of
the observed properties.
• Under the assumption of full connectivity, we are able to use the transition
probabilities to model the properties of the dissemination of a generic item.
Each property is ultimately expressed as a formula which is shown to dis-
play the same behavior as the average behavior of the protocol, verifying
the validity of the model.
While gossip protocols are easy to understand, even for a simple push/pull pro-
tocol, the interactions between nodes are unexpectedly complex. Understanding
these interactions provides insight into the mechanics behind the emergent behav-
ior observed in gossip protocols. We believe that understanding the mechanics of
gossiping is the key to optimizing (and even shaping) the emergent properties that
make gossiping appealing as communication paradigm for distributed systems.
CHAPTER 4
Canning Spam in Wireless
Gossip Networks
Thus far, we have engaged in a thorough study of gossiping as a mechanism for
information dissemination. At first instance, we explored the properties of the
dissemination experimentally, simulating a variety of scenarios within the context
of an application (the Gossip-based News Service). The positive results from that
stage led us to delve into a probabilistic analysis of the dissemination of a sin-
gle data item that resulted in the modelling of the interactions between gossiping
nodes. Having verified the properties observed in simulation through theoretical
analysis and having observed that the shuffle protocol successfully replicates and
disseminates an item throughout the network, we can conclude that gossiping is
a promising mechanism for dissemination in wireless networks. However, the
underlying assumption behind our analysis is that the nodes participating in the
gossip do so in good faith and, as such, adhere to the requirements of the gossip
protocol. Unfortunately, this might not always be true.
The assumption of good behavior excludes two very likely scenarios: the pos-
sibility of faulty nodes or, more troubling, the presence of malicious nodes in the
network. Faulty nodes may deviate from the original protocol in unpredictable
ways (e.g., gossiping at different frequencies or sending more data items than re-
quired.) On the other hand, malicious nodes may have a specific motivation for
misbehaving. In a network of gossiping nodes, a clear motive for misbehaving
would be to replicate and disseminate a data item faster than the rest. In other
words, spamming the network with certain data items.
Once a problem associated only with email, spam is now affecting other me-
dia, such as instant messaging, blogs, newsgroups and mobile phone messaging.
As wireless networks become more commonplace, we can expect that spam will
find its way into upcoming wireless communication services. This chapter stud-
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ies the threat posed by malicious nodes inserting spam in a wireless network us-
ing gossiping as a method for information dissemination. We identify the secu-
rity mechanisms needed to protect our gossip network against the proliferation of
spam, reducing the problem to a matter of finding and removing corrupted mes-
sages. Finally, we propose a probabilistic method of integrity checking to contain
the spread of spam which we evaluate through extensive simulations.
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Being an extremely robust and scalable communication model, gossiping ap-
pears to be an ideal solution for information dissemination in highly dynamic
environments, such as wireless networks. The simplicity and distributed nature of
gossiping has already sparked interest for its use in wireless environments, rang-
ing from sensor networks to MANETs. However, while gossip networks are often
described as being robust to failures, their ability to cope with malicious behavior
is rarely addressed. They can gracefully handle the departure of more than half
of their members, but this strength would not be as impressive if a few malicious
insiders could cause serious damage.
The effectiveness of gossiping is based on the collective effort by the nodes
in the network, which results in the workload (and responsibility) being divided
among the collection of nodes. With every node playing an equal role in the
network, adhering to the agreed code-of-conduct is essential. However, assuming
that every node will behave appropriately would be naive. It can be expected that
the introduction of malicious nodes will disturb the balance in the gossip network.
The extent of the disruption is the focus of this study.
In this chapter, we explore the effect of having malicious nodes in a wireless
gossip network used for information dissemination. The attack of choice for these
malicious nodes is spamming. In the broadest sense of the word, spam is defined
as unsolicited email. While spam often refers to unrequested emails of commer-
cial nature that are sent in bulk, the term is also used to describe irrelevant or inap-
propriate messages in newsgroups or message boards, as well as non-commercial
emails (religious, political, etc.) or junk mail. Nowadays, spam is not restricted to
email anymore. It has made its way into other media, such as instant messaging,
blogs, newsgroups, p2p networks and mobile phone messaging. For the purpose
of this chapter, we refer to any kind of message placed in the network as a result
of malicious behavior as spam.
For the most part, nodes in a wireless network have limited resources com-
pared to the average wired workstation making spam a serious threat and not just
a nuisance. As our network is being used to disseminate information, it is only
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Figure 4.1: Spread of spam after 5, 50 and 450 rounds of gossiping. Nodes are ar-
ranged in a 50 x 50 grid with 1% of nodes being spammers. The level of pollution
of their caches is indicated by the height and brightness of the surface.
natural that selfish nodes would try to exploit the system by overloading it to suit
their needs. The intent of these malicious nodes may be to achieve maximum ex-
posure or even to destroy the system by polluting it with junk. Regardless of their
motivation, our interest lies in determining the extent of the threat and minimiz-
ing the damage as much as possible without resorting to expensive and complex
solutions.
4.1.1. The Problem with Spam in Wireless Gossip Networks
Gossiping as a method for information dissemination relies strongly on informa-
tion being forwarded through randomly chosen paths. At each step, information is
passed along to another peer selected on-the-go, making it virtually impossible to
anticipate the path that a piece of information will travel. This random movement
of information works in favor of dissemination as it ensures that information will
find its way to all peers with certain probabilistic guarantees.
The problem with spam in a gossip network is intrinsically related to the dis-
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semination properties of gossiping. As has been noted before [Demers et al. 1987],
once a piece of information is gossiped it is extremely hard to remove it from the
network unless special mechanisms for removal are in place. This makes the spam
problem much more severe in a gossip network than spam email on the internet,
from a theoretical point of view. Gossip networks used for data dissemination re-
duce the amount of work for the spammer to the bare minimum of injecting the
spam and then sit back and watch as all other peers collaborate to deliver the spam.
There is no need for the spammer to go through the process of trying to collect the
addresses of potential targets. Knowing only one node in the network is enough
for the spammer to start operating. After all, all other nodes will make sure that
his/her message is delivered.
As for accountability, the spammer is in an enviable position. In gossip net-
works, the nodes themselves act as routers for the delivery of data. As a result,
nodes can not be held accountable for the data they deliver. This makes track-
ing down the source of the spam (or any other piece of data for that matter) very
difficult. In addition, gossip networks are often promoted on the merits of being
decentralized (no central authority) and robust (being able to deal with nodes com-
ing and going gracefully). This works in favor of a malicious node too, as there is
no central authority to keep track of its behavior and its sudden joining or leaving
will not disrupt the network or be seen as suspicious.
4.1.2. Motivating example
The magnitude of the damage that can be caused by a few malicious nodes in a
gossip network can best be illustrated through an example. Consider a collection
of nodes arranged in a grid, gossiping with their four neighbors to the North,
South, East and West. They gossip according to the shuffle protocol, which was
introduced in Chapter 2. The most important observation to make about the shuffle
protocol is that any two nodes that engage in a shuffle essentially swap a number
of data entries from their caches. In doing so, they not only preserve the data
that are collectively stored in the network, but also “move” these data around in
a seemingly random fashion. The underlying idea is that by randomly shuffling
data entries between nodes, all nodes will be able to see all data eventually.
Nodes gossip periodically, swapping half of the contents of their caches with
a randomly chosen neighbor. In our scenario shown in Figure 4.1, after nodes
have been shuffling for some time (50 cycles or rounds), malicious nodes appear.
These spammers account for 1% of the network, but the effect of their actions is
devastating to the network. Instead of forwarding the messages from their peers,
they drop them and replace them with spam. Figure 4.1 shows how the caches
of the nodes become polluted with spam. In just 5 rounds their presence can be
felt. Gradually, they replace valid items with their own, filling up the network with
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spam. Eventually, the network will be saturated with spam at 100% and all valid
items will have been lost.
4.1.3. Contribution
Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that wireless gossip networks are
highly vulnerable to the proliferation of spam. In fact, we claim that without any
security mechanisms, spammers could easily take advantage of the dissemination
properties of gossiping to overwhelm the network, consuming valuable resources
(storage space, bandwidth and processor cycles) at the same time. Second, by
means of well-established security measures, we reduce the spam problem to a
matter of integrity checking. Additionally, we propose a probabilistic solution
for verifying the integrity of messages which succeeds not only in reducing the
amount of spam in the network, but also in restricting its dissemination.
4.2. SYSTEM MODEL
4.2.1. General Description
We focus on a system where a heterogeneous mix of fixed and mobile nodes,
ranging from mobile devices such as PDAs and smart phones to PCs with internet
access, collaborate by volunteering storage space for the creation of a collective
data space. Users in the system are able to publish events, which we call items, of
interest to other users. The nodes in the system devote a limited amount of space,
which we refer to as their caches, to store items. The collection of caches of all
nodes in the network makes up a collective data space.
The caches are updated periodically using the shuffle protocol, introduced in
Chapter 2. As a result, the items in a node’s cache are in transit, which means
that they could be exchanged for other items at any moment. Items are not pur-
posefully routed. Once published, they become part of the collective data space,
replicating themselves (the number of replicas is dictated by the storage capacity
of the network) and moving freely through the network (geographic restrictions
for the dissemination of items are also possible).
Taking part in gossip exchanges results in a node populating its cache with a
collection of items. As the cache size is limited, the contents of a cache constitute
a sample of the totality of items available in the network.
Users of the system can discover items of interest by going through the items
in the local cache. Depending on the number of items in the network, the local
cache may not contain all items of interest to a user at a particular time. Nev-
ertheless, as demonstrated experimentally (in Chapter 2) and through modelling
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(in Chapter 3) all items of interest can be discovered after participating in enough
gossip exchanges. Items of interest can then be stored separately in the node’s
private data store.
4.2.2. Assumptions
Items can be published by any user of the system and are propagated through the
network in the form of entries. While an item is a piece of information, an entry
is the representation of the item in the network and for each item several entries
may exist. The dissemination of entries occurs between neighboring nodes that
exchange entries. As entries are gossiped, replication may occur naturally if a
node has available storage space to keep a copy of an entry. As a result, after an
item is published and gossiped, many entries for this item may be present in the
network, The number of entries per item is dictated by the capacity of the network
and the number of items published, as explained earlier in 2.3.3.
A unique id is associated with each node. The entries that a node inserts into
the network can be uniquely identified by a combination of the node id and a se-
quence number. In its most basic form, an entry contains a unique id, a timestamp
and a time-to-live. There may be other fields of information depending on the
application. A limited number of these entries can be stored by each node in its
local cache. A node can store, at most, c entries in its cache. For our experiments,
all nodes have the same cache size c. Nodes in the network gossip periodically,
exchanging the entries in their caches. We define a round as a gossiping interval
in which each node initiates an exchange once.
4.3. PREPARING FOR THE FIGHT
Securing a gossip-based system like the one we propose against malicious
nodes requires 1) regulating the entry of nodes into the system (access control), 2)
being able to accurately identify the source of an item (source node authentication)
3) ensuring the integrity of messages and 4) enforcing fair use of the system (rate
control). We discuss these issues in turn.
4.3.1. Access Control
To ensure that only authorized nodes can join the network, issuing credentials for
these nodes is required. One possible solution is to have a Certification Authority
(CA) certify a public key for each node. This procedure would only take place
once, establishing the identity of each node and allowing nodes to refuse commu-
nication with outsiders. In a CA-based solution like this the nodes would need to
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pass along their public key as well as a signature by the CA on the public key.
It can be argued that having a centralized component like a CA, even if only
during the initial phase, goes against the spirit of ad hoc networking. This problem
has been addressed with the proposal of distributed CAs. Zhou and Haas [Zhou
and Haas 1999] propose the idea of having a distributed certificate authority by us-
ing threshold cryptography, where a cryptographic operation is split among mul-
tiple users. Later works build on this idea and propose refinements to improve
the access to the CA services [Kong et al. 2001] and improve efficiency [Khalili
et al. 2003]. The latter combines ideas of threshold and ID-based cryptography
allowing nodes to use their ID as their public key. The key generation service
is distributed among the participants allowing them to obtain the private key cor-
responding to their identity by contacting a predefined number of nodes in the
network.
4.3.2. Source Node Authentication
By the time an item arrives at a particular node’s cache, it has most likely been
shuffled around several times by other nodes. As a result, when a node receives
an item from a neighbor, it cannot make any assumptions about the item’s origin.
In order to be able to identify the source of a item, it is necessary for the item to
be digitally signed by the original node who published it.
4.3.3. Integrity
Given that most likely an item has been forwarded several times before reaching
an interested user, the item has to be protected against malicious insiders who may
want to modify its contents. By having the source sign the item, a user can check
if the item has been modified along the way.
An ideal solution for preserving the integrity of items in the network would
be to verify the integrity of each item at every hop. This would require that ev-
ery node executes a public key signature verification operation for every item it
receives from a neighbor. The computational workload of such a solution could
be prohibitive for mobile and embedded devices. [Roman et al. 2007] evaluates
the suitability of a collection of cryptographic primitives for resource-constrained
devices. Using two different platforms (MicaZ and TelosB) to test software im-
plementations of public key cryptography, the results for verification of signatures
measure in the order of seconds. More recent work [Granjal et al. 2008], evalu-
ates several well-known symmetric key and hashing algorithms on MicaZ motes.
The memory requirements for the algorithms are, in most cases, too high for these
generation of nodes and the computational and energy demands imposed by cryp-
tography are significant. Unless hardware implementations of the algorithms are
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available, the cost of verifying every item, considering that in the gossip protocol
we use several items are received from a neighbor, is unfeasible.
Instead of verifying every item, a more efficient way of ensuring the network
remains free of forged items is for every node to do a batch verification of the
signatures on items received from a neighbor. Verifying multiple signatures in
batches is less expensive than verifying each signature at a time. We elaborate
more on this and propose our own solution for ensuring the integrity of items in
Sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively.
4.3.4. Rate Control
The shuffle protocol ensures that, on average, each item has the same number of
entries in the network. Given that the collective storage space is limited, a larger
number of different items in the network results in a smaller number of entries per
item. Therefore, a node producing an excessive number of items would occupy a
large portion of the storage space with its items reducing the number of entries that
other nodes can place. To ensure that nodes do not abuse the system by flooding
the network with their own items, a mechanism for rate control is needed.
This flooding of items by a node is a form of a denial-of-service attack. As
shown in Chapter 2 (see 2.3.3) , the dissemination speed of items through the
network is inversely proportional to the number of items published. It follows that
the insertion of an excessive number of items by one node has a negative effect
on the performance of the system, given that dissemination speed is sensitive to
the number of items in the network. In essence, more items in the network (due
to one node’s excessive publishing) result in the dissemination speed of all items
slowing down. For this reason, it is necessary to prevent a node from publishing
an excessive number of items. Otherwise, a single “overactive” node could cause
the service to slow down to the point of not being useful anymore.
Rate control can be enforced by restricting the id space of items per node. This
way, a node would be allowed to have at most x items in the network at any point
in time, where x is the size of the id space of items per node. For example, the id
space of items per node could be restricted to n bits resulting in 2n items. After a
node has published 2n items with different ids, the next published item will have
the same id as one of the previously published items. Since nodes are only allowed
to hold one entry per item based on the item id, the more recently published item
will overwrite the older item in the network resulting in an upper bound for the
amount of storage space occupied by a node’s items. With d published items in
the network, a node could only occupy at most x/d of the collective storage space.
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4.4. SPAMMING THROUGH THE CORRUPTION OF MESSAGES
The shuffle protocol ensures fairness, meaning that each node can use up the
same fraction of collective storage space for its items. As a result, a malicious
node can insert only so much spam under its own identity. In order to place more
spam in the network, a malicious node would have to utilize the ID space of items
per node assigned to other nodes. Analogous to the way an email spammer uses
false email identities to increase the likelihood that his spam makes its way into
our inboxes, a malicious node in our gossip network can place more spam by
corrupting the content of the entries that pass through its cache. In essence, a
malicious node would be replacing the content of other nodes’ entries with its
own while keeping the entries’ metadata (ID, signatures, ...) intact. This way,
the spammer can steal the storage space of other nodes and create more instances
of its messages. The spam problem then becomes a problem of preserving the
integrity of messages.
4.4.1. The threat of malicious insiders
With the measures to prevent unauthorized nodes from infiltrating the network in
place, being able to cope with attacks from malicious insiders becomes the biggest
challenge. Our gossip network obtains its desirable properties from the periodic
execution of a specific gossip protocol at every node. Having nodes in the network
behave differently can pose a major threat to the system.
Unlike fixed networks, wireless networks rely on nodes forwarding messages
for their neighbors. Without a trusted routing infrastructure available, a great deal
of responsibility is placed on the forwarding nodes to deliver a message. As-
suming that malicious nodes are present, at every hop there is a chance that the
message might be tampered with. In addition to this, we are dealing with a gos-
siping system that relies heavily on randomness to forward its messages. The
combination of these two aspects result in malicious insiders having plenty of op-
portunities to corrupt the content of messages and be safe from detection due to
the random nature of gossiping.
4.4.2. Checking all messages at every hop
A conventional approach to security can be applied to ensure the integrity of items.
Under this scheme, all entries in the network are required to be signed by their
publisher and are subject to integrity checks. Integrity checks can be used to fight
attacks based on replays of old entries and modification of entries, as the checks
would discover that the content of the entry has been tampered with. However,
given that in our system items are constantly being gossiped, verifying all entries
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received during a gossip exchange would be computationally very expensive. In
essence, an entry would have to be verified at every hop. Even though doing this
would permit the identification of malicious nodes as soon as they appear, the cost
of following this approach would be prohibitive.
4.4.3. Batch Verification
An alternative to verifying the signatures of the entries received one-by-one is to
do a batch verification [Bellare et al. 1998]. Verifying multiple digital signatures
simultaneously, instead of verifying each one individually, can be done at lower
costs with different schemes for fast verification of digital signatures in batches.
These schemes test the validity of all signatures in a batch and the test would
succeed only if all signatures are valid. The drawback is that batch verification
does not identify which signatures are invalid in the batch. This is, however, not
critical since discovering any invalid signature in the batch would be enough to
conclude that we have come in contact with a malicious node.
Having all nodes do batch verification of signatures after receiving items from
a neighbor would allow nodes to discard any invalid batch and take measures
against the neighbor who forwarded the dubious entries. However, the benefits of
using batch verification are only evident when a large number of signatures are
tested. Therefore, unless nodes are exchanging a large number of items at a time,
batch verification could still be expensive. Furthermore, it is necessary to use a
digital signature scheme where its batch verification algorithm allows a batch of
signatures from different signers.
4.5. PROBABILISTIC VERIFICATION
As an alternative solution to checking all entries at every hop, we propose
a more flexible and cost efficient approach to combating malicious nodes. Our
solution is based on a probabilistic selection of the entries to be checked.
4.5.1. Selection of entries to verify
The verification phase is incorporated into the shuffle protocol in the following
way:
• In selectItemsToKeep(), each node decides how to merge the entries
in its cache with the entries received from the selected peer. Before merging,
a probabilistic verification phase is executed.
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• Each of the received entries is checked with a probability Pcheck. The in-
tegrity of an entry is checked by verifying its digital signature. If the entry
is valid, then it is marked as checked. Otherwise, the entry is discarded.
• The entries that were not selected for checking and the ones that passed the
check are merged into the local cache.
Note that as a result of executing the probabilistic verification phase whenever
a set of entries is received, a subset of the entries in a node’s cache will be marked
as checked. The next time the node executes the shuffle (and sends a random
selection of entries from its cache to a neighbor) some of the entries it sends will
be marked as checked. The receiving node may confirm that its neighbor is
properly checking and marking entries if it selects one of these checked entries
for verification and it passes the test. Before placing any received entries in its
cache, the receiver removes the checked marks generated by the sender and
only flags as checked the entries that it has verified itself.
4.5.2. Attack model
To test the validity of probabilistic verification as a technique to counter malicious
behavior in the form of corruption of entries, we assume that a small percentage of
the nodes in the network are malicious insiders while the rest behaves according
to our gossip protocol.
Malicious nodes execute a slightly different version of the shuffle protocol. In
selectItemsToSend(), the selected entries are corrupted, with the exception
of the entries marked as checked. The reason for this is that sending a corrupted
entry marked as checked will raise suspicion if the receiving node executes an
integrity check on that entry. In this chapter, other nodes do not make an effort
to detect malicious nodes and take measures against them (this is the subject of
current study). Nevertheless, we assume that malicious nodes are cautious. As
malicious nodes do not want to be trivially discovered, they will execute integrity
checks with a Pcheck probability and will only corrupt entries that are not marked
as checked, thus avoiding direct responsibility for any corrupted entry they have
forwarded.
4.6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The results presented in this section correspond to a network of 2500 nodes
with a cache size of 100. The nodes were arranged in a square grid topology, with
50 nodes on each side over an area of 50×50 units. The range of each node was set
to 1 unit, making communication possible with the node’s immediate neighbors
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Figure 4.2: Number of corrupted entries in the network when 1% of nodes are
malicious.
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the probability of checking an entry, Pcheck.
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Figure 4.4: Spread of spam after 450 rounds since the appearance of 25 spammers
(1% of nodes in the network).
to the North, South, East and West. Nodes placed at random locations in the
grid were selected to be malicious. Experiments were conducted for different
concentrations of malicious nodes (1%, 2% and 5%).
4.6.1. Amount of Spam in the Network
Malicious nodes carry out a very simple attack: corrupt as many entries that pass
through as possible, taking into account that some entries will need to be checked.
In the absence of any measures to counter the pollution of the network with cor-
rupted entries, this kind of attack is extremely effective.
Figure 4.2 shows the spread of corrupted entries through the network over
time. In the experiment, 25 malicious nodes (1% of the network) appear at round
50 and from that moment start corrupting entries. Entries do a random walk
through the network which leads to each item eventually visiting every node in the
network, including the malicious ones. As a result, without any integrity checks,
the number of corrupted entries keeps increasing until all entries in the network are
corrupted. On the other hand, when nodes execute probabilistic checks, the num-
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ber of corrupted entries soon reaches an equilibrium where the amount of spam
generated matches the amount of spam dropped by non-malicious nodes. Experi-
ments with 50 and 125 malicious nodes (2% and 5% of the network, respectively)
show similar behavior, but converging to different levels of spam. In all cases,
spam spreads through the network after the appearance of malicious nodes, but
after an initial period of growth, the amount of spam settles at a level inversely
proportional to Pcheck.
The number of spammers present during an experiment directly affects the
amount of spam in the network, as we show in Figure 4.3, which summarizes our
experiments regarding the amount of spam in the network. For each number of
spammers (25, 50 and 125) and value of Pcheck (from 5% to 35%, with increments
of 5), the level to which the amount of spam converges was recorded (by averaging
the last 200 rounds) in order to show the relationship between the amount of spam
in the network and the probability of checking a received entry. We observe that
the amount of spam is inversely proportional to Pcheck. As can be expected, it is
also proportional to the number of spammers in the network. This is due to each
spammer creating an independent “spam heap” in its surroundings.
The effect of probabilistic verification is that corrupted entries are restricted
from spreading too far away from the source, as they become more likely to be
removed by a non-malicious node with every hop. Figure 4.4 shows how spam
is contained within an area surrounding the spammer. The snapshots, taken at
round 500 for different values of Pcheck, clearly illustrate the benefit of probabilistic
verification not only in reducing the amount of spam, but also in decreasing its
reach.
4.6.2. Reach of Spam in the Network
In the same way as the amount of spam reaches a particular equilibrium point
depending on the checking probability, the average distance (in hops) from the
source that spam travels also reaches a stable state, as can be seen in Figure 4.5.
In this experiment, for each corrupted entry we record the distance (in hops) from
its source and calculate an average distance at every round. This average distance
serves as an indicator of how far away spam travels before being discovered and
removed. After an initial period where corrupted entries find their way into the
caches of nodes in the vicinity of a spammer, the corrupted entries start being
dropped, preventing their dissemination any further. Notice how the steady state
to which the average distance converges in Figure 4.5 is inversely proportional to
Pcheck. Experiments with 2% and 5% of malicious nodes converge to very similar
values.
By measuring the value to which the average distance converges (by averaging
the last 200 rounds), we can observe its relationship with the checking probability
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Figure 4.5: Average distance (in hops) of corrupted entries from their source over
time (in rounds) , with 1% of malicious nodes in the network.
as well as the number of spammers. Figure 4.6 shows the average number of hops
away from the source that spam travels with respect to the probability of checking
for 25, 50 and 125 malicious nodes. An important observation depicted in this
graph is that the distance traveled by the spam is independent of the number of
malicious nodes present. In fact, the heaps of spam generated by spammers may
overlap, as seen previously in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.7, which shows the number of spam entries that have traveled a cer-
tain number of hops, summarizes the effectiveness of probabilistic verification as
a way of reducing and containing spam. In this graph, we observe (after 500
rounds) the distribution of spam according to the distance from the source for var-
ious values of Pcheck. It is evident from the area covered by each curve that higher
values of Pcheck reduce the amount of spam in the network as well as reduce the
area affected by spam.
4.7. RELATED WORK
Previous work has looked at malicious behavior in wireless ad hoc networks as
a problem of lack of cooperation and selfish behavior (for example, not forwarding
messages to save energy). Security in wireless environments has concentrated
mostly on the routing layer by modifying existing routing protocols, such as DSR
and AODV.
Efforts to alleviate the problem of malicious behavior by enforcing coopera-
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tion include payment systems [Buttyan and Hubaux 2000] and reputation systems
[Buchegger and Le Boudec 2004]. Payment schemes assume that a node can be
swayed away from his selfish behavior through economic incentives, while rep-
utation systems usually rely on second-hand reputation reports (which could be
false). [Bansal and Baker 2003] avoids issues of trust by relying only on first-hand
observations to build the reputation of a node. In any case, reputation systems aim
to isolate the malicious node. In our work, we are interested in reducing the ef-
fectiveness of spamming instead of detecting the misbehaving node. We believe
that containing the dissemination of spam to the malicious node’s neighborhood
will discourage malicious behavior in the network. By focusing on the authen-
ticity of the messages in the network (without judging other nodes), our work is
more closely related to the efforts to counteract content pollution in peer-to-peer
networks [Walsh and Sirer 2005].
4.8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, we explored the vulnerability of wireless gossip networks to
spamming attacks. We showed that the probabilistic nature of information dis-
semination in gossip networks makes these networks specially susceptible to the
proliferation of spam. In an effort to secure the network, we proposed that only
accredited nodes be allowed to gossip. With only authorized nodes gossiping, our
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efforts focused on dealing with malicious insiders, as these malicious nodes could
only spam by taking over the identity of other nodes. This resulted in our proposal
of probabilistic verification of messages as a way to fight spam. We evaluated this
technique through extensive simulations showing that the amount of spam is ef-
fectively reduced and its spread restricted.
As mentioned earlier when describing the attack model, malicious behavior
could raise suspicion in neighboring nodes. However, the current protocol does
not include a mechanism to react when faced with changes in the amount of spam
received. In that sense, the current protocol takes a proactive approach to fighting
spam. The problem with this approach lies in the constant toll it takes on the
nodes, requiring a fixed number of checks to be performed regardless of the threat.
It is clear that during periods when the threat is low, it would be desirable to
lower the number of checks performed. Likewise, when faced with heavy spam-
ming, an increase in the checking would be appropriate. The next chapter, Enforc-
ing Data Integrity, focuses on making this possible by observing the traffic from
neighbors and maintaining a variable Pcheck for each neighbor that a node has. The
new goals are then to a) dynamically adjust the checking probabilities for each
neighbor and b) be able to detect suspicious behavior by analyzing the traffic at
each link, which will allow us to take action against suspicious nodes.
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CHAPTER 5
Enforcing Data Integrity
Ad hoc networks rely on nodes forwarding each other’s packets, making trust and
cooperation key issues for ensuring network performance. As long as all nodes in
the network belong to the same organization and share the same goal (in military
scenarios, for example), it can generally be expected that all nodes can be trusted.
However, as wireless technology becomes more commonplace, we can foresee the
appearance of very large, heterogeneous networks where the intentions of neigh-
boring nodes are unknown. Without any security measures in place, any node is
capable of compromising the integrity of the data it forwards. Our goal for this
chapter is to ensure the integrity of the data being disseminated without resorting
to complex and expensive solutions. Building on the work presented in the previ-
ous chapter, we aim to enforce data integrity by discouraging malicious behavior
in two ways: a) enforcing integrity checks close to the source and b) refusing to
communicate with obviously malicious nodes. We find that by having nodes sam-
ple their traffic for corrupted messages, malicious nodes can be identified with
high accuracy, in effect transforming our collection of nodes into a self-policing
network.
5.1. INTRODUCTION
Given the dynamic nature, often unreliable links and lack of a central authority
that characterize wireless ad hoc networks, giving any hard guarantees regarding
their performance is a difficult task. The situation becomes even more complex
if we envision very large networks of heterogeneous nodes. In this scenario, not
only would we have to deal with the issue of scale, but also with the fact that we
cannot be certain of the willingness of all nodes to cooperate towards a common
goal. The lack of a central authority to oversee the good behavior of nodes is a
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clear disadvantage.
A common assumption is that nodes adhere to executing the chosen commu-
nication protocol. Under this condition, content can be disseminated through the
network in a reliable way. However, when some nodes decide not to play by the
rules, the characteristics of the dissemination as well as the reliability of the con-
tent being forwarded might change. As before, we refer to any kind of message
placed in the network as a result of malicious behavior as spam, as these unso-
licited messages serve only the interest of the malicious node(s) and waste the
already limited resources in the network. We use the term malicious node and
spammer interchangeably.
This chapter studies the effect of having misbehaving nodes that compromise
the integrity of the data being disseminated in an ad hoc network and the measures
that can be taken to counteract such malicious behavior. Since we are dealing with
large-scale networks, our intention is to develop effective solutions that scale eas-
ily. Therefore, we favor simplicity and the use of local interactions and decisions
only.
5.1.1. The Cost of Guaranteeing Data Integrity
The conventional approach to ensuring the integrity of a message is to require
that the message be signed by its creator. By verifying the digital signature on
the message, the receiver can be assured of its integrity. However, this procedure
is computationally expensive. In a wireless ad hoc network, where nodes act
themselves as routers, a message may have traveled several hops before reaching
its destination. Due to the lack of a trusted infrastructure for routing, the message
might have become corrupted along the way. If that is the case, and the receiver
verifies this with an integrity check, the cost incurred due to the corrupted message
is not just limited to the verification of the signature, but it also includes the cost
of routing. This situation could be avoided by executing integrity checks at every
hop. As a result, data integrity would be guaranteed and malicious nodes could be
easily detected.
The downside of this approach is the heavy computational load inflicted on the
nodes, as each node would have to check every message it forwards. Therefore,
even at times when no malicious nodes are present, the nodes in the network would
be wasting resources checking valid messages.
5.1.2. Contribution
The ideas presented in this chapter build on the previous chapter, which explored
the vulnerability of wireless gossip networks to spamming attacks. In Chapter 4,
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nodes deal with corrupted content (spam) generated by malicious nodes by exe-
cuting integrity checks on their incoming traffic with a certain fixed probability
Pcheck. The result of these probabilistic checks is a reduction in the amount of
spam and its spread away from the source. As can be expected, the effectiveness
in fighting spam is highly related to the value of Pcheck used by all nodes. It should
be noted that all nodes execute integrity checks with a probability Pcheck blindly,
regardless of the presence of spammers or corrupted content.
Our current work strives to find a middle ground with regard to the workload
imposed on nodes to guarantee the integrity of data in the network. First, we
present a probabilistic data verification scheme, which dynamically adapts the
workload of each individual node according to the threat of malicious nodes in
its surroundings, in essence reducing the amount of work required by nodes that
are not in the vicinity of malicious nodes. As a result, the overall workload in
the network is kept low and it concentrates around the malicious nodes. Second,
we take a proactive approach to enforcing data integrity in the network by having
the nodes constantly monitor the good behavior of their neighbors. In addition,
we show that the immediate neighbors of malicious nodes are able to detect their
suspicious behavior with high accuracy, enabling them to take measures to prevent
further corruption of data.
Nodes make their own decisions to regulate traffic according to perceived ad-
herence to good behavior by their neighbors. As a consequence, suspicious behav-
ior is penalized and the malicious nodes are faced with the decision of adhering to
the rules or be isolated.
5.1.3. Related Work
In our work, discovery of malicious nodes is made possible by statistical anal-
ysis of incoming messages. Unlike reputation-based systems [Buchegger and
Le Boudec 2005] where nodes rely on second-hand reputation reports (which
could be false) to determine if a neighbor is misbehaving, our approach avoids
issues of trust by relying only on first-hand observations to asses the behavior of a
neighbor. In that sense, our work lies closer to [Bansal and Baker 2003], which re-
lies only on first-hand observations to build the reputation of a node. Other efforts
to alleviate the problem of malicious behavior by enforcing cooperation include
payment systems [Buttyan and Hubaux 2000] which assume that a node can be
swayed away from his selfish behavior through economic incentives.
From the data integrity point of view, our work is closely related to the efforts
to counteract content pollution in peer-to-peer networks [Walsh and Sirer 2005]. A
related problem due to malicious behavior is index poisoning [Liang et al. 2006],
which could lead to effective distributed denial-of-service attacks [Naoumov and
Ross 2006].
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Previous work in data aggregation has also addressed the threat of malicious
nodes by using cryptographic and statistical techniques [Garofalakis et al. 2007;
Przydatek et al. 2003]. In this case, the goal of the attackers is to make a user ac-
cept false aggregation results without the user being aware that the results deviate
significantly from the true result of the aggregation. Work in this area aims for
the user to reject a result with a high probability if it is not a good approximation
of the true value of the aggregation. Unlike these projects, the work we present
in this chapter is not concerned with in-network processing. In other words, we
do not assume that data is processed by intermediate nodes. To the contrary, we
want to prevent intermediate nodes from modifying information as it is being for-
warded. Form this angle, [Zhu et al. 2004] is closer to our work. The focus in
[Zhu et al. 2004] is to detect and filter out false data packets either at or on the
way to the base station. While [Zhu et al. 2004] requires node collaboration (to
agree on and authenticate a report), our approach is based purely on local obser-
vations and decisions. Probabilistic validation methods have also been recently
proposed for VANETs [Picconi et al. 2006].
5.2. SYSTEM MODEL
We focus on store-and-forward systems where nodes devote a limited amount
of space to store messages. We refer to this space as the node’s cache. The com-
munication medium is wireless and, therefore, messages are disseminated through
the network in a multi-hop fashion. We assume that nodes forward a batch of mes-
sages at a time.
Concerns regarding authentication and integrity are addressed through con-
ventional security measures. Nodes that publish information are required to digi-
tally sign their messages. Consequently, all messages in the network have a dig-
ital signature and are subject to integrity checks. We assume that executing an
integrity check for every message received is prohibitively expensive for a node.
Wireless gossip networks fall under these assumptions. The goal of these
networks is to achieve reliable, robust and scalable data dissemination. To this
end, nodes are required to engage in communication with their neighbors on a
regular basis. Executing integrity checks under these conditions would be too
expensive and undesirable. With this in mind, we propose a probabilistic solution
for integrity verification. Using wireless gossip networks as an example platform,
we evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed data integrity enforcement solution.
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5.2.1. Example: Gossip-based News
The Gossip-based News Service, as introduced in Chapter 2, serves as the exper-
imental platform to evaluate the data integrity enforcement measures described
in this chapter. The service is provided by a mesh backbone made up of a large
number of wireless routers that communicate through gossiping using the shuf-
fle protocol. In order to prevent a malicious router from overloading the network
with spam, we incorporate security measures into one of the core shuffle meth-
ods, selectItemsToKeep(). The remaining two core methods remain un-
changed. To summarize, our new implementation of the shuffle protocol retains
the same structure. Of its three core methods, only one is slightly modified to
include a data integrity enforcement mechanism, as follows:
◦ selectPeer(): Select a neighbor randomly
◦ selectItemsToSend(): Randomly select s entries from the local cache
and send a copy of those entries (buff send) to the selected peer.
◦ selectItemsToKeep(): Probabilistically verify data integrity. Add re-
ceived entries (buff recv) to the local cache and remove repeated entries.
If the number of entries exceeds c, remove entries among the ones that were
previously sent (unless they were also in buff recv) until the cache contains
c entries.
We highlight, in bold letters, the added step to enforce data integrity as nodes
disseminate data through the network. In the remainder of the chapter, we examine
the effect of adding measures for data integrity enforcement for the case of a
wireless gossiping network where a number of malicious nodes compromise the
integrity of messages.
5.2.2. Probabilistic Verification
Upon receiving a set of messages from a neighbor, nodes execute integrity checks
by verifying a digital signature on each received message with probability Pcheck.
If the message is valid, then it is marked as checked and stored in the node’s
cache. Otherwise, the message is discarded. We call this process probabilistic ver-
ification. As introduced in the previous chapter, probabilistic verification proves to
be an effective method for reducing the amount of corrupted content and restrict-
ing its spread. While we proved that probabilistic integrity checks could reduce
the impact of spam in the network, the nodes did not have a role in determining
the strength of the measures taken against malicious nodes. The probability of
checking an entry Pcheck was a fixed network-wide parameter, chosen at the begin-
ning of each experiment. As a result, nodes had to do the same amount of work
regardless of the conditions in their surroundings (being flooded with corrupted
messages or not).
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In this chapter, nodes are given the autonomy to apply probabilistic verifica-
tion on an individual basis, in effect transforming our collection of nodes into a
self-policing network. By making nodes self-aware with respect to malicious be-
havior in the network (in particular, corrupt messages being disseminated), small
adjustments to local behavior can be made. The result of these adjustments is that
security measures are applied where needed, while nodes in safe areas keep their
work to a minimum (but always maintaining a watchful eye).
Discouraging malicious behavior in the network involves two steps: a) ex-
ecuting probabilistic verification and b) updating the checking probability Pcheck
for the next round. Pcheck is a local parameter and its value is updated according
to the observations made during the probabilistic verification stage. The dynamic
nature of ad hoc networks makes it necessary to continuously adjust the value of
Pcheck.
5.2.3. Verifying the Integrity of Data in a Dynamic Environment
We define the level of pollution in a collection of messages as the fraction of
corrupted messages found in the collection. Nodes get an insight into the pollution
levels in their neighborhood during the probabilistic verification phase. When
participating in a gossip exchange, a node P receives s entries from a neighbor Q.
These entries are subject to integrity checks with a probability Pcheck, resulting in
a fraction of the s entries being checked. Since the neighbor selected the s entries
at random from its cache, this sample gives node P an estimate of the level of
pollution in the neighbor’s cache. Node P can then use this information to update
Pcheck for the next round in the following manner:
Pcheckt+1 = (1−α)Pcheckt + αP′
P′ =
numRemoved
numChecked
P′ is the level of pollution calculated after checking numChecked items in the
probabilistic verification phase. numRemoved is the number of items that did not
pass the integrity test and were removed. The value of Pcheck for the next round
(Pcheckt+1 ) is updated as a weighted sum of its previous value (Pcheckt ) and the level
of pollution P′. The parameter α determines the sensitivity of parameter Pcheck to
changes in the pollution levels in the neighborhood.
In general, nodes are bound to have more than one neighbor. For this rea-
son, each node should maintain a different Pcheck for each neighbor. In essence,
for each neighbor i node P maintains a Pcheck[i]. As described in the previous
chapter, some security measures are in place before tackling the problem of data
integrity (see 4.3). The measures taken to impose access control (discussed in
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4.3.1) are of particular interest now, as the identity of each neighbor plays a role
in the mechanism we describe. By requiring that nodes be accredited by a cer-
tification authority and that they include their identity certificate (signed by the
certification authority) when gossiping, any node can verify the identities of its
neighbors. In this way, the use of identity certificates protects the network against
malicious nodes sending messages under many different identities (as the use of
unauthorized identities would deem the messages invalid).
5.2.4. Experimental Setup
All nodes in the network start gossiping with no knowledge of their environment
besides the identity of their immediate neighbors. Since nodes have no precon-
ceptions about their neighbors, they start gossiping with little caution. This means
that they apply a low level of checking at t = 0. For the experiments presented in
the upcoming sections, Pcheckt=0 [i] = Pcheckmin = 0.05 for all nodes and all neighbors
i. Pcheckmin is also the lower bound for Pcheck. A lower bound for Pcheck is necessary,
since some checking is needed to monitor any changes in the behavior of neigh-
bors. The implications of this are that there is a minimum workload imposed on
the network, even in the absence of malicious nodes, and that there is a reaction
time upon appearance of malicious nodes during which Pcheck does not match the
amount of spam being received. The disadvantage of this approach is that nodes
can be caught off-guard by a spammer.
The damage caused by the sudden appearance of a spammer will undoubtedly
depend on the level of checking applied by its neighbors at the moment of the
attack. We argue that being overly cautious when starting to gossip with a new
neighbor will not necessarily protect a node from being spammed, as a spammer
could easily act like a normal node for a few rounds to gain a node’s trust before
starting its attack. For this reason, we prefer to start with and maintain a minimum
level of checking until malicious behavior is detected. As we will see later on,
the introduction of a detection mechanism for spammers will deter attacks at high
spamming rates, reducing the damage that a spammer can cause by catching its
neighbors off-guard (before they adjust their checking probabilities).
In our experiment, nodes are arranged in a square grid topology, with 50 nodes
on each side, over an area of 50× 50 units. Each of the 2500 nodes has a range
of 1 unit, making communication possible with its immediate neighbors to the
North, South, East and West. From this collection of nodes, 250 are selected
to be malicious at the beginning of each experiment. The selection is random,
resulting in malicious nodes being placed at random locations in the grid. For all
experiments, nodes have a cache size of c = 100 and during each gossip exchange
they exchange s = 50 entries.
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5.3. MALICIOUS VS. BENIGN BEHAVIOR
We define malicious behavior as the execution of a variation of the gossip pro-
tocol with the intent of gaining an unfair advantage in the use of a shared resource.
In our system, the shared resource is storage space. By deviating from the data
exchange rules defined in the shuffle protocol that the majority of nodes are exe-
cuting, a malicious node can increase its share of storage space. The method used
by a malicious node to place large quantities of its own content in the network is
compromising the data integrity of the messages it forwards.
5.3.1. Attack Model
In order to test the effectiveness of the proposed method for enforcing data in-
tegrity, we assume that a relatively small number of nodes in the network are
malicious. These malicious nodes, which we also call spammers, are randomly
placed in the network and execute a slightly different version of the shuffle proto-
col. Their basic attack model is to corrupt entries before forwarding them to the
nodes they communicate with. A spammer may deviate from the normal behavior
of the general population in the following ways:
• Corrupt outgoing entries (in selectItemsToSend()) with a probabil-
ity Pspam (also referred to as spamming rate).
• Fail to execute any integrity checks (in selectItemsToKeep()).
Although intuitively the most effective attack appears to be spamming with Pspam
equal to 1, we will show later that a high spamming rate is actually counterpro-
ductive. In Section 5.4, we illustrate through simulation results that the only way
for a malicious node to place more spam in the network is by spamming less (i.e.,
“behaving better”).
5.3.2. Can Malicious Nodes Be Identified?
This section describes the expected composition of the cache of a node that prop-
erly applies our spam removal algorithm and how that could help differentiate
well-behaved nodes from malicious ones.
Cache Contents of a Well-behaved Node
The probability of having a corrupted entry after the probabilistic verification
phase, Pspam in cache, is directly related to the probability with which a node’s
neighbor forwards spam to the node. For a node Q with a neighbor i that for-
wards a corrupted entry with a probability Pi, the probability of a corrupted entry
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Figure 5.1: If a node applies probabilistic verification properly, the amount of
spam and checked items in its cache should be similar.
making its way into Q’s cache can be expressed in terms of Pi and the probability
of Q checking an entry received from a neighbor i, Pcheck[i]:
Pspam in cache[i] = Pi (1−Pcheck[i]) (5.1)
In a similar way, we can determine the probability of Q marking an entry as
checked and placing it into its cache, Pchecked in cache, by calculating the proba-
bility that an entry received by Q is selected to be checked and is not corrupted.
The probability of this occurring is:
Pchecked in cache[i] = Pcheck[i] (1−Pi) (5.2)
Assuming that node Q is executing the probabilistic verification properly,
Pcheck[i] should approximate Pi, the probability that a received entry is corrupted.
Therefore, we can expect that when dealing with neighbor i the percentage of
spam sent by i that makes it into Q’s cache roughly approximates the percentage
of entries marked as checked by Q and placed in Q’s cache. This comes as a
result of (5.1) and (5.2) being approximately the same when Pcheck[i]≈ Pi.
As a general case, node Q has many neighbors and each neighbor may forward
a different amount of spam. For example, neighbor A may be malicious and send
many corrupted messages, while B may pass along a few corrupted messages spo-
radically. Nevertheless, the interaction with each neighbor should result in similar
amounts of spam and checked entries arriving into Q’s cache. Therefore, neigh-
bor A may be responsible for a large number of corrupted and checked entries in
Q’s cache, while neighbor B, which rarely forwards spam, is responsible only for
a few corrupted and checked entries. As a result, if node Q is properly filtering
the content received from its neighbors, Q’s cache should have similar amounts of
corrupted and checked entries. Figure 5.1 illustrates this scenario.
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Expected Incoming Traffic
When exchanging entries with a malicious node, spam may come in two forms: as
checked entries or as unchecked entries. Marking a corrupted entry as checked
is a big risk as it effectively proves that the neighbor is indeed misbehaving. If a
node runs an integrity check on an entry marked as checked by a neighbor and
the test fails, the neighbor identifies itself as a spammer. Therefore, it is unlikely
that a malicious node would send spam marked as checked. We can expect
corrupted entries to arrive as unchecked.
The shuffle protocol specifies that entries to shuffle are selected at random
from a node’s cache. Therefore, given that a well-behaved node has a similar
amount of spam and checked entries in its cache, we can reasonably expect to re-
ceive a similar amount of corrupted entries and checked entries when engaging in a
gossip exchange with a well-behaved neighbor. A significant difference between
the two should raise concerns. The spammer detection mechanism (introduced
later on) is built on this principle.
5.4. EFFECT OF SPAMMERS ON THE NETWORK
This section shows the extent of the damage caused by spammers in terms of
the amount of spam they can place in the network.
5.4.1. The Effect of Alpha
The parameter α, introduced in Section 5.2.3, determines the sensitivity of the
integrity enforcement mechanism to the current levels of pollution observed. In
essence, α ∈ [0,1] controls the speed with which Pcheck[i] adjusts to the pollution
levels observed in the link corresponding to neighbor i.
Figure 5.2 shows the effect of α on the proliferation of corrupted entries
through the network. For this experiment, 250 malicious nodes start corrupting
entries with a probability Pspam = 0.50 at round 50. It is important to point out
that the parameter α has no effect on the final amount of spam in the network. It
only affects the speed at which the level of spam stabilizes. The level to which
spam converges is dictated by the number of malicious nodes and the rate at which
they place spam in the network.
While it might appear from Figure 5.2 that setting α to its highest value is
the best policy, doing so would effectively mean that a node would adjust the
checking probability for its neighbor solely based on their previous interaction.
This strategy would be quick to react to the appearance of a spammer, but at
the same time it would be quick to forget previous spamming by a neighbor. A
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of corrupted entries in the network over time for different
values of α.
spammer could then easily reset the Pcheck used by its neighbor by simply not
sending spam in one round, opening the doors for more serious spamming in the
next round. Remembering previous behavior of a neighbor (by having α < 1)
makes this kind of attack less harmful.
5.4.2. Varying Spamming Rates
Whenever a node exchanges entries with a malicious node, the malicious node has
the opportunity to send spam. The amount of spam included in the collection of
entries sent by the malicious node is regulated by the parameter Pspam, which is
the probability that an entry sent by a spammer is corrupted.
Figure 5.3 shows the amount of corrupted content in the network over time,
after the appearance of spammers. The results of six independent experiments,
each with a different spamming rate, are shown. In each experiment, 250 spam-
mers (10% of the network) at random positions start generating spam at round 50.
Prior to that moment, all nodes in the network are checking the traffic in each of
their links at the minimum level of Pcheckmin = 0.05. The appearance of spammers
is followed by a fast increase in the amount of spam in the network. However,
in all cases the amount of spam stabilizes after the initial period of growth. An
important observation is that the value to which the amount of spam converges is
not proportional to the spamming rate of the malicious nodes. In fact, a closer
look reveals that spamming at a high rate is actually detrimental to the spammer’s
ability to place corrupted entries in the network. By measuring the value to which
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Figure 5.3: Amount of corrupted entries in the network over time, for different
spamming rates (α = 0.90).
the amount of spam converges (by averaging the last 200 rounds), we can observe
its relationship to the spamming rate Pspam more clearly (see Figure 5.4). Starting
from a low spamming rate, we observe that initial increases of Pspam yield pos-
itive results for the malicious nodes. However, after reaching the mid-point of
Pspam = 0.5, increasing the spamming rate turns counterproductive.
After an initial period of adjustment following the appearance of spammers,
well-behaved nodes tune their filters to the actual amounts of spam observed
through each of the links to their neighbors. Consequently, neighbors of spammers
create a barrier that filters out corrupt messages produced by malicious nodes. The
strength of the filtering is proportional to the amount of corrupted entries observed.
This explains the inability of spammers to disseminate corrupt data when using a
very high spamming rate. In essence, the large amounts of spam produced are
being filtered out after a hop or two.
In contrast, a somewhat lower spamming rate results in neighbors lowering
their checking, allowing more spam into the network. The key to understanding
this behavior lies in equation (5.1). In the stable state, where nodes have adjusted
their filters (Pcheck[i] = Pi), the percentage of spam in a well-behaved node’s cache
is dictated by the value of Pcheck[i], peaking when Pcheck[i] = 0.5 and reaching 0 at
the extremes (Pcheck[i] = 0 and Pcheck[i] = 1).
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Figure 5.4: Average number of corrupted entries in the network for different spam-
ming rates.
5.4.3. Workload Caused By Spammers
The previous sections have established that nodes regulate the number of checks
they perform according to the amount of corrupted content they observe. Since
the nodes’ wireless transceivers have a limited range, nodes that are in physical
proximity of spammers are more likely to receive corrupt entries and, therefore,
execute more integrity checks. This causes some nodes to have a higher workload
than others with regard to data integrity enforcement.
The amount of checking done by a node is dictated by the values of Pcheck on its
incoming links. Using the average value of Pcheck per node as a metric, Figure 5.5
shows the imbalance in the workload placed on the nodes in the network. While
the majority of nodes has a low average Pcheck (with a high number doing only the
minimum amount of checking, Pcheckmin = 0.05), a considerable number checks
more than a quarter of their incoming traffic. Even a few nodes check up to 50%
or more of the entries they receive. These nodes are directly affected by having
malicious nodes as neighbors. Even though their work prevents malicious nodes
from disseminating corrupted entries, the malicious nodes succeed at disrupting
the network by wearing out their neighbors by increasing their workload. For this
reason, it is not enough to monitor and reduce the amount of corrupted entries, but
also to take active measures towards isolating misbehaving nodes.
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Figure 5.5: Histogram of average values of Pcheck for every node in the network
(malicious nodes excluded). 250 malicious nodes insert corrupted entries with
Pspam = 0.90.
5.5. DETECTING MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR
Identifying a neighbor as a spammer boils down to being able to differentiate
between a node that actively corrupts entries and one that simply forwards the
corrupted content received from somebody else. Since nodes do not check 100%
of the entries they receive from a neighbor, they cannot assume that receiving
spam from their neighbor makes the neighbor a spammer. In fact, forwarding
some spam is a perfectly valid situation in our network. In a similar way, the
number of checked entries by itself is not enough to determine if a neighbor is
a spammer or not. In fact, nodes doing minimal checking will forward very few
checked entries.
5.5.1. Detection Mechanism
The key to detecting a spammer lies not in the amount of spam or the number
of checked entries received, but in the relationship between these two values. As
explained previously in Section 5.3.2, if a node is behaving properly, there should
be a balance between the amount of spam and the number of checked entries it
sends. With this in mind, a node can monitor the behavior of its neighbors by
individually tracking the difference between the amount of spam received and the
number of checked entries for each neighbor.
In a similar way as keeping track of the value of Pcheck for every neighbor,
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a node Q can keep track of the number of checked entries it receives from each
neighbor i. Node Q does not do any additional checking, it just counts the number
of entries flagged as checked. After every exchange with neighbor i, node Q
updates its estimate of the number of checked entries received from i:
checked[i]t+1 = (1−α)checked[i]t + α f ractionChecked
The fraction of checked entries for the next round (checked[i]t+1) is updated as
a weighted sum of its previous value (checked[i]t ) and the percentage of checked
entries found ( f ractionChecked).
The spammer detection mechanism is based on monitoring the difference be-
tween Pcheck[i] (which is an approximation of the amount of spam received from
neighbor i) and checked[i] (which reflects the fraction of checked entries expected
from neighbor i). An acceptable difference is defined as the parameter δ. In every
round, node Q:
• Calculates diff = |Pcheck[i]− checked[i]|
• If diff ≤ δ, neighbor i is behaving properly. Otherwise, i is a suspected
spammer.
Figure 5.6 shows the result of applying the proposed detection method for different
values of δ, with Pspam set to 0.5 (the value that allows for the most spam to be
placed in the network, as shown in Figure 5.4). The graphs depict the number of
spammers detected, as well as the number of false negatives (spammers that avoid
detection) and positives (well-behaved nodes that are confused with spammers).
The results are counted per link, since nodes do separate analyses for each of their
neighbors. The threshold δ affects the detection of spammers in the following
ways:
• A small δ results in spammers being detected quickly after their appearance,
but could also lead to well-behaved nodes being mistakenly identified as
spammers, i.e., false positives [see Figure 5.6(a)].
• With larger values of δ, spammers can operate for a longer period of time
before being identified. However, a larger δ prevents well-behaved nodes
from being confused with spammers, i.e., false negatives.
The initial period after the appearance of spammers is characterized by well-
behaved nodes struggling to adjust their values of Pcheck for every neighbor to the
appropriate level. As a result, good nodes may store and forward more corrupted
entries than expected and could easily be confused with spammers if the threshold
δ is too restrictive.
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Figure 5.6: Results of applying the detection algorithm over time for different
values of δ: a) δ = 0.05, b) δ = 0.10, c) δ = 0.15 and d) δ = 0.20.
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Figure 5.7: Spammers try to prevent being discovered by executing integrity
checks: a) average value of diff ±σ for spammers and normal nodes as neigh-
bors (Pspam = 0.5, δ = 0.20), b) spammers that avoid detection.
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5.5.2. Flying under the Radar
We say that a malicious node is “flying under the radar” if the system consistently
detects it as a false negative. As seen previously, after a short initial period where
nodes adjust to the presence of spammers, spammers can be accurately discovered
given an appropriate value of δ. In order for a malicious node to fly under the radar,
it needs to modify its behavior enough to be confused with a well-behaved node.
Simple Strategies to Avoid Detection
We identify two possible strategies for a malicious node to avoid detection:
• Checking entries just as a normal node would do and spamming with prob-
ability Pspam in the unchecked entries.
• Reducing Pspam in the hopes of reducing diff enough so that diff ≤ δ.
Figure 5.7 shows the results of the first approach. The experiment records
statistical information for diff (average value and standard deviation) when the
neighbor is a spammer and when the neighbor is a normal node. By executing
integrity checks just like a well-behaved node (now selectItemsToKeep()
is the same for spammers and normal nodes), spammers can lower the value of diff
[see Figure 5.7(a)] to the point were some nodes avoid detection [Figure 5.7(b)],
using δ = 0.20. However, only a very small number of nodes are not discovered
as being malicious. Moreover, this does not happen consistently.
The second approach is more effective in terms of avoiding discovery. With
a spamming rate of 0.1, the value of diff for a considerable number of spammers
falls below the threshold δ = 0.20, as can be seen in Figure 5.8(a). As a conse-
quence, many spammers are not discovered as such [see Figure 5.8(b)]. However,
at Pspam = 0.1 the amount of spam they can place in the network is low. And after
discovered spammers are removed, the amount of spam will decrease even more.
In addition, the spammers that are not discovered are not always the same. There-
fore, a well-behaved node could identify spammers by taking as a policy to stop
communication with another node if the node qualifies as a spammer x number of
times over a period of time.
A Clever Attack: Carefully Controlled Output
Reducing Pspam appears to be a natural way of avoiding detection. With a suffi-
ciently small spamming rate, the value of diff falls below the δ threshold. How-
ever, when the value of Pspam is low, the amount of spam that a malicious node
can place in the network is also limited.
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Figure 5.8: Spammers try to avoid detection by lowering their spamming rate to
0.1.
In an effort to place as much spam as possible while avoiding detection, a
spammer may intentionally send checked entries along with the corrupted entries.
The reasoning behind this behavior is that if neighbors observe as much spam as
checked entries coming from the spammer, they will not suspect that their neigh-
bor is malicious. For example, a spammer may send 50% of spam in every gossip
exchange and fill in the remaining 50% with checked entries. In our experiments,
spammers accomplish this by intentionally checking all the entries they send to
achieve a 50%−50% balance of spam and checked entries.
By behaving in this manner, spammers are able to avoid detection and at the
same time place almost the same amount of spam in the network as if they simply
spammed with Pspam = 0.50 (see Figure 5.9). This type of attack takes advantage
of the fact that in our solution we suspect node i based on the relation between
Pcheck[i] and checked[i] and do not take into account the actual value of Pcheck[i]. In
other words, a malicious node could send as much as 50% of spam without being
detected as long as it also sends just as much checked entries. Referring back
to section 5.3.2, we find that there is a limit to the amount of spam that we can
expect from a well-behaved node. Given that when a node executes probabilistic
verification properly Pchecki should approximate Pi, we can derive from equation
5.1 that the amount of spam in a well-behaved node’s cache should not exceed the
maximum value of x(1− x), with x in [0,1]. Consequently, a well-behaved node
should not send more than 25% of spam among its entries. If we incorporate this
observation into our detection mechanism, malicious nodes would be forced to
lower the level of the spam they send to 25% at most. This results in a decrease in
the amount of spam in the network as can be seen in Figure 5.9.
Unfortunately, there seems to be no obvious method to discipline the mali-
cious nodes even more. By sending 25% of spam in every exchange along with
25% of checked entries, the spammer can simulate the behavior of a well-behaved
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Figure 5.9: Amount of corrupted entries in the network over time for different
malicious behaviors.
node that is struggling with malicious neighbors. Being more strict about the ad-
missible values of Pcheck could result in the increase of false accusations.
5.6. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we explored the feasibility of ensuring data integrity in very
large ad hoc networks by means of a simple and inexpensive solution based on
probabilistic integrity checks and traffic analysis. Our approach has proven to be
effective in containing the spread of corrupted content without imposing a burden
for all nodes in the network. In fact, the workload placed on nodes is proportional
to the amount of corrupted content they receive, affecting mostly nodes in the
neighborhood of spammers. By keeping track of their incoming traffic, nodes
affected by malicious neighbors can discover and isolate those misbehaving nodes.
We also explored to what extent a malicious node can avoid detection. Al-
though possible, avoiding detection implies a considerable decrease in the level of
malicious behavior, lessening the impact of spammers in the network. By send-
ing a combination of 25% of spam along with 25% of checked entries in every
exchange, a malicious node can fool our detection mechanism. Nevertheless, this
situation is not as dire as it appear, as the damage caused by the spammer is purely
local. To illustrate, we can calculate (using equation 5.1) that after shuffling with
a spammer that sends 25% of spam the probability that a corrupted entry makes
its way into a given node’s cache is 18.75%. However, the node is bound to have
102 ENFORCING DATA INTEGRITY CHAP. 5
other neighbors besides the spammer, diluting the impact that a spammer has on
the node. Moreover, this filtering is repeated at every hop, relegating the spam
problem to the surrounding area of the spammer and, thus, allowing the rest of the
network to keep operating with a reduced burden.
CHAPTER 6
Broadcast-based Epidemics
Nodes in wireless ad hoc networks are often limited in terms of resources, such
as storage, power, and bandwidth. A downside of this is the fact that local stor-
age at one node cannot accommodate the vast amount of data contained in the
network. In this chapter, we present SharedState, a scheme for storage, replica-
tion, and distribution of common-interest data in wireless networks of resource-
constrained devices (e.g., sensor nodes or embedded devices). Unlike the shuffle
protocol, which represents a peer-to-peer style of communication, SharedState
uses broadcast-based communication to achieve the same effect of epidemic dis-
semination. SharedState takes advantage of the fact that wireless communication
is broadcast-based in nature. Messages are not explicitly addressed to a particular
node, like in the shuffle protocol. Instead, when a node sends a message, the mes-
sage is received by all nodes within radio range that are listening to the channel.
Our aim is to replicate the desirable properties observed in a peer-to-peer gossip
protocol like the shuffle, which is based on data exchange, while exploiting the
broadcast nature of radio communication. In other words, we aim to benefit from
the fact that messages are delivered to all nodes within radio range. The downside
of this approach is the uncertainty of whether an item that has been broadcast will
be received and kept by a neighbor.
As a consequence of relying on broadcast, the incoming traffic is greater than
the amount of data that a node can broadcast. This is the fundamental difference
between the shuffle protocol and SharedState: while a shuffling node sends as
many items as it receives from its gossip partner, SharedState nodes receive many
more items as they listen to all of their neighbors. By selecting a random neighbor
to gossip with, shuffling nodes control their incoming traffic. SharedState nodes
accept all incoming traffic and apply randomness in the selection of items to store
and forward. The result, as this chapter presents, is epidemic dissemination of
data items through the network in the same fashion as the shuffle protocol.
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SharedState works under the assumption that individual nodes would greatly
benefit from having access to the wealth of information in the network, but are un-
able to store it locally at once. SharedState strives to make data available to every
node by providing local access to a subset of the whole collection of data items
in the network at any moment in time and ensuring that this subset is updated
periodically. This is accomplished by probabilistic propagation and replication
of data items, ensuring the availability and persistence of information in the face
of changing network conditions. We evaluate the performance of SharedState by
studying the effectiveness with which nodes can gather information from the net-
work. In addition, we optimize the bandwidth usage of our proposed solution by
minimizing unnecessary communication based on feedback from the local neigh-
borhood.
6.1. INTRODUCTION
The usual paradigm for wireless networks consists of wireless nodes - often
laptops or smartphones - connecting to a base station in order to access a resource
(for example, a data repository or a local printer). Wireless ad hoc networks break
away from this model by focusing on the interaction between nodes to create a
network on-the-fly, without relying on a preexisting infrastructure. The ad hoc
model shuns the centralized approach in favor of operating in a distributed fash-
ion. The resources and services are therefore provided by the nodes themselves,
making cooperation between nodes absolutely necessary.
Nodes in a wireless ad hoc network are often mobile, portable, resource-
constrained devices. In this chapter, we focus on resource-constrained embedded
devices designed with specific applications in mind (for example, a wireless sen-
sor network that monitors the presence of people in a building). Unlike phones
or PDAs with wireless capabilities, these devices typically use low power RF ra-
dios that provide limited bandwidth and communicate through broadcast (Section
6.3 describes the target platform for SharedState in more detail). The networks
that these devices create do not rely on a fixed infrastructure for services, but they
self-organize to provide certain functionality.
One of the main challenges with wireless devices is that they are inherently
unreliable, as they might fall out of reach due to mobility or leave the network un-
expectedly. As a result, nodes - and the data they carry - are constantly joining and
leaving the network. While most of the data that a node stores locally may only
be relevant to the node itself, some nodes might have information that could be of
interest to the community in general. Such information may include, for example,
configuration information, advertisements or general announcements. Viewing
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these pieces of information as community knowledge and making them available
to the general population would enhance coordination efforts in the network and
create a cohesive environment.
The goal of this project is to provide a middleware layer capable of storing data
items published by any node in the network and make them available for all nodes.
In essence, SharedState acts as a distributed repository of shared data. Unlike a
publish/subscribe system, nodes do not subscribe to receive certain information.
In our system, all nodes are considered to be possible subscribers. The purpose is
then not just to deliver a data item to the interested parties, but to store the data
item in the network so that any interested node could retrieve the item presently
or in the future. In other words, the ultimate goal of SharedState is to ensure the
availability and persistence of data items of interest to all (or most) nodes.
SharedState acts as a loosely coupled communication platform, such that pro-
ducers and consumers of data are decoupled in time and space. Consumers can
recover a data item from the network when they deem it necessary: producers and
consumers do not need to be present at the same time in order to share data. Like-
wise, they can do so without being within communication range of each other.
SharedState takes care of delivering the data items to consumers, who might be
located anywhere in the network. Producers are oblivious to any consumer’s lo-
cation.
Contribution Working under the assumption that the information contained in
the network greatly surpasses the storage capacity at each node, this chapter pre-
sents SharedState, a scheme designed to move data items through the network and
create replicas of the items at various locations. Specifically, the contributions of
this chapter are:
• We introduce a scheme for disseminating and replicating data items through
the network. This new protocol is characterized by its low complexity and
minimal state needed at each node, making it suitable for a wide range of
wireless devices.
• We evaluate the efficiency of collecting data items from the network by
testing the worst case scenario: each node discovers new items solely by
querying its local store. Additionally, we use static topologies in our ex-
periments. The lack of mobility means that data items can propagate only
through multiple hops, instead of being carried by mobile nodes to different
locations. We show that acceptable discovery rates can be achieved even
under these conditions, suggesting that mobility and queries involving sur-
rounding nodes would only improve performance.
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• We evaluate our protocol through simulations using TOSSIM. We test the
effect of node density on the performance of the system, first using uniform
topologies of various densities and then with a non-uniform topology where
nodes concentrate at a central point. We show that by allowing individual
nodes to decide when to communicate based on neighborhood information,
we can take advantage of node density to decrease the number of transmis-
sions by individual nodes. Global knowledge of the network topology and
its properties is not required. By relying solely on local information, our
algorithm remains effective in larger networks.
6.2. RELATED WORK
Like the shuffle protocol, the role SharedState plays in the software stack is
similar to coordination mechanisms such as publish/subscribe (see 2.5) and shared
tuple spaces (made popular by Linda [Gelernter 1985]). Like these schemes,
SharedState provides a flexible model of interaction based on the decoupling in
space and time of producers and consumers of data. SharedState has a more nar-
row focus as it is intended for small, resource-constrained devices. This puts
SharedState in the same category as TeenyLIME [Costa et al. 2006], a Linda-
like tuple space abstraction for wireless sensor networks and Hood [Whitehouse
et al. 2004], a programming abstraction where nodes share their state with selected
neighbors. A major difference with these schemes is that they aim to facilitate the
development of wireless sensor network applications by providing a neighborhood
abstraction and, therefore, share data only within the neighborhood. Abstract Re-
gions [Welsh and Mainland 2004] expands the scope of sharing by enabling com-
munication using tuple spaces within a region. Unlike these approaches, Shared-
State is not explicitly aimed a wireless sensor network and, therefore, does not
assume that data is only relevant within a restricted space.
The problem of improving data access and availability in wireless environ-
ments has been approached in various ways. One approach is to encode [Dimakis
et al. 2005; Chessa and Maestrini 2003] the data into a number of pieces in such a
way that the original item can be reconstructed by collecting a subset of the pieces.
By distributing the pieces through the network, ubiquitous access is provided. In
our case, we assume that the data items we propagate are small read-only data
files and we achieve availability by replicating the items. The number of replicas
and their location is determined probabilistically.
Cooperative caching for ad hoc networks is another related area. Its aim is
to share cached data among multiple nodes by having some nodes host the data
and handle requests from other interested nodes [Sailhan and Issarny 2003; Yin
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and Cao 2006]. Popular data items are cached at various locations leading to re-
sources being saved by requesting the item from a nearby node. Additionally,
access can be obtained even when the original source is unavailable. While co-
operative caching also makes use of data replication, it differs from our work in
that its aim is to improve the experience of being connected to the infrastructure
(Internet). Conversely, SharedState focuses on sharing lightweight data items cre-
ated by nodes in the network that can be disseminated in the background using
a limited amount of resources. Instead of a request/forward model, nodes using
SharedState discover data items by periodically exchanging them.
Projects focused on data dissemination for ad hoc networks are also relevant
to our work. 7DS [Papadopouli and Schulzrinne 2001] focuses on allowing access
to data available on the Internet, so that when a node’s access fails it can get the
data from its peers. The types of networks 7DS addresses are different from ours.
The authors consider that the network is rarely connected (sparse) and that nodes
do not necessarily cooperate. The nodes themselves are more powerful than the
ones we consider. While 7DS does implement policies for power management,
storage space is not a major concern, as it is for us. In PeopleNet [Motani et al.
2005], users forward data to pre-defined geographic regions (according to topic)
and within each region the system tries to match queries and responses. The nodes
in each region become a database for a particular topic, with items being replicated
in many nodes. Within each region, data dissemination/replication occurs in a
p2p fashion, whenever two devices encounter each other. In RANDI [Wolfson
et al. 2007], nodes also communicate when they encounter each other, but also
proactively if a certain amount of time has passed since the last broadcast. These
two systems rely on p2p communication and neighborhood discovery/awareness.
SharedState intends to be as lightweight as possible, relying solely on broadcast.
There is no need to keep track of the identities of neighboring nodes.
In the realm of wireless sensor networks, data-centric storage (DCS [Shenker
et al. 2003]) addresses the storage problem by storing data by type at designated
nodes, making data retrieval more efficient. Replication of data at strategic loca-
tions has been proposed to improve scalability and robustness [Ghose et al. 2003].
Unlike our work, these approaches require a routing layer and replication is done
in a deterministic fashion.
Closer to our work are probabilistic protocols for data dissemination, where
the decision to broadcast a piece of data is made locally based on a probabilis-
tic algorithm. Due to their simplicity, these types of protocols are appealing for
small devices lacking in computing power. They are also resilient to failures and
mobility, which makes them attractive for wireless environments. Probabilistic
protocols have been used as an alternative to flooding [Haas et al. 2002; Drabkin
et al. 2007] and for concrete applications like code dissemination [Levis et al.
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2004].
6.3. SYSTEM MODEL
The system we envision consists of a collection of nodes with wireless com-
munication capabilities. Participating nodes are required to contribute resources to
the system in the form of storage space. Every node contributes a limited amount
of storage space to maintain a local data store of shared information. Nodes access
their local data stores to discover previously unseen or interesting items. We will
refer to the local data store as the node’s cache in the remainder of the chapter.
The caches are updated periodically with data items broadcast by nodes in the
local neighborhood. Items have unique ids and are time stamped when created,
allowing the system to keep the latest version of an item by overwriting older
versions. Since all data exchanges occur within one hop, routing is not necessary.
By relying purely on broadcast, we intend to make the system suitable for a wide
range of wireless platforms, including simple and inexpensive devices that use
broadcast at the physical layer. Moreover, nodes do not need to keep track of their
neighbors.
Communication is limited to periodic updates that are broadcast by each node.
Each update message contains a set of data items selected by each node. The
frequency with which nodes can broadcast updates is a network-wide parameter,
which should be set considering the workload and bandwidth that we desire to
allocate for the service.
In addition to the cache, nodes allocate space for an input buffer to receive
update messages from neighboring nodes and an output buffer for the items to be
broadcast. Each node uses the input buffer (which should be, at most, as big as
the cache) to accumulate data items received during a fixed period of time, which
we call a round. At the end of a round, the node updates its cache with the items
from the input buffer and broadcasts the set of data items in its output buffer to
update its neighbors. We say that a node alternates between two modes: active or
passive. Each node takes an active role once per round, when it updates its local
cache and decides which items to broadcast. After taking care of these tasks, it
falls into a passive mode, where it silently awaits for updates from its neighbors.
We abstract a framework to describe the core structure of a replication and
storage protocol like SharedState. There are three main operations (see Figure 6.1)
that a node needs to execute: a) handle incoming items (passive mode), b) update
its cache (active mode) and c) select which items to broadcast (active mode). The
specific way in which these three events are implemented has a direct impact on
the characteristics of the propagation and replication of items. In Section 6.4
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Figure 6.1: Visual representation.
we describe the implementation details of SharedState, which is one particular
instance of this framework.
Target Platform The experimental platform for which SharedState was specifi-
cally developed consists of very simple, inexpensive units that integrate a radio, an
antenna and an embedded processor in one module. These nodes are meant to be
expendable and, as such, they have modest features. Nodes operate on a fixed duty
cycle and communication is based purely on the broadcast of small data packets
of a fixed size (in the order of tens of bytes). In other words, nodes wake up peri-
odically to communicate and process information and then go to sleep for the rest
of the cycle.
The reason for choosing to operate by broadcasting/processing periodically is
to have a predictable use of resources, enabling us to tailor the duty cycle and
packet size according to the requirements of our applications and the desired life-
time of the network. We imagine that a sensor application (sending an alarm
whenever high temperatures are measured, for example) needs to be long-lived
and has very small data packets. For this application, the broadcast interval can
be set to a value that allows the batteries to last for the desired period (two years,
for example). By operating periodically, we eliminate the risk of having nodes
run out of energy prematurely due to being located at busy spots, as can occur
in event-triggered systems. Of course, this comes at a price. The tradeoff is that
nodes are required to communicate even when there are no new events to report.
This is an acceptable compromise, considering that we aim to deploy very large
networks where having clear expectations of the lifetime of nodes is important.
Applications Application areas for SharedState include dissemination of topo-
logical information, membership management and service discovery. An example
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application could be asset management, where active tags attached to objects keep
track of each other so that logical groups stay together (e.g., a set of boxes in a
warehouse or a collection of documents).
6.4. SharedState
The key to ensuring the availability and persistence of items in the network
lies in a strategy of massive replication and relocation of replicas. The replication
of items is a natural consequence of the probabilistic methods used for the selec-
tion of items to be stored and propagated. As items are propagated, they become
available to the nodes who stored them locally. The periodic update of caches
ensures that nodes can discover items as they flow through. Discovery is gradual,
however, as nodes can store only a limited number of items in their caches.
As we will see later on, we evaluate the performance of SharedState by mea-
suring how fast a node can discover the items that are available in the network.
We consider the most simple way in which a node can discover items, which is by
looking into its own cache (0-hop query). Nevertheless, if improved data access is
required, a node can resort to enlisting the help of neighboring nodes. Having its
neighbors search into their own caches effectively casts a wider net from which
to retrieve items. We can apply the same reasoning we used in 2.4.2 for finding
the probability of seeing an item in a node’s cache after k trials to the case where
we look for an item in k different caches. To illustrate, imagine that a given item
can be found in a given node’s cache with a probability of 5%. If a node requests
the help of 4 neighbors to find the item, the probability of success increases to
1− (1− 0.05)5 = 22.6%. Considering that discovery of items takes place over
several rounds, it becomes apparent that requesting the help of neighbors in dis-
covering items is highly beneficial. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that a node can
discover the items available in the network over time even when searching in a
single (i.e., its own) cache.
The issue of data persistence is critical in a wireless ad hoc network, since
nodes may come and go on a regular basis. Whenever a node leaves, the data
items it carries disappear with it. For this reason, maintaining a set of replicas per
item is necessary. We refer to each replica of an item as an entry. While a data
item is a piece of information, an entry is the representation of the data item in
the network and for each data item several entries may exist. Instead of explicitly
trying to maintain a particular number of entries per item, we allow competition
between entries to determine the number of entries per item in the network.
Whenever a node broadcasts an entry, there is a chance that it might be repli-
cated if more than one of the node’s neighbors decides to keep it. Likewise, when-
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ever a node updates its cache, some entries are discarded due to lack of space.
Because of this, the number of entries per item is constantly experiencing varia-
tions and, since there is no preference for any particular data item, competition
for space in a node’s cache is fair. This ensures that each data item has on aver-
age the same number of replicas in the network and that the number of replicas
adjusts dynamically according to the number of different items published. That
is, when there is a large number of different items in the network, each item has
few entries. Conversely, when there are few different items present, each item has
several entries.
6.4.1. The Protocol
The way nodes manage their entries depends on the actions they take in their active
and passive modes. Figure 6.2 gives a detailed account of the steps involved in the
execution of a node’s active and passive thread. Before giving a more thorough
explanation of the events that take place in each thread, one distinction between
nodes should be noted. Of all the nodes that participate in the system, only a subset
acts as a source of data items. That is, at any point in time, only some nodes take
the role of producers of information. The only difference between a producer and
a consumer is the fact that the producer makes an effort to insert its own item
(represented in Figure 6.2 as localEntry) in the network whenever possible. Other
than that, they execute the same algorithm. Moreover, at any point a consumer
may take the role of producer if it has some information to add to the collective
knowledge base.
6.4.2. Active Thread
Each node in the network executes the active thread once per round. The algorithm
executed by the active thread is divided in two phases: a) updating the cache and
b) selecting which entries to broadcast.
Phase I - Update Cache: In this phase, the node has to decide what to do
with the entries accumulated in the input buffer. The result should be an updated
cache with as little correlation as possible to the previous one. The reason for
this is that applications that access the cache have already seen the entries in the
previous version. Showing the same entries again does not provide any value
for the application layer. In the majority of cases, the cache will already be full
forcing the node to decide which entries from the input buffer should be placed in
the cache and which entries from the cache should be removed.
The strategy for updating a node’s cache is the following. First, if an entry
has already been seen (it is in the cache) and also appears in the input buffer, it
is discarded from both, making space for new entries in the cache. This strategy
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/*** Active thread ***/
// Runs every T time units
1: PHASE I : Update cache
2: for all entry in inputBuffer do
3: if cache.contains(entry) then
4: cache.remove(entry)
5: inputBuffer.remove(entry)
6: while cache.slotsAvailable() < inputBuffer.size()
do
7: randomEntry = cache.removeRandomEntry()
8: if outputBuffer.slotsAvailable() then
9: outputBuffer.add(randomEntry)
10: cache.addAll(inputBuffer)
11: inputBuffer.clear()
12:
13: PHASE II : Select entries to broadcast
14: if outputBuffer.slotsAvailable() then
15: if !outputBuffer.contains(localEntry) then
16: outputBuffer.add(localEntry)
17: while outputBuffer.slotsAvailable() do
18: randomEntry = cache.copyOfRandomEntry()
19: if !outputBuffer.contains(randomEntry) then
20: outputBuffer.add(randomEntry)
21:
22: broadcast(outputBuffer)
23: outputBuffer.clear()
/*** Passive thread ***/
// Runs when receiving a transmission
1: for all received entries do
2: if inputBuffer.slotsAvailable() then
3: if inputBuffer.contains(entry) then
4: inputBuffer.keepMostRecent(entry)
5: else
6: inputBuffer.add(entry)
Figure 6.2: SharedState pseudocode.
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might seem at odds with the behavior of the shuffle (which we are trying to emu-
late), where a node always keeps the entries received from its gossiping peer. The
difference is that, in a broadcast-based protocol like SharedState, when a node se-
lects an entry to be sent, it is received by all its neighbors. To emulate the shuffle, a
p2p-style protocol, only one of the neighbors should keep the entry in its cache. In
SharedState, we try to achieve a similar effect by allowing nodes to drop a newly
received entry that they have already seen. The assumption being that even if a
node drops the entry, another node in the neighborhood might keep it, resulting in
a shuffle-like behavior.
The second part of the strategy for updating the cache is that all remaining
entries in the input buffer should be placed in the cache. If there are not enough
empty slots available in the cache, random entries from the cache are removed to
make space for all the entries from the input buffer. The entries removed from the
cache are placed in the output buffer until it reaches its maximum capacity. The
ones that do not fit into the output buffer are discarded.
Phase II - Select Entries to Broadcast: In Phase I, some entries were already
placed in the output buffer. These entries, having been removed from the cache
in Phase I, have preference to be broadcast. The motivation for this is to lower
the risk of items disappearing entirely from the network. If there are not enough
entries to fill the output buffer, the local entry (which is available if the node is
a producer) is added. If this is not enough, random entries are selected from the
cache and a copy of each is placed in the output buffer. Once the selection of
entries has finalized, the node broadcasts the chosen entries and clears the output
buffer for the next round.
6.4.3. Passive Thread
Each node executes the passive thread whenever a broadcast is received. There-
fore, the passive thread may execute several times in one round (depending on
the number of neighbors a node has). Whenever a node receives a broadcast, the
entries received are put into the input buffer. No duplicates (entries with the same
id) are allowed. If a duplicate is received, the version with the freshest timestamp
is kept. The input buffer has a limited capacity, therefore, entries have to be dis-
carded once the buffer is full.
6.4.4. Early Strategies
In 6.3, we introduced the framework on which SharedState is built. During the
design phase, several strategies were explored for each of the three main opera-
tions defined in the framework. As a way to motivate the design choices made in
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SharedState, we present a summary of the different approaches that were explored
on the way to its final implementation.
Insertion of items
In the shuffle protocol, an item only needs to be inserted once to start its repli-
cation through the network. This is derived from the fact that when two nodes
shuffle, items cannot be lost. At most, an item might lose one of its replicas.
In a broadcast-based protocol with limited storage space, however, there are no
guarantees that an item that is broadcast will be kept by the nodes that receive it.
Since nodes receive more items than what they are allowed to broadcast within
one round, they are inevitably forced to discard some items. Early on in the de-
velopment of the protocol, we used the same strategy for inserting items as in the
shuffle: insert the new item once and let it replicate. Because of the possibility of
the new item being dropped from the network soon after being published, the pro-
tocol would sometimes fail to spread the new item. For this reason, we decided to
modify the publishing strategy so that a publisher can reinsert its local entry (i.e.,
the item it wants to disseminate) whenever there is space in the output buffer (see
Active Thread, Phase II.)
Update the cache directly
In the early stages of design, each node had only a cache (that is, there was no
input buffer). Two of the main operations, handling incoming items and updating
the cache, were merged into one step where the cache was updated directly with
the incoming items whenever a broadcast was received. The update strategy was
simple, if the item is not already in the cache, place it in an empty slot in the cache
or a randomly chosen slot if the cache is full. The downside of this approach is
that items that arrive when the cache is full have to overwrite an existing item.
Consequently, items that were just received could be overwritten before getting
the chance to be broadcast further, which has a negative effect on dissemination
speed. To avoid this situation (or make it less likely to happen), the input buffer
was introduced as a place to collect all incoming items received during a round.
In this way, the cache can be updated once per round with the items from the input
buffer. By having a clear differentiation between new (in the input buffer) and
previously seen (in the cache) items, better choices can be made with respect to
the new contents of the cache.
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Random selection of items to broadcast
The initial strategy for selecting which items to broadcast was to pick them ran-
domly from the cache. Although selecting them randomly from the cache is not
a bad strategy, we quickly realized that we could improve performance by taking
a cue from the shuffle protocol. A principle of the shuffle is that only items that
are sent can possibly be overwritten in the cache. We incorporate this idea into
SharedState by favoring the items that have been displaced from the cache when
filling the output buffer. By doing so, the items that are broadcast lose their spot in
the cache just like in the shuffle, but are essentially given a chance to be replicated
and kept alive in the network.
Removal of duplicates
This strategy is inherited from the shuffle protocol and was motivated by the fact
that the application running on top of the dissemination layer has access only
to the cache and there is no added value in presenting the same item twice. We
included this strategy when updating the input buffer, as it has limited space which
should be used optimally. Early on, the same idea was applied when updating the
cache with the items from the input buffer. To be more precise, if an item was in
the cache and also in the input buffer, one copy was kept in the cache, just like
it would occur in the shuffle when an item received from a neighbor is already in
the cache. However, keeping these items in the cache would result in the cache
being almost always full, which in turn caused us to randomly overwrite items in
the cache. To avoid this situation, we now remove items from the cache when they
appear both in the input buffer and the cache, clearing slots in the cache for other
items that were not in the cache in the previous round.
6.5. BASIC PROPERTIES
When executed in a large scale over a period of time, the SharedState protocol
presents certain characteristic behavior. In this section, we take a look at this
behavior in terms of dissemination speed and replication of items.
6.5.1. Discovery Rate
The ultimate goal of SharedState is to make data available to all nodes by storing
it in the network. Since nodes themselves do not have enough storage space to
store all of the available data items, they can “discover” data items from the net-
work when required by the application layer. Discovering items can be done by
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Figure 6.3: Discovery rate for different rates of cache size c versus number of
items d.
inspecting the local cache (0-hop query), consulting immediate neighbors (1-hop
query) or recruiting the help of neighbors to inspect caches n-hops away (n-hop
query). In this work, we consider only 0-hop queries.
We evaluate the performance of the protocol by observing the discovery rate
of items. The discovery rate is defined as the number of items that a node discovers
by examining its cache over a period of time versus the total number of items in
the network. The discovery of items is gradual, as nodes update their caches once
per round. The discovery rate, therefore, is measured over a number of rounds and
with every passing round it increases or stays the same.
The speed at which nodes discover items is directly related to the fraction of
all items that they can store locally. In other words, for a collection of nodes with
a cache size of c and d different items in the network, the fraction cd determines the
discovery rate. Figure 6.3 presents the discovery rate over time for three different
experiments. 900 nodes, each with a cache size of c = 18, input buffer size of
18, and output buffer size of 9, were arranged in a 30 × 30 grid. The nodes
can reach only their neighbors to the North, South, East and West. After the
network has been running for 300 rounds, a number of test nodes start measuring
their discovery rates. The graphs show the average discovery rate and standard
deviation. For each experiment, a different number of items in the network d
was used (d = 180,360,720). A higher value of d means that a node can store a
smaller percentage of the d items locally. As Figure 6.3 illustrates, the discovery
rate slows down when the fraction of items that a node can store in its cache
decreases.
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6.5.2. Fairness in Replication
Given that our network has a fixed storage capacity (the sum of the space available
at each node), the number of replicas that an item can have is limited. Items have
to compete for the limited space in a node’s cache. When there is a large number
of items in the network, this competition is intense. When there are few items, the
competition is less fierce. Nevertheless, the protocol does not favor any particular
item, resulting in every item having the same chance of creating or losing a replica.
Figure 6.4 presents a histogram of the number of replicas per item averaged
over a period of 50 rounds (after a start-up period of 300 rounds where items
are published and nodes populate their caches). The results correspond to the
experiment in Figure 6.3 where d = 180. Our 900-node network, with c = 18, has
900× 18 available slots. With 180 different items in the network, if the storage
space is divided evenly, each item should have 90 replicas. Figure 6.4 shows how
many items are replicated a given number of times. From the distribution, we
see that there is a tendency for items to have 90 replicas (the mean value of the
distribution).
Due to the constant competition for space, the number of replicas for a par-
ticular item is always fluctuating. Figure 6.5 shows this fluctuation with a new
experiment where an item is published after a start-up period of 300 rounds. By
the time the new item is published, the nodes in the network have been broadcast-
ing items for 300 rounds already and their caches are full. The new item has to
compete for space with the 180 items that were published earlier. As can be seen,
at every round the new item experiences gains and losses in its total number of
replicas, but manages to eventually create just as many replicas as the other items.
6.6. COMPARISON TO THE SHUFFLE PROTOCOL
The original motivation for the development of SharedState was to have a
broadcast-based protocol capable of replicating and disseminating items in the
same way as the shuffle protocol, but without the need for point-to-point commu-
nication. With this in mind, a comparison of the behavior of both protocols is in
order. Having just discussed the basic properties of SharedState, in this section we
compare the performance of the shuffle protocol under the same conditions and
discuss the similarities in the results.
In order to compare SharedState and the shuffle, we need to find a common
ground in the execution of both protocols. Each execution of the shuffle protocol
requires that a node contact a randomly chosen neighbor and that the neighbor
send its reply. If we count each of these interactions as one broadcast, we find that
in each round of the shuffle protocol the number of broadcasts executed is twice
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Figure 6.6: Discovery rate for different rates of cache size c versus number of
items d: a) SharedState and b) Shuffle.
the number of nodes. Therefore, as a way of having a fair comparison between
protocols in terms of executed broadcasts, we take one round of shuffling to be the
equivalent of two rounds of the SharedState protocol.
Figure 6.6.b) reproduces the discovery rate experiments from Section 6.5 with
nodes executing the shuffle protocol. To facilitate the comparison, Figure 6.3 is
repeated as Figure 6.6.a) next to the shuffle results. Note that Figure 6.6.b) shows
only 200 rounds, half the number of rounds presented in Figure 6.6.a). The first
observation that we can make is that both figures show essentially the same behav-
ior: the discovery rate slows down as the number of different items in the network
increases. The fundamental differences between the protocols are reflected in the
slight variations in their performance. SharedState is more sensitive than the shuf-
fle to the increase in number of different data items, as can be clearly seen in the
experiment with the most different items in the network (c/d = 0.025). It is also
evident from comparing both figures that the discovery rate curves, which are the
average from the discovery rate measurements of 50 test nodes, show a smaller
standard deviation for the shuffle.
For the purpose of understanding the reason for the observed differences, we
reproduce the replication experiment from the previous section using the shuffle
protocol. Figure 6.7 shows the replication of an item published at round 300
in a network where 180 previously published items are already occupying the
network. Figure 6.5 is repeated as Figure 6.7.a) for comparison with the shuffle
results displayed in Figure 6.7.b). While both figures eventually converge to a
somewhat stable number of replicas (around 90), the major difference between
the figures is the change in the number of replicas from one round to the next.
When two nodes shuffle items cannot be lost, as demonstrated in the modelling
analysis in Chapter 3. At most, a node will drop an item that has been sent to a
neighbor. However, the neighbor will store it, which ensures that the item is not
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Figure 6.7: Number of replicas for one item published at round 300 in a network
of 900 nodes with 180 items (cache size = 18): a) SharedState and b) Shuffle.
lost after the exchange. On the other hand, losing items is a very real possibility in
SharedState. Even though when a node broadcasts an item it is received by all of
its neighbors, there is a possibility that none of the neighbors will keep the item for
the next round. Conversely, broadcasting an item to several neighbors can result
in the item being replicated more quickly that in the shuffle. As a result, we see
more dramatic variations in the number of replicas for the SharedState protocol
as opposed to the shuffle. We speculate that the fluctuating behavior with regards
to replication of SharedState affects the discovery rate at the test nodes in the
Figure 6.6.b) resulting in the larger standard deviation observed. Nevertheless,
we can conclude that SharedState does retain the main properties of the shuffle
protocol.
6.7. DENSITY AWARENESS
An important characteristic of wireless networks is that neighborhoods are
defined by the proximity between nodes. If a given area is densely populated, one
node’s broadcast will be overheard by a large number of nodes. On the flipside, if
the area is sparsely populated, the broadcast will be received just by a few nodes
in the sender’s range.
The protocol introduced in Section 6.4 does not take density information into
account. Nodes blindly broadcast update messages every round, regardless of
whether their neighbors would be able to handle the traffic or not. While this
may not be a problem in sparse networks, in densely populated areas excessive
communication could be detrimental due to collisions. It should also be noted that
the size of the input buffer limits the number of updates that a node can effectively
make use of in one round. Once a node’s input buffer is full, the subsequent
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updates have no effect on the outcome. With this in mind, we propose a slight
modification of the original SharedState protocol to optimize the use of bandwidth
by reducing the amount of ineffective communication.
The key to reducing the number of ineffective broadcasts is identifying when
a node becomes “overloaded” by transmissions from its neighbors. If that is the
case, the node cannot derive any benefit from receiving more broadcasts. It would
be desirable, then, to decrease the chances that its neighbors send more broadcasts
in the remainder of the round. This can be accomplished if nodes inform their
neighbors of their “overload level,” defined as the fraction of ineffective broadcasts
received in one round. Nodes can use the overload levels of their neighbors to
decide if they should broadcast in the next round or not.
We say that a node is overloaded if its input buffer is already full when it
receives a broadcast. Since several broadcasts are often received in one round,
each node can calculate its own overload level by keeping track of the number
of broadcasts received in a round and of how many of those were received when
the input buffer was already full. Let Ri(x) represent the sources of broadcasts
received by node x during round i and let Ui(x) represent the number of ineffective
broadcasts. The calculation of the overload level is based on the observations
made during the previous round and takes place in the active thread, once per
round, in the following way:
Oi(x) =
Ui−1(x)
|Ri−1(x)|
Ideally, a node’s overload level should be close to 0, indicating that the node
rarely receives ineffective broadcasts. However, the node itself does not have
direct control over its own overload level. The local overload level is determined
by the behavior of the node’s neighbors. For this reason, we propose an improved
version of the protocol where nodes are required to append their own overload
level when broadcasting a message. Each node can then accumulate these reported
overload levels to get a sense of the overall overload level in its neighborhood.
With this information, each node can determine if it should skip a broadcast based
on whether the broadcast would benefit its neighbors or not. Let ProbSkipi(x)
be the probability used by node x to decide whether to skip a broadcast or not at
round i. ProbSkip is calculated in the active thread as follows:
ProbSkipi(x) =
[
∑
y∈Ri−1(x)
Oi−1(y)
]
+ Oi(x)
|Ri−1(x)|+ 1
The probability of skipping a broadcast, ProbSkip, is an estimate of the over-
load level in node x’s neighborhood calculated based on the overload levels re-
ported by x’s neighbors (y) that communicated in the previous round and x’s own
122 BROADCAST-BASED EPIDEMICS CHAP. 6
overload level. It is important to note that this estimate may not always be very
precise. The reason for this is that if a node decides not to broadcast, its neighbors
will not be updated on the node’s overload level. Therefore, the calculation of
the overload level in the neighborhood is done with only partial information. The
inclusion of the node’s own overload level helps make up for the missing reports
of some neighbors. In any case, as will be shown later on, an estimate - even if it
is not very precise - is good enough to result in considerable resource savings.
Before moving on, it should be noted that since each node can calculate
its overload level locally, an alternative optimization could be proposed where
ProbSkip is simply calculated based on the local overload level (under the assump-
tion that it accurately reflects the overload levels in the neighborhood). While this
strategy would work in homogeneous topologies where nodes have roughly the
same number of neighbors, it does not perform as well in more complex scenar-
ios. For example, take a situation where a node is surrounded by obstacles and as a
result only has one neighbor. The neighbor, however, is surrounded by many other
nodes and is often overloaded. In this case, the first node will never be overloaded
and will always broadcast, contributing to the overload of its only neighbor. The
second node, meanwhile, experiences higher overload levels, meaning that it will
skip some rounds. The results are detrimental to both nodes: the first receives
broadcasts only sporadically, as its only neighbor tends to skip broadcasts, while
the second node becomes even more overloaded. Under the scheme that we pro-
posed earlier, the first node would be aware that its neighbor is often overloaded
and would skip some rounds to relieve its neighbor’s load. At the same time,
the second node measures less overload in its neighborhood and would tend to
broadcast more often, benefitting the first node. Through experimentation, we ob-
served that the method proposed earlier performs better overall. We compare its
performance against the original SharedState in the remainder of the chapter.
6.8. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the effectiveness of the SharedState system by observing i) the
discovery rate of items (as defined in Section 6.5) and ii) the number of broad-
casts generated. Section 6.7 introduced a modified version of the original algo-
rithm aimed at reducing resource consumption by letting nodes skip broadcasts
according to the overload levels in their neighborhoods. In order to quantify the
improvements introduced by the modified algorithm, we gathered statistics (over
a test interval of 50 rounds) on: a) Broadcasts sent in the whole network per round
and b) Broadcasts received by a node per round. These statistics give us some in-
sight into the usage of the communication medium and the workload of the nodes,
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both of which we aim to reduce.
We tested our storage system by implementing it as a TinyOS application and
using TOSSIM to run experiments under different scenarios. In order to observe
the effect of varying node densities in the performance of the protocol, various
topologies with different node densities were used. The topologies were gener-
ated with the LinkLayerModel tool that comes bundled with TinyOS. This tool
generates network topologies using a theoretical propagation model that takes pa-
rameters to describe the channel (which affects how the signal propagates), the ra-
dio (which determines link asymmetry due to noise) and the topology (how nodes
are physically positioned). Based on these parameters, the tool generates the link
gain and the noise between any pair of nodes in the network. The TOSSIM ra-
dio model is signal-strength based and takes these link gain and noise values to
determine the connectivity of the network. Within a 100×100 meter terrain, we
explored the following simulation scenarios:
Uniform Node Distribution For the “uniform” setting, the physical terrain is
divided into a number of cells (based on the number of nodes) and a node is
randomly placed within each cell. Since the tool requires that the number of
nodes be a square, we generated topologies with the following numbers of nodes:
100,144,196, ...900, or (10+ 2n)2 for n = 0...10.
“Center of attraction” Distribution This scenario emulates a more realistic
situation where nodes gather around a point of interest. We crafted a topology
with 576 nodes where the highest concentration of nodes occurs at the center
of the terrain (50,50). The position of the nodes was determined by selecting a
random angle between 0 and 360 degrees and a distance from the center according
to a normal distribution (with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 30; we use
the absolute value). The minimum distance between nodes was set to 1 meter.
Besides the distribution of nodes, system-wide parameters and the role of
nodes had to be defined. For all experiments, the following settings were used:
• Of all nodes in the network, 80 nodes were chosen at random to be pub-
lishers. These 80 nodes produce 80 items that are disseminated through the
network.
• 20 nodes selected at random are chosen as “test nodes.” These nodes mea-
sure their discovery rates and numbers of broadcasts sent and received.
• For all nodes, the cache and the input buffer can hold only 8 entries. The
output buffer can hold 4 entries.
• All nodes execute the active thread once per second.
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Figure 6.8: Discovery rate over time for networks of different sizes: a) sparse
topologies, b) dense topologies.
6.9. UNIFORM NODE DISTRIBUTION
In this section, we will focus on the behavior of the system when the collection
of participating nodes is spread uniformly over an area of 100×100 meters.
6.9.1. Discovery Rate and Node Density
Figure 6.8 shows the discovery rate measured over time for the different topolo-
gies, starting from a sparse 100-node network and increasing in density up to
900 nodes in the same 100×100 meter terrain. For clarity, we present the sparse
topologies (from 100 nodes to 400 nodes) on left and the dense topologies (484
nodes to 900 nodes) on the right. Notice how the increase in density leads to
higher discovery rates, most notably for the sparse topologies in Figure 6.8.a). It
can be clearly observed that for a sparse network of 100 nodes the discovery rate
after 50 rounds is quite low (about 11%) and does not improve substantially over
time. This is due to the low connectivity between nodes. With only 100 nodes
in the 100×100 meter terrain, the network is too sparse. However, even a slight
increase in density (144 nodes) already yields much better results.
To better understand the discovery rate results, it is necessary to have more
insight into the connectivity of the different topologies. Figure 6.9 shows the
average number of transmissions received by a node in one round for the differ-
ent topologies used in Figure 6.8. A linear relationship between the number of
nodes in the network and the number of received transmissions can be distinctly
observed. Taking a closer look at Figure 6.9, we can see why the discovery rate
for the 100-node network was so low. With an average number of receptions per
node of 1.6, it is not uncommon for nodes to be unreachable or for the network to
become partitioned at times. Due to the nodes being sparsely located, the LinkLay-
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Figure 6.9: Average number of broadcasts received per node for networks of dif-
ferent sizes.
erModel tool generates a topology where the link gain between neighboring nodes
is low. As a result, links in the 100-node network are weak and nodes may not
always receive messages from their neighbors. At the other end of the spectrum,
we have the 900-node network with an average of 19.23 transmissions received
per node in one round, indicating stronger links between neighbors.
The linear increase in receptions with the number of nodes does not translate
to a linear increase in performance (measured by the discovery rate), as shown in
Figure 6.8. After a considerable improvement in discovery rate when going from
the sparse 100-node network to the more populated 144, 196 and 256-node net-
works, further increases in density fail to have a substantial effect in the discovery
rate (as shown in Figure 6.8.b)). The reason for this can be traced back to the
limited size of the input buffer. With the input buffer being twice the size of the
output buffer for our experiments, the first transmission received fills up half of
the input buffer. The subsequent transmissions gradually fill up the rest. Since the
input buffer becomes full after receiving a few transmissions, the higher number
of transmissions received in the denser topologies do not provide much additional
benefit.
We can model the way the input buffer fills up under the assumptions that: a)
each entry received is selected randomly from the collection of d different items in
the network, b) each transmission from a neighbor consists of s randomly selected
entries and c) the input buffer is infinite. Let nk represent the number of entries in
the input buffer after k transmissions.
For k = 1, all entries are kept, resulting in n1 = s. For the second transmission,
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Figure 6.10: Number of entries in the input buffer after receiving k transmissions
(s = 4,d = 80).
some of the s received entries might already exist in the input buffer. Therefore,
n2 increases only by s ·
(
1− n1d
)
entries, where n1d is the probability that an entry is
already in the input buffer. Likewise, n3 increases by s ·
(
1− n2d
)
entries over n2.
A general expression for nk can be derived in terms of s, d and nk−1:
nk = nk−1 + s ·
(
1− nk−1d
)
,n0 = 0
The second term of the equation represents the increase in entries for each
additional transmission. Since the probability of receiving an entry that is already
in the input buffer, nk−1d , increases as the input buffer accumulates more entries,
the second term becomes smaller with every new transmission.
Using the same parameters as our TOSSIM simulations (number of items
d = 80 and output buffer size s = 4), nk is plotted in Figure 6.10. The graph
illustrates how later transmissions have less impact on filling up the input buffer
by comparing nk with a curve depicting a linear increase in number of entries with
each transmission received. We can also observe from this graph that, under this
model, our input buffer (which can hold only 8 entries) would be full by the third
transmission. This helps to explain why the 100-node network underperforms: the
input buffers are rarely used to their full capacity.
On the other hand, the 256-node network, where the average number of broad-
casts received is 4.8 with a standard deviation of 1.5, makes full use of the input
buffers and performs considerably better. Notice, however, how the experiments
with more than 256 nodes show slightly better discovery rates. We speculate that
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Figure 6.11: Comparing the original algorithm and the improved version in terms
of discovery rate for: a) 256 nodes and b) 784 nodes.
this is due to the fact that when nodes have more neighbors, the s entries broad-
cast by each node are more likely to be truly random selections from the d pos-
sible items in the network. For more sparse networks where nodes have only a
few neighbors, the entries at neighboring nodes are more likely to be correlated,
slowing down the discovery of new items.
6.9.2. Taking Advantage of Node Density
The SharedState protocol works as expected, but suffers from a common problem
in wireless networks: unnecessary transmissions. Section 6.7 introduced a mod-
ified version of the protocol aimed at optimizing the use of bandwidth by taking
node density into account. Knowing that the input buffers have a limited capacity,
it is evident that at some point additional transmissions are not effective anymore
and resources are wasted on them. In this section, we show that our modified algo-
rithm can reduce the waste of resources while still delivering good performance.
We start by comparing the discovery rate over time for the original algorithm
and the density-aware version. Figure 6.11 shows the results for two selected
topologies: a sparse (256 nodes) and a dense (784 nodes) one. The performance
is virtually the same in the sparse topology. For the dense topology, the discovery
rate is slower during the initial phase of the experiment. Nevertheless, it recovers
and matches the original algorithm in the later stage of the experiment.
Given that performance has not been compromised by the changes introduced
to the original algorithm, we proceed to study the effect the changes have on the
workload of the network. First, we measure the average number of broadcasts
received per node during one round and compare the results to the original ones.
Figure 6.12 presents the new measurements alongside the results shown in Fig-
ure 6.9, clearly showing the reduction in the number of broadcasts received per
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Figure 6.12: Average number of broadcasts received per node for networks of
different sizes.
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Figure 6.13: Number of broadcasts sent per round for networks of different sizes.
node. As a result, the nodes have fewer transmissions to handle in each round.
This is not surprising, given that in the density-aware version of the algorithm
nodes refrain from broadcasting based on the overload levels measured in their
neighborhoods. It can be expected, then, that nodes in denser topologies would
experience higher overload levels and, therefore be more likely to skip broadcasts.
Figure 6.13 showcases the reduction in the number of broadcasts sent per
round in the whole network. Figure 6.13.a) highlights the impact of density in
the decrease of broadcasts being sent. As the topologies become more dense, and
the number of neighbors per node increases, nodes are more likely to be over-
loaded increasing the probability of broadcasts being skipped. The companion
table to the right gives a more detailed account of the reduction in broadcasts,
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Figure 6.14: Layout of a network of 576 nodes with a higher density centered at
(50, 50). Nodes with a higher ProbSkip appear in a darker tone.
with the column titled “Broadcast Ratio” referring to the ratio of the number of
broadcasts sent in one round using the density-aware protocol versus the number
of broadcasts using the original version. While the difference is minimal in the
sparse 100-node network, as the networks become more dense, it is clear that the
new algorithm allows the nodes to save transmissions by reducing the number of
ineffective broadcasts.
6.10. CENTER OF ATTRACTION
In this section, we observe the behavior of our system using a more realistic
node distribution where nodes (576 in total) are arranged around a central point.
While the uniform node distributions used previously may approximate the layout
of a sensor network (in a field, for example), we think that this scenario resembles
more closely a social event, such as an outdoor barbecue, where people gather
around a central location (a bonfire, for example). The physical distribution of the
nodes is shown in Figure 6.14.
We start by comparing the original algorithm and the modified version using
the new centralized topology. In terms of discovery rate, the results vary slightly
(see Figure 6.15), with the original version outperforming the modified version
in the initial rounds of the experiment. After that initial period, both versions
perform similarly, with the modified version gaining an edge over the original
protocol towards the end of the experiment.
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of discovery rate.
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Figure 6.17: Probability of skipping a round in relation to the distance from the
center.
Given that the density-aware version of the protocol behaves as expected, we
proceed to analyze the resource usage in the network. For this experiment, values
of ProbSkip for every node were collected over a 400-round run. The histogram
in Figure 6.16 shows the percentage of nodes using a value of ProbSkip that falls
within a certain range. It is clear that the graph is skewed towards high values of
ProbSkip, indicating that most nodes skip some rounds. In fact, a large majority
skips more that 50% of broadcasts. It should be noted, though, that a few nodes
(roughly 3%) do not skip any broadcasts. These are the nodes in the outer regions
of the terrain, which have only a few neighbors and need to take advantage of
every broadcast.
The relationship between the distance from the center and the probability of
skipping a round becomes evident in Figure 6.17. During a period of 50 rounds,
every node reported its ProbSkip and distance from the center. This graph plots
each pair (distance,ProbSkip) as one point and clearly shows a trend where nodes
closer to the center report lower values for ProbSkip.
6.11. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have demonstrated that it is possible to build an effec-
tive shared-storage solution based purely on probabilistic methods. Moreover, we
have shown that by taking into account only local neighborhood information the
use of resources, namely bandwidth and energy, can be drastically reduced with-
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out having a major impact on performance. We achieve this by allowing nodes to
regulate their output to prevent their neighbors from being overloaded, which in
turn benefits them by saving transmission costs. This results in resource savings
according to the density of the area, without the need to explicitly disseminate
topology information. We conclude that the combination of a probabilistic ap-
proach and local-only decision making is key to the scalability of systems such as
SharedState.
CHAPTER 7
Conclusions
In this dissertation, we studied the use of epidemic techniques for information dis-
semination in the context of a wireless environment. While pursuing our goal of
building protocols for wireless networks based on epidemic techniques and eval-
uating their properties, it became evident that modifying the steps of a protocol
to obtain the desired properties is not a trivial task. In this chapter, we elabo-
rate on the problems we encountered while trying to fine-tune our protocols to
achieve certain behavior and the lessons we learned along the way. We conclude
by outlining future research directions.
7.1. DISCUSSION
Epidemic techniques have successfully been applied in dynamic environments,
specifically peer-to-peer networks, triggering our interest in studying their behav-
ior in wireless networks. Wireless communication presents particular challenges
in comparison to a wired network caused by the fact that placement of nodes is a
determining factor for connectivity. Therefore, interactions within a neighborhood
are crucial for achieving the desired large-scale behavior. Given that epidemic pro-
tocols rely solely on local interactions (that is, the execution of the protocol can be
fully realized without contacting any nodes from outside the neighborhood), we
find them ideally suited for a wireless environment. In this section, we discuss the
challenges we have faced in the development of gossip-based protocols and what
these challenges taught us about the nature of gossiping.
7.1.1. Local Interactions vs. Large-scale Behavior
Gossip protocols achieve their goals through repeated execution of simple rou-
tines. As long as there are enough gossiping nodes to maintain the network con-
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Figure 7.1: Discovery rate for different rates of cache size c versus number of
items d: a) Shuffle and b) modified Shuffle.
nected, a network of gossiping nodes displays certain large-scale behavior. While
changes to the routines that describe the local interactions often result in changes
in the large-scale behavior, the mapping between changes in small-scale interac-
tions and their large-scale implications is not obvious. A small modification in
a routine may result in very noticeable changes in the emergent behavior of the
protocol when executed in a large network. For example, let’s take a look at the
shuffle protocol. Figure 7.1.a) shows the discovery rate for 900 nodes (c = 18)
arranged in a grid and three experiments where the number of different items
is d = 180,360 and 720, respectively. This figure was presented earlier in Sec-
tion 6.6. To show the impact of a small change in the large-scale behavior, Figure
7.1.b) reproduces the same set of experiments with a version of the shuffle, in
which the method selectItemsToKeep() has been modified slightly. Like
before, the first step is to remove repeated items (to avoid duplicates in the cache).
The difference is that now, if there is not enough space in the cache to store the
received entries, random entries from the cache are dropped. In the shuffle, a node
is allowed to drop only those entries that have already been sent to a neighbor.
This seemingly unimportant change has a big impact in the discovery rate, as can
be seen in Figure 7.1. Looking only at the local interactions is not enough to pre-
dict the effect a modification to the protocol may have in the large-scale behavior
of the network.
Not all changes to local interactions have a noticeable effect in the protocol’s
performance. Chapter 6 offers a good example of this. In Section 6.7, we propose
a modification to the original SharedState protocol such that nodes can decide to
skip broadcasts based on neighborhood information. The number of broadcasts
is reduced dramatically (in dense neighborhoods), yet performance is minimally
affected. In this case, the fact that large-scale behavior is barely affected works to
our advantage, as we have reduced the number of transmissions.
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To summarize, the fact that gossip-based protocols execute simple routines
does not necessarily mean that their large-scale behavior can be easily understood
or manipulated. The mapping between the local interactions and the resulting
large-scale behavior is not obvious. Throughout our work we have discovered that
minimal changes in a protocol can have unexpected consequences for its large-
scale behavior. For this reason, the modification of local interactions should be
accompanied by large-scale experiments to verify that the desired emergent prop-
erties are retained or changed as expected.
7.1.2. The parameter space for gossip-based protocols
What makes a protocol “gossip” has been the subject of some debate. The defini-
tion of gossip itself when applied to networking is somewhat fuzzy. The literature
provides several examples of protocols that define themselves as gossip, many of
which are vastly different. Some are broadcast-based while others adhere to peer-
to-peer interactions. Some execute periodically, while others are event-based. In
any case, a defining characteristic of gossip-based protocols is an element of ran-
domness in their routines.
We have explored two basic types of gossip protocols: one based on peer-to
peer interactions (the shuffle) and one based on broadcast communication (Shared-
State). While the style of communication (request/reply vs. broadcast) differs
between both protocols, they share many characteristics: periodic execution, lim-
ited storage space and fixed amount of data exchanged per round. With these
constraints, we have reduced the number of possible parameters to tune in our
protocols.
Identifying the parameters that affect system behavior is crucial, yet not trivial,
as protocols may be sensitive to changes in some parameters more than others.
Let’s look, for example, at the size of the local storage space (i.e., the cache).
While our protocols benefit from having a larger cache, we can intuitively predict
that at some point we would stop seeing the benefit of increasing the cache size.
Once the cache size surpasses the number of different items being propagated, it
is of no use to have a larger cache (as the cache can now store all available items).
The effects of tuning a parameter cannot always be easily predicted. Chapter 3
provides a good example of a parameter which, when adjusted, has a counterin-
tuitive effect on performance. We are referring to the exchange buffer s in the
shuffle protocol. At first, we presumed that increasing the size of the exchange
buffer would always improve performance. This is true for small sizes of the ex-
change buffer (in relation to the size of the cache). However, at some point further
increases in the size of the exchange buffer fail to yield better performance. In
fact, to our surprise, larger sizes of s are counterproductive for the dissemination.
We find that, even when dealing with a reduced parameter space, the setting
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of the parameters still remains an open question. Not only is the effect of a given
parameter setting not easily predictable, there may be non-obvious dependencies
between parameters. For the case of the shuffle protocol, we have discovered
through probabilistic analysis that the exchange buffer has an optimal value, which
depends on other system parameters. Probabilistic analysis has proven to be ex-
tremely helpful and enlightening for the understanding of parameter relationships
for the shuffle protocol and, we surmise, that taking a similar approach for other
gossip-based protocols could be fruitful.
7.1.3. Determinism and Probabilistic Protocols
Gossip protocols are characterized by having a component of randomness in their
behavior. Be it in the selection of a peer to gossip with or in the handling of the
information being gossiped, randomness plays an integral role in gossiping. How-
ever, pure random behavior tends to be wasteful, as it fails to take advantage of
opportunities to achieve the goal at hand. What we have observed is that through a
controlled use of randomness the beneficial properties of random behavior can be
preserved, while performance is improved. In other words, it is important to take
the time to pinpoint the appropriate places where randomness can be beneficial.
Although the protocols for information dissemination we consider are simple,
there are several points at which decisions have to be taken. To rely on random-
ness at every step of the decision-making process would produce less than optimal
results. Figure 7.1, presented earlier, gives a clear example of the negative effect
of applying randomness in a thoughtless manner. The graphs illustrate how the
extra care in selecting which items to keep in the shuffle protocol pays off signif-
icantly in terms of performance. In contrast, the modified version of the shuffle,
which randomly drops items from the cache to make space for the items received,
performs poorly. We should stress that the superior performance of the shuffle is
not derived from increased complexity in the algorithm. In fact, the shuffle still
uses randomness to select which items to drop. The only difference is that the
items are randomly selected from a subset of the items in the cache, namely the
ones that were selected to be sent to the gossiping neighbor.
Throughout the work presented in this dissertation, we have strived to find
the balance between retaining the random component of gossiping and improving
performance. For example, in the SharedState protocol, we introduced the input
buffer to collect incoming items during one round before updating the cache. Early
on, we tried updating the cache directly obtaining much poorer results. Having the
input buffer in place gives us more control, as having more complete knowledge
of the messages received in the previous round allows us to make better decisions
when updating the cache. This comes at the cost of using extra storage space for
the input buffer.
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We find that introducing ways to impose control over the random behavior
of the network can allow us to improve performance, yet often times there is a
tradeoff. Chapters 4 and 5 help to illustrate this point. As described in Chap-
ter 5, we can reduce the amount of spam in a gossiping network more effectively
if we keep track of the amount of spam sent by each neighbor individually. While
this is an improvement over checking a fixed amount of the incoming traffic (see
Chapter 4), the need to maintain historic information about the behavior of neigh-
bors in order to dynamically adjust the probability of executing checks opens the
door for malicious nodes to try elaborate strategies to continue spamming with-
out raising suspicion. For instance, they may choose irregular spamming patterns
or constantly change neighborhoods. What we observe is that our attempt to im-
prove performance (decrease spam) by exerting more control over the traffic in the
neighborhood comes with the tradeoff of our solution being more fragile. That is,
malicious nodes, knowing our anti-spam strategy, may find ways to get around it.
On the other hand, the strategy of indiscriminately checking a certain portion of
the messages (Chapter 4), while inefficient when there are no spammers, would
have a guaranteed level of success.
7.2. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the preceding discussion, we give a summary of the conclusions
derived from the work presented in this dissertation:
• When designing gossip-based protocols, the design choices are not obvious
since there is no clear mapping between the local interactions (described by
the protocol) and the behavior of the protocol observed at a large scale.
• By restricting our protocols to a particular framework, we have reduced the
parameter space. Nevertheless, how to set the remaining parameters is still
a challenge since the effect of parameter setting is not easily predictable.
• While random behavior is a key ingredient of gossip protocols, it is impor-
tant to identify how and when to best apply it.
While we realize that these conclusions seem to suggest that the design of
gossip protocols does not follow any strict methodology, we would like to outline
the strategies that can be followed in the design of gossip protocols:
The incremental design (trial-and-error) approach - This strategy requires the
evaluation of the performance of the protocol whenever changes are intro-
duced to determine if the changes are an improvement. The same strategy
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can be applied for finding the appropriate parameters for the protocol. That
is, an extensive exploration of the parameter space is required to find good
settings for the parameters.
The modelling approach - Modelling of the local interactions (as done for the
Shuffle protocol in Chapter 3) requires a deep understanding of the me-
chanics of the protocol and, as a result, can help identify ways to improve
the protocol. More importantly, modelling can clarify the relationship be-
tween local interactions and large-scale behavior and even help reduce the
parameter space (by uncovering relationships between parameters).
We find that a good approach to developing gossip-based protocols falls some-
where between these two strategies. While modelling forces us to understand,
evaluate and even reconsider certain design decisions, we are still required to look
at the large-scale behavior of the protocol because that is where emergent behavior
manifests itself. Standard modelling techniques, such as the use of model check-
ers, fail to help us when considering large networks, as they do not scale well.
Traditional models of epidemics concentrate on characterizing the speed of infec-
tion, often using very simple gossip protocols or abstracting away the details of
more complex protocols. While providing useful insight into the generic behavior
of epidemics, these models are not detailed enough to capture subtle changes that
we may introduce in our protocols.
In order to serve as tools for the understanding and development of gossip
protocols, the models we develop should: a) capture the interactions between gos-
siping nodes at a level of abstraction that can allow us to evaluate the effect of
system parameters on the behavior of the protocol and b) be able to handle large
networks, in order to observe the emergent behavior of the protocol.
7.3. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this section, we outline possible research directions based on the work pre-
sented in this dissertation.
7.3.1. Further exploration of the parameter space
The constraints we have defined for our gossip-based protocols (i.e., periodic ex-
ecution, limited storage space and fixed amount of data sent per round) have al-
lowed us to concentrate on a limited set of parameters and their influence on the
characteristics of the data dissemination through the network. It follows that upon
the removal or modification of these constraints we would be faced with a richer
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parameter space. Moreover, customizing our protocols with specific applications
in mind will undoubtedly introduce new parameters.
The expansion of the parameter space calls for a reevaluation of the perfor-
mance of our protocols, with an emphasis on discovering how the new parameters
may impact the behavior we have come to expect from our protocols.
7.3.2. Incremental Design of Gossip Protocols aided by Models
We have shown that we can model a gossip exchange between two nodes and use
this model to reproduce the dissemination of an item through the network and ob-
serve its properties. The development of the model gave us valuable insight into
the mechanics of gossiping and let us see the relationship between system param-
eters. This, in turn, allowed us to determine the optimal value for a parameter (the
exchange buffer s) as a function of the other system parameters.
In the case of the shuffle protocol, the theoretical analysis came after the pro-
tocol had been developed and its behavior studied through simulations. While
developing the analytical model for the shuffle protocol, it became clear to us that
modelling the local node interactions could help us understand the large-scale be-
havior we observed in earlier experiments. For this reason, a logical next step
for our research could be to incorporate this theoretical analysis into the design
phase of future gossip protocols. The aim of this design approach would be to use
modelling to validate the inclusion of new policies into a protocol. In other words,
we would start with a simple gossip-based protocol (and its model) and refine its
behavior through the inclusion of policies (that should also be modelled). Policies
would then be incorporated into the final version of the protocol depending on
whether the model suggests that their large-scale behavior would be desirable.
7.3.3. Focus on Applications
The protocols we have presented are essentially application independent low-level
services for information dissemination. By studying the properties of these pro-
tocols, unencumbered by application-specific optimizations, we have established
a baseline of performance and expected behavior. We foresee that tailoring our
protocols for particular application scenarios can only improve their performance.
Being probabilistic protocols, our gossip-based protocols are best suited for
non-critical applications, where delays or occasional loss of messages can be tol-
erated. In that category, we find a variety of monitoring applications, notification
services and asset management. Our current work in the area of ambient assisted
living is intended to enhance elderly care by monitoring patients in non-intrusive
ways using embedded technology [ALwEN 2008]. In this context, gossip pro-
tocols are used for robust communication within a network of sensor nodes and
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monitoring nodes.
7.3.4. Field Experiments
Even though not included in this dissertation, we have conducted practical exper-
iments with real wireless gossiping nodes to validate some of our observations
from simulations [Mandemaker 2008]. To be more specific, we deployed net-
works of up to 100 nodes executing a simplified version of the SharedState proto-
col. Being our first experience with a real deployment, we used these experiments
to measure the connectivity of the network and the coverage achieved by a newly-
published data item. We observed that the pattern of dissemination of a new item
shows similar characteristics to the dissemination observed in simulations.
The main challenges we faced with our field experiments were related to the
connectivity of the network and the collection of performance data. Unlike simu-
lations, where we are able to define which nodes can communicate, real deploy-
ments use unreliable radio links to connect the nodes. As a result, we only had
a vague idea of our topology as we deployed the network. Case in point, while
we arranged our nodes in a grid, the number of neighbors that each node received
messages from varied greatly from node to node, with some nodes having more
than eight neighbors while others had less than one on average. The reasons for
this variance are hard to pinpoint. The condition of the ground the nodes were laid
on (grass, in this case) or the quality of the air (very humid, most days) may be
factors. External interference, such as cell phone usage or intruders (people and
even cats) wandering through our deployment certainly affected connectivity. In
any case, instead of being discouraging, the experiments have solidified our con-
viction that wireless networks are far from reliable or predictable and that gossip-
ing as a communication paradigm provides the robustness necessary to overcome
these issues. After the experiments finished, the time-consuming task of gathering
the nodes and reading out the data from memory began. Due to the large number
of nodes, having a wired backbone for data collection was not an option and since
we did not want to disturb the experiment by having additional wireless commu-
nication, we opted for logging data in local memory (EEPROM) and manually
recovering the data after the conclusion of the experiment.
Next steps in practical experimentation with nodes include gathering informa-
tion about the connectivity of the network and deploying simple applications to
run on top of our gossip protocols. We realize that most of our simulations use
unrealistic topologies. For this reason, we are interested in collecting data about
node connectivity in real deployments (e.g., asymmetric links, number of neigh-
bors). We expect to use this information to generate more realistic simulations
of our protocols and compare the results with actual performance measurements
from a deployment. Regarding applications, the ongoing ALwEN project [AL-
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wEN 2008] focuses on practical uses of embedded technology for assisted living.
As part of this project, a number of simple monitoring applications running on top
of a gossiping network are being developed.
SAMENVATTING
Epidemische
Informatiedisseminatie in
Grootschalige Draadloze
Netwerken
Het voortschrijden van de technologie heeft het de afgelopen jaren de grootte en
kosten van computers dramatisch doen afnemen, waardoor ze nu alomtegenwoor-
dig zijn in de thuisomgeving en op kantoor. Bovendien heeft de voortdurende
miniaturisatie van verwerkingseenheden geleid tot ingebedde systemen, die net
zo krachtig zijn als personal computers van een aantal jaar geleden. Deze com-
putersystemen voor specifieke doeleinden treft men nu overal aan, van mobiele
telefoons tot keukenapparaten, en het is niet onredelijk om aan te nemen dat hun
aantal de komende jaren zal stijgen.
Terwijl personal computers vaak met elkaar verbonden worden door middel
van een vaste bedrade infrastructuur, gebruiken kleine rekenapparaten normaliter
de ether als verbinding naar zo’n infrastructuur. Deze apparaten werken als een
draadloze extensie van het bedrade netwerk. Om deze draadloze apparaten hun
eigen autonome draadloze netwerk te laten vormen, zonder te bouwen op de di-
ensten die de infrastructuur biedt, moeten vele problemen opgelost worden. In
deze dissertatie heb ik me gericht op hoe men effectief en efficie¨nt informatie kan
verspreiden in volledig draadloze netwerken.
De karakteristieken van het draadloze medium (beperkt bereik van de radio’s,
onbetrouwbare communicatie, dynamische topologiee¨n) maken het gebruik van
gecentraliseerde oplossingen doorgaans complex, tenzij men zich beperkt tot re-
latief kleine systemen. Hoewel gecentraliseerde oplossingen goed zouden kunnen
werken op kleine schaal (zoals voor een groep gebruikers met laptops in een cafe´)
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mag verwacht worden dat de wijdverspreidheid van draadloze ingebedde syste-
men kan leiden tot grootschalige draadloze netwerken met duizenden knopen.
Voor deze netwerken is gecentraliseerd beheer allesbehalve triviaal. Grootschalige
draadloze netwerken vereisen algoritmen die volledig gedistribueerd zijn, zich
aanpassen aan veranderende omstandigheden, bestand zijn tegen het falen van
individuele elementen en gebaseerd zijn op lokale interacties tussen elementen.
Epidemische (of roddel) protocollen voldoen aan deze eisen.
De termen roddel en epidemisch worden over het algemeen door elkaar ge-
bruikt. Formeel zijn roddelprotocollen een subgroep van epidemische protocollen.
Analoog aan de verspreiding van geruchten in het echte leven geeft de term rod-
del aan dat een gerucht wordt verspreid wanneer entiteiten interacteren. Deze
interactie gebeurt willekeurig en iedere keer dat het gerucht doorgegeven wordt
zal de ontvangende entiteit het met een bepaalde waarschijnlijkheid weer verder
verspreiden. Dit heeft als resultaat dat het gerucht snel verspreid wordt, maar zon-
der harde garanties dat het alle entiteiten zal bereiken. In de informatica refereert
een roddelprotocol over het algemeen aan een protocol met de volgende karakter-
istieken: willekeurige selectie van entiteiten om mee te interacteren, periodieke
uitvoering en symmetrie (waarmee bedoeld wordt dat alle knopen hetzelfde algo-
ritme uitvoeren).
We hebben twee basale typen van roddelprotocollen verkend: e´e´n gebaseerd
op peer-to-peer interactie (genaamd het Shuffle type) en e´e´n gebaseerd op broad-
cast communicatie (genaamd het SharedState type). Hoewel de stijl van commu-
nicatie (verzoek/antwoord vs. stuur-naar-allen) verschilt tussen beide protocollen
delen zij vele karakteristieken: periodieke uitvoering, beperkte opslagcapaciteit en
de uitwisseling van een vaste hoeveelheid data. Voor beide protocollen hebben wij
een uitgebreide studie uitgevoerd naar de karakteristieken van de informatiever-
spreiding in grootschalige netwerken en hoe deze karakteristieken beı¨nvloed wor-
den door verschillende parameterwaarden en ontwerpkeuzes. Na uitgebreide sim-
ulaties en analyses van de resultaten kunnen we de hieruit getrokken lessen als
volgt samenvatten:
• Een netwerk van roddelende knopen vertoont na het herhaaldelijk uitvoeren
van de roddelroutines een bepaald globaal gedrag. Hoewel veranderingen
in de routines die de lokale interactie tussen knopen beschrijven vaak resul-
teren in veranderingen in het globale gedrag van het netwerk is de afbeeld-
ing van de lokale veranderingen naar hun globale implicaties niet voor de
hand liggend.
• Het identificeren van de parameters die het systeemgedrag beı¨nvloeden is
cruciaal, maar niet triviaal, omdat protocollen gevoeliger kunnen zijn voor
veranderingen in bepaalde parameters dan in andere. Door onze proto-
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collen te beperken tot een bepaald raamwerk hebben wij de parameterruimte
beperkt. Maar zelfs met een gereduceerde parameterruimte is onze bevind-
ing dat de keuze van de parameters nog steeds een open vraag blijft. Niet
alleen is het effect van een gegeven parameterkeuze niet gemakkelijk te
voorspellen, er kunnen ook niet voor de hand liggende afhankelijkheden
bestaan tussen parameters.
• Alhoewel willekeur een cruciaal bestanddeel is van roddelprotollen is het
belangrijk om te identificeren hoe en wanneer probabilistische keuzes het
beste toegepast kan worden. In ons werk hebben we ernaar gestreefd om
de balans te vinden tussen het behoud van willekeur bij roddelen en het
verbeteren van de prestaties. Al zijn de protocollen voor informatiedissem-
inatie die wij beschouwen simpel, toch zijn er verscheidene punten waarop
er beslissingen moeten worden genomen. Het gebruik van willekeur in elke
stap van het beslissingsproces zou tot minder dan optimale resultaten leiden.
Op basis van deze observaties concluderen we dat hoewel roddelprotocollen
heel eenvoudig te implementeren kunnen zijn, het bereiken van het gewenste
globale gedrag is verre van simpel. Om de mechanismen van roddel waarlijk
te begrijpen hebben we twee benaderingen gevolgd: (a) we hebben een varie¨teit
aan parameter- en ontwerpkeuzes verkend, en (b) de interactie tussen roddelende
knopen gemodelleerd. De eerste benadering hield in dat wij de prestaties van
het protocol moesten evalueren wanneer er wijzigingen gemaakt werden om te
bepalen of deze wijzigingen tot een verbetering leiden. De tweede benadering
dwong ons om roddelinteracties op een dieper niveau te begrijpen, en om bepaalde
ontwerpbeslissingen te evalueren en zelfs te herzien. Een combinatie van beide
benaderingen is cruciaal om te begrijpen hoe roddelprotocollen te ontwerpen en
af te stellen zodat het gewenste globale gedrag bereikt wordt.
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